This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
POL -- FOR J. MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958 DECL 01/15/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DIFFERENT INSIDER VIEWS ON THE PDP 
CONVENTION 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The PDP convention was a study of 
rough-hewn politics. All participants agree the 
convention was not for the faint-hearted; but they 
also give differing, sometimes conflicting, versions 
of what happened. We probably will never fully know 
the complete truth because so much was blurred by the 
hectic pace of events and distorted by the person's 
political bias. However, we can state with confidence 
that the actual vote count did not accurately reflect 
the heated competition at the convention. Less than 
one day before the vote, delegates were more evenly 
divided between Ekwueme and President Obasanjo. The 
power of incumbency and the liberal use of pay-offs 
tipped the scale in Obasanjo's favor, turning what 
looked like a close race on January 4 into an Obasanjo 
landslide by the morning of January 5. What follows 
are observations of the convention by three insiders. 
We provide them to afford Washington a view of what 
many players perceived as what happened behind the 
scenes and not necessarily as the complete picture of 
what transpired at the convention.  End Comment. 
 
 
--------------------- 
From Inside The Villa 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) While the voting was being conducted at the PDP 
convention late into the night of January 5, PolCouns 
met Tunji Abayomi (strictly protect), Obasanjo's 
private attorney before the President assumed 
Nigeria's highest office.  Now an informal advisor to 
the President, Abayomi described a panicky President 
and coterie the previous day. Obasanjo and his aides 
were caught off-guard when, on the eve of the 
convention, PDP state governors decided to abandon the 
President.  Confronted with this betrayal, Obasanjo 
issued an "all hands-on-deck" call.  Responding to 
this mayday, Abayomi spent most of January 4 at the 
Villa huddling with numerous Obasanjo advisors, 
confidants and friends. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The President was dazed, Abayomi recalled. 
Jarred by the unexpected possibility of defeat, the 
usually know-it-all Obasanjo eagerly solicited counsel 
on how to escape the closing vise.  Early that day, 
the dominant theme was to seek a court injunction 
postponing the convention.  Proponents suggested the 
delay to afford Obasanjo time to marshal support and 
undermine Ekwueme's momentum.  However, this idea was 
ultimately discarded, partially because of 
apprehension over the public's reaction.  More 
importantly, the push for an injunction became less 
urgent when the President's advisors began to sense 
their man was regaining ground by the hour. 
 
 
¶4. (C) The President owed much of his recovery to his 
own tenacity and, at times, shamelessness.  He pulled 
out virtually all the stops to clinch the nomination, 
according to Abayomi. For most of that day, the 
President's diet consisted of liberal portions of 
humble pie. The President pleaded and cajoled; on at 
least two occasions his eyes welled with emotion as he 
pursued fence-sitting delegates and governors. 
However, Obasanjo saved his best to keep Vice 
President Atiku from defecting. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) With rumor swirling that Atiku would opt to 
run with Ekwueme, Obasanjo wasted no time visiting the 
Vice President's residence.  Obasanjo begged, 
declaring he would not leave Atiku's home unless the 
Vice President accompanied him to win back the 
delegates and governors.  The performance had the 
desired effect.  Atiku joined Obasanjo in publicly 
lobbying the conventioneers.  While it might not have 
been Obasanjo's finest hour it was the defining moment 
of the convention.  What had been a suspenseful 
contest would now turn into a rout. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Abayomi thought the convention had taught 
Obasanjo some valuable lessons. The President learned 
that victory was a collective effort but defeat was 
solitary; the President, despite all the trappings of 
office and the buzz of advisors, was a frightened and 
lonely figure much of January 4.  Abayomi thought 
Obasanjo would show more humility and act less 
imperiously as a consequence. 
 
 
¶7. (C)  However, Abayomi admitted Obasanjo could 
easily learn the wrong lessons from the convention 
victory. The events could reinforce the notion that 
the coercive powers of his office are a President's 
chief assets.  Abayomi admitted the pleading and 
cajolery would not have worked without the underlying 
threat that, even if he lost the convention, Obasanjo 
still would retain the presidency for another five 
months.  During that period, he could wreck the 
political ambitions of those who sided against him. 
It was this reality that kept the Vice President in 
line and with him, the governors, and ultimately the 
delegates.  All things being equal, Ekwueme would 
probably have won the convention, Abayomi contended. 
Obasanjo was disliked by most of the political elite, 
while most people think highly of Ekwueme, he said. 
However, the conventioneers' fear of Obasanjo 
ultimately corralled their respect for Ekwueme.  The 
convention boiled down to a street fight between a 
hard-nosed bully and a reserved intellectual.  In the 
end, the bully won. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
The View From The Ekwueme Group 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) During a January 9 conversation with DCM and 
PolCouns, Alhaji Isaiku Ibrahim, Ekwueme's campaign 
coordinator, fulminated that Obasanjo cheated his way 
to victory. Ibrahim's delegate count the morning of 
January 5 revealed a virtual dead heat between 
Obasanjo and Ekwueme; thus, Ekwueme's camp anticipated 
a second ballot not an Obasanjo first round landslide. 
Ibrahim acknowledged that throughout January 4 and 
into the early hours of January 5, Ekwueme's fortunes 
began to crumble. He cited several reasons for the 
change. First, Obasanjo's camp generously showered 
delegates and governors with money. Ibrahim contended 
governors were given 30 million Naira each while every 
delegate received at least 1,000 dollars.  The 
Obasanjo campaign, not the PDP, paid for the 
delegates' hotel rooms.  Ibrahim claimed Obasanjo's 
team required so much money to pass around that the 
Central Bank and Habib Bank kept their doors open 
Friday and Saturday nights. (Comment: Money was 
certainly passed around at the convention, but 
Ibrahim's figures are high even by Nigerian standards. 
More importantly, Ekwueme's team should not protest 
too loudly. Ekwueme received support from former Head 
of State Babangida; if Babangida is in the mix, money 
cannot be too far behind. There were numerous reports 
that Ekwueme's team also paid for delegate support. 
End Comment.) 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Early on Saturday, Obasanjo was in deep 
trouble and he knew it, maintained Ibrahim. 
Obasanjo's campaign rousted a High Court judge from 
his sleep to prepare the ground for an ex parte motion 
to enjoin the convention.  Ibrahim said Obasanjo's 
minions dropped this idea after the angry judge chided 
that their antics not only disturbed his sleep but 
also his professional integrity; if they filed the 
motion, he would summarily deny it, the judge 
promised. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Ibrahim claimed Obasanjo's campaign then began 
tinkering with delegate accreditation.  They 
successfully padded the delegate lists of some states 
while substituting new lists for other states.  He 
asserted this manipulation of delegate lists 
demonstrated that the PDP machinery was not neutral, 
but an adjunct of the Obasanjo campaign. PDP chairman 
Audu Ogbeh had compromised his integrity, declared 
Ibrahim. (Comment: Others say that Ogbeh had saved the 
day and that it was VP Atiku who wanted to cancel the 
convention to afford himself more time to a way to 
ease Obasanjo out and take first place on the ticket 
without infuriating the President.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶11. (C) The Ekwueme team's biggest complaint was the 
vote counting procedures at the convention.  The party 
had agreed to conduct the vote by secret ballot, 
ostensibly to minimize the fear of intimidation. 
However, Obasanjo's team used numbered ballots to 
achieve the very thing (intimidation) the secret 
ballot was to eliminate.  The numbered ballots were 
the tip of an elaborate scheme to intimidate 
delegates, according to Ibrahim.  He claimed Ekwueme 
had been hoodwinked by Ogbeh, who ironically was 
Ekwueme's campaign manager in the 1980's.  Prior to 
the convention, Ogbeh had guaranteed he would keep the 
ballot paper close-hold to prevent tampering.  Because 
of their past relationship, Ekwueme trusted Ogbeh. 
Thus, Ekwueme did not request to examine the ballot 
papers prior to the convention.  This was an 
irreparable mistake, Ibrahim asserted.  With the 
ballots numbered, the President's team could determine 
how each delegate voted. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Ibrahim maintained the President and Vice 
President pressured the governors to deliver their 
states or risk the overturn of their own re- 
nominations. In turn, the governors put their feet on 
the neck of their respective state chairmen. The state 
chairmen were told to record the numbered ballots 
given to each delegate; more ominously, they were 
instructed to make sure the delegate knew a ledger was 
being kept so that their votes could be traced, 
maintained Ibrahim. 
 
 
¶13. (C) Even with these devices, the Obasanjo-Atiku 
team was not completely sure of victory.  They 
continued to pressure governors as the vote was being 
conducted.  Ibrahim claimed VP Atiku cornered Niger 
Governor Kure, reminding Kure a favor was owed.  The 
Vice President reminded Kure, an Obasanjo foe and a 
friend of former Head of State Babangida, that Atiku 
has supported Kure for renomination in Niger while 
Obasanjo and the rest of the party hierarchy backed 
Commerce Minister Bello.  Calling in his chip, Atiku 
said now was Kure's time to reciprocate.  Unless he 
backed the Obasanjo-Atiku ticket,  Atiku threatened 
that both he and Obasanjo would make Kure's life 
unbearable.  Ibrahim also described Kaduna State 
governor Makarfi as waffling.  Prior to the 
convention, Makarfi met Ekwueme and personally pledged 
to deliver Kaduna's delegates.  After being threatened 
by Obasanjo, Makarfi reversed direction.  While other 
states were voting, Makarfi reportedly gathered 
several key delegates from Kaduna pleading with them 
to return to Obasanjo.  Makarfi said he would "lose 
his job" if Kaduna did not vote Obasanjo. 
 
 
¶14.  (C) Ibrahim maintained that most delegates 
recognized Ekwueme was better qualified and 
intellectually superior to Obasanjo. However, he 
accused Obasanjo of scare tactics and bullying his way 
to victory. Ibrahim had no kind words for VP Atiku. 
Ibrahim felt Atiku was the person who most influenced 
the convention due to the relationship with the 
governors.  Atiku disliked Obasanjo but listened to 
expediency's counsel and stuck with the President. 
Atiku ultimately was too frightened that Obasanjo 
would ruin him if he defected, Ibrahim asserted. 
Obasanjo needed Atiku now.  But given Obasanjo's 
history of ingratitude and untrustworthiness, Ibrahim 
predicted Obasanjo would dump Atiku after the general 
election. 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Because of the perceived irregularities with 
the convention. Ekwueme's camp had not "recognized" 
the result.  Ibrahim stated they were undecided 
whether to quit the party or to continue to challenge 
the convention results from within.  Whatever decision 
is made, will be done as a bloc, he said. (Note: 
Ekwueme filed a lawsuit to overturn the convention 
results. The court denied his request for a temporary 
injunction prohibiting the PDP from referring to 
Obasanjo as the winner.  However, the court will still 
hear the substantive issues raised in Ekwueme's suit 
at a later date.  End Comment. 
 
 
------------------------- 
One Governor's Perception 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶16. (C) In a post-convention discussion with 
Ambassador Jeter, Kaduna Governor Makarfi asserted 
that Ekwueme's candidacy was never a serious threat to 
Obasanjo.  The report that he and other governors had 
shifted to Ekwueme was a complete feign.  The 
governors leaked the story to "teach Obasanjo a 
lesson" to end his autocratic ways.  Makarfi said 
Ekwueme's candidacy was ill fated because he 
procrastinated by waiting to announce his candidacy a 
mere one month before the convention.  He logically 
could not have expected to catch Obasanjo within such 
a brief time.  Second, Ekwueme erred by canvassing 
delegates independently instead of first talking to 
the governors who resented being short-circuited. 
Ekwueme learned the hard way that the governors 
control the state machinery, Makarfi said. 
 
 
¶17. (C) Last, many governors opposed Ekwueme because 
he had never explicitly repudiated a proposal he 
published in 1994 to reshape Nigeria into a 
confederation of relatively autonomous regions.  This 
proposal, coupled with the fact that Ekwueme might be 
sympathetic to Igbo secessionists, caused governors to 
fear an Ekwueme presidency could occasion the 
dismemberment of Nigeria.  (Comment:  Makarfi's 
points, particularly the belated concern about the 
1994 confederation proposal, seem somewhat contrived. 
It seems that Makarfi was trying to put the best gloss 
on his vacillations during the convention. End 
comment.) 
 
 
------------------------ 
What A Convention It Was 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶18.  (C) By all accounts, the convention was spirited 
drama.  The day before the vote was a day of high 
anxiety. Obasanjo and Ekwueme's fortunes waxed and 
waned several times that day.  Vice President Atiku 
occupied an extraordinary position.  If any one person 
determined the outcome, it was Atiku. However, his 
situation was bittersweet.  Courted by both Obasanjo 
and Ekwueme, he could do no worse than emerge as the 
Vice Presidential candidate; however, he also could do 
no better. Atiku recognized the irony of his position, 
although he certainly did not enjoy it.  Meanwhile, 
the PDP governors affirmed that they were powerful 
players, yet, in the end they did not buck the 
President. 
 
 
¶19.  (C) Backslapping, back-room deals, and 
backtracking from promises made were all represent and 
well accounted for during the convention.  This was a 
classic lesson in hardball politics.  Throughout the 
convention, principle was told to sit still and behave 
while the players cut and uncut deals unmolested by 
any tinge of conscience.  The convention was about 
people protecting and promoting their narrow 
interests.  Political conventions traditionally are 
not profiles in rectitude but contests of ambition, 
avarice and advantage.  This one was no different.  It 
was both worse and better than it could have been. 
Competition was limited to political tricks and 
treachery -- there was no violence or physical 
intimidation.  Money exchanged hands but probably in 
lesser amounts than in 1999.  For all its demerits, 
the convention was what realistically could be 
expected for a second edition of a party convention in 
a fledgling democracy like that of Nigeria. 
JETER