This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 000253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM; PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2013 
TAGS: PREF PREL EAID MOPS IZ JO OFDA
SUBJECT: JORDAN CHANGES HUMANITARIAN PLANNING TO ACCEPT 
IRAQI REFUGEES IN FIRST STAGE OF ANY CONFLICT 
 
REF: 02 STATE 262459 
 
Classified By: CDA Greg Berry per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary and comment:  The Prime Minister, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs and JAF Assistant Chief of Staff 
confirmed in separate meetings that, in the event of 
hostilities in Iraq, the GOJ would allow 10,000 to 20,000 
Iraqi refugees to enter Jordan on a "temporary basis."  JAF 
Assistant Chief of Staff reported the GOJ would set up four 
separate installations for processing of refugees and TCNs: 
a staging facility on the Iraqi/Jordanian border to screen 
refugees and TCNs; two camps with a capacity of 25,000 each 
at Ruweished, Jordan (H-4); and a camp at Nadayim airbase 
inside Iraq, to be established when events make that 
possible.  This is an important practical change from 
previous GOJ policy and contrasts with continuing public GOJ 
statements which insist that Jordanian borders will remain 
closed to all except third-country nationals in the event of 
hostilities.  (It is essential that we respect the 
Jordanians' requirement for confidentiality on this issue. 
It is highly sensitive in the Jordanian political context.) 
 
¶2.  (S) The GOJ and UNHCR are in the process of negotiating 
an MOU to delineate responsibilities but negotiations 
reportedly have snagged over the GOJ's financial requests. 
The GOJ has asked UNHCR for 51 million JD (approx USD 70 
million) to cover its costs, but UNHCR has told us it will 
cover only humanitarian assistance costs and not related 
development and infrastructure costs.  We will obtain a list 
of Jordan's estimated assistance costs from the Ministry of 
Planning and report via septel.  Given this apparent change 
in GOJ policy, it could be useful for members of the 
PRM/USAID Humanitarian Planning Team to travel to Jordan to 
brief senior GOJ officials on the planned USG humanitarian 
response and possible USG support to the international 
community's and GOJ's humanitarian assistance efforts.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
PM:  Iraqi Refugees to be Allowed Entry 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb informed the 
Ambassador January 8 that, in the event of hostilities in 
Iraq, the GOJ would allow Iraqi refugees to enter Jordan and 
would provide camps and some assistance inside the Jordanian 
border.  The PM also referred to a memorandum of 
understanding with UNHCR that would detail the arrangements 
for camps and first asylum procedures. 
 
¶4.  (S) The PM added that he was sending a team to Geneva to 
participate in UNHCR's January 12-13 planning meetings and to 
encourage donors to fund a substantial refugee assistance 
package for use by frontline states.  Planning should be for 
long-term camps and should include, inter alia, establishing 
schools for refugees on the assumption that camps would 
likely remain in place for six months to a year or more.  The 
PM asked for strong USG support for a sizable assistance 
package, noting that other donors would base their 
contributions on what the USG pledged.  He added that initial 
figures he had heard of USD 3 million in USG pledges would be 
insufficient for the needs of these camps.  The Ambassador 
assured the PM the USG would be helpful in the effort to 
ensure refugee camps were properly funded and supplied. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
JAF Confirms Policy; Planning for Two Camps Inside Jordan 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) In a January 12 meeting, Jordanian Armed Forces 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (and chief of the 
GOJ's crisis management center) General Mohamed Majid Al 
Eitan confirmed to DCM, Refcoord and Army Attache that the 
GOJ would allow 10,000 to 20,000 Iraqi refugees to enter 
Jordanian territory "in the first stages of a conflict."  Al 
Eitan reported that the GOJ was prepared to set up four 
separate refugee/TCN processing facilities and camps:  one on 
the Baghdad-Amman highway border crossing for initial 
screening of refugees and TCNs; two 75 km inside the 
Jordanian border near Ruweished (H-4), for care and 
processing of refugees and TCNs; and one at an Iraqi airbase 
in Nadayim, to be established only after Iraqi authority 
disintegrates.  (NOTE:  Ruweished, Jordan is also identified 
on maps as H-4.  The Iraqi airbase at Nadayim often is 
incorrectly identified on maps as Ruweished.  The Nadayim 
airbase is located in the "cut-out" that was traded from 
Jordan to Iraq several years ago in exchange for similarly 
sized Iraqi territory.) 
¶6.  (S) JAF planners have identified four separate groups of 
displaced persons likely to seek assistance in Jordan in the 
event of hostilities in Iraq.  First, foreign diplomats and 
Western nationals fleeing Iraq would be granted immediate 
entry to Jordan for repatriation through commercial flights 
from Amman's Queen Alia airport.  Second, TCN workers 
resident in Iraq (believed to number up to 100,000 mostly 
Egyptian and Sudanese nationals) would be screened and 
registered at a processing facility on the Baghdad-Amman 
highway border crossing, where they would be sent in waves to 
the two camps near Ruweished until they could be repatriated. 
 (IOM has separately confirmed to us its plans to repatriate 
TCNs with bus transport to Aqaba and then ship transport to 
Nuweibeh, Egypt.  IOM can handle processing of 2,000 TCNs per 
boatload.  IOM has contracted with appropriate transport 
companies, but warns that key bus companies could be occupied 
with Hajj pilgrims if hostilities begin before the end of the 
Hajj, o/a February 12-13.)  Third, the GOJ is prepared to 
accept an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Iraqi refugees "on 
humanitarian grounds," and only at the early stages of a 
conflict in Iraq.  Like TCNs, these initial Iraqi refugees 
would be screened at the staging facility on the 
Iraqi-Jordanian border and moved to the camps at Ruweished. 
However, General Al Eitan made clear the GOJ would not accept 
into Jordan "bad" Iraqis -- former members of the military or 
otherwise suspect Iraqis -- and would instead hold them at 
the screening center and possibly the stage two camp at 
Nadayim airbase.  Fourth, the GOJ believes the estimated up 
to 100,000 Palestinians resident in Iraq could seek to enter 
Jordan in the event of hostilities in Iraq.  Al Eitan 
confirmed that the GOJ would not allow Palestinians to enter 
Jordan, telling emboffs that Jordan "suffered a lot" from the 
1990-91 influx of Palestinians from the Gulf and is not 
prepared to accept a similar influx.  The GOJ therefore plans 
to hold the Palestinians at the screening center on the 
Iraqi-Jordanian border and would facilitate assistance to 
Palestinians only in that area.  Al Eitan added that the GOJ 
believes most Palestinians resident in Iraq are without any 
papers -- UNRWA registration or Iraqi travel documents. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
GOJ Requests USD 70 Million in Support 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) General Al Eitan confirmed that the GOJ is in the 
process of negotiating an MOU with UNHCR to delineate 
responsibilities and, most importantly from the GOJ's 
perspective, secure financial assistance for humanitarian 
assistance provided by the GOJ.  According to Al Eitan, the 
GOJ has estimated its humanitarian expenditures at 51 million 
JD (approx USD 70 million).  15 million JD (USD 21 million) 
are required to set up the staging ground at the 
Iraqi-Jordanian border, two camps inside Jordan at Ruweished, 
a later camp on the Iraqi side of the border, and a military 
headquarters in the field.  Al Eitan confirmed that the 51 
million JD covers anticipated military and civilian 
expenditures and said emboffs could obtain a detailed 
breakdown of anticipated GOJ costs from the Ministry of 
Planning.  (Comment:  From Al Eitan's brief description of 
the services the GOJ is prepared to provide, the GOJ appears 
to have thought through important logistical issues such as 
water (the JAF has requested six desalination units and 
accompanying water tankers) and health care (one JAF field 
hospital has been assigned for refugee assistance) and 
transport.  Yet the GOJ also appears to seek compensation for 
development projects such as water pipelines, sewerage 
systems and electricity grids.  Army Attache will obtain a 
more detailed list of JAF assistance plans, and USAID Mission 
Director and Refcoord will meet with the Minister of Planning 
January 13 to obtain the GOJ's detailed financial request.) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
UNHCR's Perspective:  Progress but Financial Hurdles Remain 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) In a one-on-one meeting following a January 9 donor 
briefing, UNHCR Representative Sten Bronee confirmed to 
refcoord that the GOJ had agreed to accept Iraqi refugees 
inside Jordanian borders.  In order to protect GOJ political 
equities, UNHCR has agreed that the camps at Ruweished will 
not be for "refugees" but will be for "displaced people" with 
the understanding that this group would include Iraqi 
refugees.  Bronee commented that the GOJ seems to have 
realized it could have a huge public relations disaster if it 
is caught unprepared with several thousand Iraqi asylum 
seekers on its border.  However, the GOJ also wants to make 
sure it has financial support from the international 
community, as it feels that it was "burned" by providing 
services without compensation during the 1990-1991 refugee 
crisis.  Bronee said the GOJ has asked the UN for guarantees 
that it will be reimbursed for all refugee-related expenses. 
 
¶9.  (S) Not surprisingly, UNHCR's MOU negotiations with the 
GOJ have snagged over GOJ financial requests.  Dismissing the 
GOJ's 51 million JD figures as "enough to build an Olympic 
city," Bronee said he needed a "reasonable and credible 
budget" before UNHCR could sign the MOU.  Bronee added that 
UNHCR will not pay for development projects, such as 
high-quality electrical infrastructure or permanent 
hospitals.  Bronee asked the USG to weigh in with the GOJ on 
the need to provide detailed, credible financial figures, 
hinting that perhaps bilateral donors might be prepared to 
finance development projects that the GOJ wanted to complete 
in conjunction with refugee assistance. 
 
¶10.  (S) Bronee did not report any of his discussions with 
the GOJ in the broader donor briefing.  Instead, he reported 
only that the UN is preparing to provide assistance to "large 
number of displaced people at the Iraqi-Jordanian border." 
While the UN "hopes" that the GOJ will be able to provide 
assistance, Bronee said that the GOJ "is not in a position to 
say so at this time."  Echoing comments made by Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs Shaher Bak, Bronee later told 
refcoord the GOJ is unlikely to change its public position 
"until the very last minute." 
 
----------------------------- 
UNHCR Prepositioning Complete 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) At the January 9 donor briefing, Bronee announced 
that with GOJ authorization, UNHCR had prepositioned non-food 
stocks (tents, plastic sheeting, kerosene heaters, cooking 
sets, blankets, etc) for 36,000 at a warehouse in Aqaba.  The 
stocks would be used to respond to refugee flows in/toward 
Jordan and/or Syria.  UNHCR also has secured 8600 square 
meters of additional warehouse space in Amman.  Bronee noted 
that overall UNHCR planning figures for the region have not 
changed:  600,000 refugees distributed among Iran, Turkey, 
Syria, Jordan and Kuwait.  Bronee made a strong pitch for 
funding, telling donors that of the USD 60 million required 
to preposition supplies and respond to initial refugee flows, 
UNHCR had received only USD 16 million -- 6 million from the 
UN's CERF and 10 million from UNHCR's emergency fund -- all 
of which must be paid back. 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment and Action Requests 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) The GOJ's apparent decision to allow Iraqi refugees 
to enter Jordan in the event of hostilities in Iraq 
represents an important practical change from previous GOJ 
policy and contrasts with continuing public GOJ statements 
which insist that GOJ borders will remain closed.  Given GOJ 
sensitivities on refugee questions (including its steadfast 
refusal to allow large number of West Bank Palestinians to 
enter Jordan), as well as its very real desire to limit the 
number of Iraqi asylum seekers in Jordan, we do not expect 
the GOJ's public posture to change "until the very last 
minute."  Nevertheless, this change in GOJ policy poses new 
questions for USG humanitarian planning, such as whether an 
even partially open border would attract a greater flow of 
refugees toward Jordan.  If so, this argues more strongly for 
a DART team to be positioned in Jordan.  In order to sort out 
these questions, Embassy Amman would welcome a visit by a 
senior member(s) of the USG's Humanitarian Planning Team, to 
assess UN, IO and GOJ capabilities and to explain in greater 
detail the assistance the USG could offer. 
 
¶13.  (S) Finally, from both a humanitarian and political 
perspective, we are concerned by two key GOJ planning 
assumptions.  First, the GOJ made it clear that refugees 
would be admitted to camps in Ruweished only in the initial 
stages of conflict.  The GOJ did not clarify what it intended 
to do with Iraqi refugees resident in Ruweished after the 
second-stage camp would be established at Nadayim airbase in 
Iraq and seems to have hinted that they would be granted only 
temporary admission to Jordan.  We will seek clarification of 
this policy and remind the GOJ of our non-refoulment 
concerns.  Second, we question whether the GOJ will be able 
to sustain its categorical refusal to admit Palestinians 
resident in Iraq.  We also are concerned that Palestinians 
resident in Iraq -- without UNRWA documentation or any other 
documents to establish their claims to UNRWA status -- could 
fall through the cracks of the UN refugee system.  Although 
ICRC Jordan Delegate Guy Mellet had previously indicated the 
ICRC would be prepared to provide assistance to stateless 
Palestinians displaced as the result of hostilities in Iraq, 
we request that Geneva clarify this policy at the appropriate 
time. 
BERRY