This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P, EUR/SE, AND PM/LEGAL (CMDR MITCHELL); OSD FOR 
ISP CAPT. WILKINS; JCS FOR J3, J5 AND CJCS DEPUTY LEGAL 
COUNSEL CMDR BOOCK; EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5, POLAD AND LEGAL; 
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD; TREASURY FOR LOEVINGER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ EFIN
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MOU NEGOTIATING TEAM NEEDS TO BE READY START 
TALKS IN ANKARA ON FEB 3 
 
REF: A) ANKARA 788 (NODIS) B) ANKARA 673 
 
 
(u) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson.  Reasons: 
1.5 (B and D) 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  See para 2. 
 
 
---------------------- 
SUMMARY/ACTION REQUEST 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Agreement with Turkey on a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on US activities related to a possible Iraq operation 
may be the long pole in the tent of our struggle to secure 
full Turkish cooperation.  Both TGS and the MFA say an MOU is 
a prerequisite for seeking parliamentary approval for site 
preparations and inflow of forces.  The Turks will make this 
negotiation only as urgently as we do.  They have said they 
will mirror our team in composition and level.  Embassy 
therefore strongly recommends that Washington dispatch an 
Assistant Secretary-led team to Ankara to begin negotiations 
with the Turks.  MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin told the Ambassador 
during his January 30 meeting with the PM (ref a) that the 
GOT intended to provide the USG its version of the MOU on 
February 3.  TGS Deputy J5 for Agreements Maj. Gen. Acar 
subsequently told ODC January 31 that the PM had approved 
Turkey's draft MOU and the PM had authorized GOT officials to 
begin negotiations with the US on Monday, February 3. 
Therefore, our team needs to be ready to negotiate here in 
Ankara by Monday morning.  The USG team should be authorized 
maximum flexibility on the key issues (i.e. jurisdiction and 
liability), and prepared to remain in Ankara as long as it 
takes to reach an agreement with the GOT.  We also ask that 
the Department provide us via front-channel the official US 
delegation list, including the head of delegation.  End 
summary/action request. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
MOU STATE OF PLAY:  TURKS READY TO NEGOTIATE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) During the Ambassador's January 30 meeting with Prime 
Minister Gul (ref a), MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin said the MFA hoped 
to be able to "finalize" its review of the MOU on January 31 
and be prepared to present its inter-agency approved views on 
the MOU to the USG on February 3.  TGS Deputy J5 for 
Agreements Maj. Gen. Acar subsequently told the Office of 
Defense Cooperation (ODC) Turkey that the Prime Minister had 
approved Turkey's proposed MOU and the PM authorized the GOT 
to begin negotiations with the US on Monday, February 3. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FEB 3: USG NEGOTIATIONS TEAM NEEDS TO BE IN ANKARA 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
¶4. (C) We understand that Washington currently is considering 
having the negotiating team depart Washington Tuesday, 
February 4.  This is too late.  We need to begin face-to-face 
discussions with the GOT Monday, February 3.  If the team 
departs on February 4, negotiations will not commence until 
February 5 in the evening at the earliest.  Only two working 
days would remain before the weekend and the week-long local 
Turkish holiday beginning February 10.  To give the teams the 
time they may need to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement 
and put maximum pressure on the Turks, the US negotiating 
team needs to be prepared to begin face-to-face negotiations 
with the Turks on Monday, February 3. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
TEAM COMPOSITION, FLEXIBILITY AND AUTHORITY KEY TO SUCCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) Based on our experience negotiating with the Turks 
(including the recent negotiations over the site survey MOU 
negotiations), we strongly believe that the USG negotiating 
team needs to be headed at the Assistant Secretary level and 
contain the necessary supporting civilian and military 
technical experts to close the deal in-country.  The Mission 
does not possess the resources or the expertise to negotiate 
the MOU, and we believe that the USG delegation must be 
headed by a senior policy civilian from Washington in order 
to achieve success.  From the Turkish perspective, the higher 
the level of the USG delegation chairperson, the more serious 
they perceive the USG is about the negotiations.  Deputy U/S 
Ilkin asked the Ambassador January 30 for the USG to provide 
an official delegation list ASAP, saying the Turks would put 
together a team of equal rank and composition.  An Assistant 
Secretary-level chairperson from State or DOD should be 
 
SIPDIS 
considered, but there is a risk to a DOD-lead: the Turks may 
counter with a delegation led by an individual from a similar 
but less influential organization (i.e. the Ministry of 
National Defense, whose responsibilities encompass defense 
procurement more than policy).  We understand the Turks 
intend to include discussions of financial compensation 
(including possibly the assistance package).  We believe the 
USG team needs to be instructed to deal with that question. 
We expect that such instruction would be to keep these issues 
on the existing separate tracks. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Given our experience in negotiating the site survey 
MOU, we believe that the team needs to come to Ankara with 
the maximum flexibility possible on the key issues of 
jurisdiction and financial liability/compensation in order to 
have a chance at concluding an mutually satisfactory 
agreement in a reasonable period. 
PEARSON