This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y////PARAS TWO AND FOUR//// 
 
DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM 
 
E.O. 12958:DECL:12/31/12 
TAGS: PREL PREF KPAL KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT:  PLO REFUGEE AFFAIRS OFFICIAL QUIETLY TRYING TO 
LAY GROUNDWORK FOR COMPROMISE ON RIGHT OF RETURN 
 
REF:  A) JERUSALEM 3982 
 
      B) JERUSALEM 3541 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM GREG BERRY PER 1.5 (b) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Jordan-based PLO Refugee Affairs official 
Mohamed Abu Bakr told refcoord December 24 that he and West 
Bank Refugee Affairs Director Saji Salameh are quietly 
trying to prepare the Palestinian refugee community for 
what they see as an inevitable compromise on the right of 
return.  Working in secret -- and without the knowledge of 
either Abu Mazen or de facto PLO Refugee Affairs Department 
head Marwan Abdelhamid -- Abu Bakr and Salameh are seeking 
funding from the Canadian and Norwegian governments for 
public opinion surveys and a broad public relations 
campaign that would convince Palestinians of the need to 
think pragmatically about right of return.  Abu Bakr said 
they will not raise the proposal with PLO or PA leadership 
until they have received Canadian and Norwegian reaction to 
their proposal.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a December 24 meeting with refcoord, Jordan- 
based PLO Department of Refugee Affairs Director (for 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) Mohamed 
Abu Bakr dismissed as "nonsense" the notion that "five 
million Palestinians will return to a country of five 
million Israelis."  Abu Bakr told refcoord that 
Palestinians need to think pragmatically about the right of 
return and start preparing public opinion now for an 
eventual, inevitable compromise.  In order to do so, Abu 
Bakr said, the PLO must conduct studies and surveys of the 
entire Palestinian population, including those not 
typically included in the diaspora such as the 45,000 1948 
refugees believed to be resident in Iraq.  Abu Bakr 
believes that any settlement made without a comprehensive 
survey will not last, as the absence of a unified 
Palestinian position would provide a pretext for 
rejectionists to disavow and destroy the settlement. 
 
¶3.  (C) In order to prepare the groundwork for what they 
see as an inevitable compromise, Abu Bakr said that he and 
PLO Refugee Affairs West Bank Director Saji Salameh are 
seeking funding from the Canadian and Norwegian governments 
to conduct studies and surveys, followed by a wide-scale 
public relations campaign to convince Palestinians of the 
need to compromise on the right of return.  Abu Bakr 
cautioned that neither Abu Mazen nor de facto head of the 
Department of Palestinian Affairs Marwan Abdelhamid are 
aware of this plan; neither he nor Salameh wanted to raise 
the proposal until they had received an initial reaction 
and hopefully a promise of funding from the Canadians and 
the Norwegians.  Salameh was to have meet with the 
Canadians on the margins of a late November Geneva forum on 
compensation, but was unable to travel due to health 
problems.  Abu Bakr promised to brief refcoord as soon as 
he had reaction from the Canadians and Norwegians. 
 
¶4.  (C) When queried about the timing of his proposal -- 
and specifically why Abu Bakr believes Palestinians might 
be receptive to the idea of compromise when the situation 
on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza had deteriorated so 
dramatically over the last two years -- Abu Bakr said the 
Palestinians havc "no choice" but to compromise.  (Note: 
PLO Refugee Affairs West Bank Director Salameh appears to 
have reversed his early position that the timing wasn't 
right for a public debate on the issue -- see ref b.) 
Although political realities dictate that PLO and PA 
officials must use "different language" when discussing the 
right of return in public, Abu Bakr said that more 
pragmatic statements, such as those made by Sari Nusseibeh, 
reflect the reality of the PA's position.  While little 
appears to be moving on a political level between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, Abu Bakr believes that the 
Palestinians cannot afford to waste time by not pushing 
forward on their own internal political issues.  Should the 
Israelis decided to negotiate, Abu Bakr said, political 
progress could come very quickly and the Palestinian public 
needs to be convinced of the importance of compromise.  To 
this end, Abu Bakr and Salameh havc decided to change the 
focus of the Department of Refugee Affairs, away from 
humanitarian assistance projects and toward broader 
political mobilization such as their proposed survey and PR 
campaign. 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment: Given the vehemence with which the PLO 
publicly denounced Sari Nusseibeh's October 2002 proposal 
for compromise on the right of return (ref a), it is 
unlikely that the PLO leadership will publicly embrace Abu 
Bakr and Salameh's proposal.  Yet their proposal reflects a 
core truth essential to any long-term settlement:  that the 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y/////PARAS TWO AND FOUR////// 
Palestinian public -- both within the West Bank and Gaza 
and elsewhere -- will need to be convinced of the 
importance of compromise on the right of return.  Only a 
serious internal Palestinian debate will reduce the gap 
between public and private PLO rhetoric on this pivotal 
question -- though the present circumstances hardly seem 
propitious for a dispassionate discussion of anything 
connected with the refugee issue. 
 
¶6.  (U) ConGen Jerusalem cleared this cable. 
 
GNEHM