This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 003350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, T, PM, WHA/PPC, WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR HO
SUBJECT: CERRO LA MOLE RADAR--STILL AN UNREQUITED PACT 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 01780 
 
Classified By: PolChief Francisco Palmieri, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Post reiterates the U.S. national interests 
in fulfilling its obligations under the 1993 agreement with 
the GOH regarding the maintenance of the radar located at 
Cerro La Mole.  The U.S. agreed to pay 75% of all maintenance 
costs up to a limit of $400,000 per year, while the GOH 
agreed to pay 25% of the maintenance costs.  To date, the 
U.S. has paid nothing under the agreement, while the GOH has 
paid for all maintenance costs in excess of $800,000.  Post 
recommends that the U.S. honor the spirit of the agreement by 
either replacing it with a TPS-78 solid state version or with 
another TPS-70, or repair the existing one.  In the wake of 
the rapid Honduran accession to an Article 98 agreement, the 
ongoing failure of the U.S. to fulfill its legal obligations 
under the agreement is creating doubt about the U.S.'s 
commitment to international agreements at the very time we 
are urging further Honduran cooperation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------- 
THE AGREEMENT 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In 1993 the U.S. and the GOH signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Expansion of the Radar Located in Cerro 
La Mole in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (MOU).  The 
purpose of the MOU was to reaffirm the cooperation of the two 
governments in the international battle against narcotics 
trafficking by expanding the radar capability of the region 
as set forth in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network agreement 
(CBRN) signed by the U.S. and the GOH April 7, 1989.  The MOU 
was designed to integrate the Cerro La Mole radar ("the 
radar") into the operations of the CBRN. 
 
¶3.  (U) The core provisions that are relevant to this 
recommendation are as follows (NOTE: A more complete summary 
of the core provisions of the MOU are found in Ref A. END 
NOTE.): 
 
-The costs of operations and maintenance of the radar are to 
be borne by the GOH. 
 
-The U.S. will have unrestricted access to the data from the 
radar except in the case of a Honduran national emergency. 
 
-The U.S. will provide spare parts support and technical 
assistance valued at a maximum of $400,000 per year, with the 
GOH responsible for no less than 25 percent of the total 
spare parts/technical assistance costs each year. 
 
-The MOU is effective until April 7, 2009. 
 
------------------------------ 
THE PROBLEMS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) There are a number of emerging diplomatic problems 
due to the U.S.'s failure to comply with the MOU.  The U.S. 
has paid nothing under the terms of the MOU, while the GOH 
has paid more than $800,000 in an attempt to maintain the 
radar.  This is a source of tension between the Honduran 
Armed Forces (HOAF) and the U.S. military personnel stationed 
in Honduras.  Moreover, the situation has become a diplomatic 
problem.  We understand that President Maduro had considered 
raising it during the postponed visit of Secretary Powell in 
October.  Ref A outlines the effects of the strained 
relations that U.S. non-compliance has caused.  It is 
difficult to ignore the GOH's argument that the agreement was 
entered into between two sovereign nations, and that the U.S. 
has a legal and moral obligation to abide by its terms. 
 
¶5.  (C) The GOH is also raising the ante over the issue of 
non-compliance.  Political and military relations are 
becoming more and more bogged down with discussions about the 
future of the MOU.  In a recent meeting between Ambassador 
Palmer and Minister of Defense Fred Breve (MOD), when the 
Ambassador discussed U.S. security assistance concerns, the 
MOD responded by mentioning the U.S. failure to comply with 
the MOU.  During the Conference of the Chiefs of the American 
Air Forces, Colonel Ramos (Commander of the Honduran Air 
Force), pressed General Jumper (Chief of Staff, U.S. Air 
Force) for his support.  All political and military VIPs that 
visit Honduras must field questions about our non-compliance. 
 MOD Breve raised it with WHA A/S Reich in August when the 
A/S visited Honduras.  The situation has become increasingly 
embarrassing for post and actually hampers productivity due 
to the amount of time all mission military elements must 
spend responding to HOAF questions.  Compliance with the MOU 
would permit all country team elements to focus on more 
important U.S. interests and priorities in Honduras, such as 
working on counterterrorism and counterdrug training for the 
HOAF, obtaining MOD support for counterterrorism treaties 
languishing in Congress and designation of a GOH 
counterterrorism coordinator. 
 
--------------------------- 
APPRECIATION FOR ARTICLE 98 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The GOH recently signed an Article 98 agreement, 
despite pressure from other Latin American countries to 
decline.  Honduras was the first Central American country to 
sign Article 98, and the Hondurans remain staunch supporters. 
 Post believes that the GOH should receive a tangible sign of 
U.S. appreciation for signing the Article 98 agreement.  At 
the recent USSOUTHCOM Security Assistance Conference (MILGP 
Commanders' Conference), Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, 
Deputy Director, Pol Mil Affairs, WHEM, from Joint Staff J-5 
stated that our new approach would be the "carrot and the 
stick"--in other words, the U.S. will help those countries 
that sign Article 98 agreements and cut aid to those that do 
not.  The radar issue is the U.S.'s chance to demonstrate 
that we will assist countries that support us on Article 98. 
At the same conference, representatives from State and 
Defense stated that U.S. interests are best served when each 
country can best protect its own sovereignty.  The radar at 
Cerro La Mole would enable Honduras to become a "full 
partner" in the counterdrug and counterterrorism fights, 
better protect its own sovereignty and allow for more 
complete control of its airspace. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7.  (U) More and more frequently, Honduran waters and air 
space are used by narcotraffickers for transshipment of drugs 
from Colombia to the U.S. and of illegal arms back to 
Colombia.  Stopping this flow of arms to Colombian terrorist 
groups is a direct and measurable contribution to the global 
war on terrorism.  The U.S. regularly asks the GOH to assist 
in the war against drugs.  The GOH has made a number of 
strides in its counterdrug operations.  The Honduran Air 
Force has begun to fly intercept missions, and maintains two 
F-5s on fifteen-minute alert to scramble on counterdrug 
flights.  Additionally, the Honduran Navy has returned at 
least two patrol vessels to deep water service on the north 
coast.  Honduras continues to grow as a transshipment zone 
for illicit drugs, and the National Police are now having 
some success in interdicting overland shipments.  An 
operational TPS-70 at Cerro La Mole would allow the GOH to 
become more fully engaged in regional counterdrug efforts, 
since it would give Honduras the ability to track and pass 
information to other governments in the region.  Drug 
traffickers are increasingly exploiting the known hole in the 
Cental American radar network to fly through the Cerro La 
Mole radar coverage of the Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador 
border areas. 
 
¶8.  (U) Currently, the TPS-70 is non-operational and, 
therefore, provides no intelligence directly to the U.S.  It 
is part of SOUTHCOM's radar architecture, meaning it is tied 
directly into our radar network.  A functional radar system 
at Cerro La Mole would directly provide the U.S. a much 
better view of Central America's illicit flights 
(specifically, it would provide the U.S. with a means to 
differentiate between friendly and unfriendly tracks provided 
by the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) 
system)--thus, buttresses the U.S. in its war against drugs. 
 
------------------ 
REGIONAL STABILITY 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (U) U.S. compliance with the MOU would ultimately 
translate into increased regional stability by providing 
Honduras with an increased capability for maintaining its 
sovereignty.  Due to the geographical coverage of the radar, 
it would provide advance warning of aggression against 
Honduras, and thus provide a strong (yet peaceful) deterrent 
to hostile military actions.  This would serve to reduce 
misunderstandings between the Central American countries.  It 
would also enhance identification of illicit flights skirting 
the Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador border areas.  This has 
become a serious problem because none of the three countries 
can encroach on a 10-mile buffer zone along the borders under 
terms of multi-national agreements.  A functioning TPS-70 may 
lead to agreements among the three countries for better 
cooperation in the buffer zones. 
 
----------------- 
HOAF EXPENDITURES 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) During the last nine years, the GOH has spent more 
than $800,000 to maintain the radar, but has lost the battle 
in keeping it operational. 
 
----------------------------- 
ANSWERS TO OPPOSING ARGUMENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) There is stated DOD/SOLIC opposition to support for 
this radar.  This mission contends the following--the 
Hondurans are paying their fair share (paragraphs 4 and 10); 
and, Cerro La Mole is now needed to improve radar collection 
on a growing number of illicit drug flights that exploit the 
Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador window (paragraphs 7 and 9). 
 
¶12.  (C) We ask DOD/SOLIC to reconsider its previous position 
and find a way to identify funds for this radar.  It is not 
just the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do to 
advance multiple U.S. interests in Central America. 
 
--------------------- 
POST'S RECOMMENDATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Post recommends that the U.S. should immediately 
begin honoring the MOU by either replacing the radar with a 
solid state version (TPS-78) or with another TPS-70 
transferred from counterdrug programs.  This should be done 
because we agreed to do so, to support counternarcotics 
efforts in the region, and as a tangible sign of U.S. 
appreciation to Honduras for its prompt signing of Article 98 
(the first in Central America). 
 
¶14.  (C) In the alternative, the U.S. could repair the radar 
to operational status.  However, the radar is an older 
300-series radar, and this approach may not be cost 
effective.  Cost of replacement or repairs should be 
evaluated to determine the most economical solution. 
Moreover, post recommends that, pursuant to the MOU, the 
radar be left in the control of the GOH, with all outputs 
made available to the U.S. 
PIERCE