This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU GR CY UN
SUBJECT: ANNAN CYPRUS PLAN: ISTANBUL COMMENTATORS 
ASK WHETHER IT'S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE 
 
 
REF: A) ANKARA 8778 B) ATHENS 4121 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Turks in Istanbul continue to debate the 
merits and drawbacks of a possible Cyprus settlement in the 
wake of Denktas's acceptance of the UN plan as a "basis for 
negotiations."  Consensus among the experts with whom we 
have spoken in Istanbul (including Turkish Cypriots, 
journalists, and academics) is that the plan is a good one, 
albeit with some serious flaws.  All of them look first and 
foremost to Ankara for clues on how Turkey will act in the 
coming weeks and months.  They believe that Denktas's 
conditional approval of the plan was inevitable (he could 
not afford to appear obstructionist in the face of pressure 
from the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
government), but that the Turkish side (and perhaps the 
Greek) will not be prepared to negotiate a plan for 
signature before the December 12 Copenhagen Summit. 
Furthermore, most of our interlocutors are convinced that 
the signals that the EU gives Turkey with regard to its 
membership bid at the summit are likely to have a major 
impact on Turkey's position in the upcoming Cyprus 
negotiations.  In the end, however, many of those we spoke 
to believe that the Annan plan is simply too good to be 
true -- the Greek Cypriots will ultimately either reject 
the deal outright or throw up unrealistic demands to ensure 
that no final agreement is reached.  End Summary. 
 
 
The Most Pro-Turkish Plan Ever 
------------------------------ 
¶2. (C) Murat Munir, a well-regarded journalist for Sabah 
newspaper (and a Turkish-Cypriot himself) told poloff that 
the Annan proposal was the "most pro-Turkish plan" ever 
presented.  He and others had only high praise for how the 
plan meets Turkish demands for sovereignty and equality in 
its "common-state" formula.  Kemal Kirisci, an expert on 
international affairs at Bogazici University, was also 
impressed by many of the details, including provisions for 
ensuring that Cyprus not be in a position to block Turkey's 
EU bid and for extending to both Greek and Turkish 
nationals the same entry and residency rights (a major 
concession, he noted, in light of Turkey's position outside 
the EU).  Oddly enough, one of the only criticisms we heard 
of the administrative arrangements was that the "component 
states" (as opposed to the "common state") were given too 
much authority.  Niyazi Bekiroglu, President of the 
Association of Turkish Cypriots in Turkey, explained to 
poloff that Greek immigration to the Turkish side may 
ultimately enable them to wrest control of local 
administration. 
 
 
We Give up Beaches, Farmland -- and are left with Mountains 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶3. (C) For the most part, criticism of the plan has 
focused not on the administrative arrangements, but on the 
territorial concessions and provisions for refugee return. 
"We are being asked to give up the pristine beaches, the 
fertile farmland, and the port and water resources of 
Guzelyurt (Morphou).  What are we left with?...  The 
mountains," Bekiroglu lamented (Note: Bekiroglu claims that 
his views largely reflect those of the 150,000 Turkish 
Cypriots living in Turkey).  Cyprus watchers in Istanbul 
are still buzzing about the recent public remarks by former 
Turkish President Kenan Evren about how the Turkish 
military in 1974 never intended to take as much territory 
as they did and that they did so with the expectation that 
such land be used as a bargaining chip at the negotiating 
table.  When pressed on the issue of territory, all of 
those we spoke to admitted that such concessions (subject 
to some minor changes to the maps and special provisions 
regarding water and port rights in Guzelyurt) are possible. 
 
 
A Flood of Greek Refugees? 
-------------------------- 
¶4. (C) Conceding that the territorial concessions might 
ultimately be acceptable, Bekiroglu admitted that he was 
more concerned about the provisions allowing for the return 
of Greek refugees. According to Bekiroglu's calculations, 
the territorial concessions, the return of Greek refugees, 
the concurrent displacement of Turkish Cypriots, and the 
need for many non-Cypriot mainland Turks to return home 
will lead to the unacceptable displacement of a majority of 
the existing population in the TRNC.  Additionally, even 
with the annual limitations provided for in the plan, 
Bekiroglu worries that Greek immigration combined with 
Turkish emigration will quickly lead to unacceptably large 
Greek minorities (or even majorities) in certain areas on 
the Turkish side of the island.  Munir, too, argued that 
allowing Greeks to return to the north may ultimately 
undermine the viability of an agreement.  Although Munir 
concedes that the principle of refugee return may be 
necessary (although he suspects few will rush back), 
neither of the publics on either side of the Green Line is 
psychologically prepared to lower that long-standing 
barrier.  Munir said that his personal experience on the 
island suggests to him that the suspicion and distrust 
harbored in equal measure on both parts of the island would 
lead quickly to renewed violence if the communities are 
brought together too quickly. 
 
 
Ankara Calls the Shots 
---------------------- 
¶5. (C) Even assuming that the two publics come to support a 
settlement, Munir argues that it will require concerted 
pressure from Ankara to overcome those in the TRNC that 
have a vested economic interest in maintaining the status 
quo.  Most of our interlocutors seem convinced that the new 
AKP government would like to see a settlement.  The 
million-dollar questions, however, are: What does the 
Turkish deep state think?  Is AK's recent electoral mandate 
sufficient to sway the National Security Council (NSC) 
debates?  Kirisci and a former Turkish diplomat both argued 
that the military and more conservative elements of the 
secular establishment will be heavily influenced by the 
signals that Turkey gets on its membership bid from the 
December 12 EU Copenhagen Summit.  If (as Turkish President 
Sezer suggested in his remarks at the end of the NATO 
Prague Summit) the Europeans are engaging in "double-talk," 
Turkey may feel that they cannot abandon the Turkish 
Cypriots to a double-dealing, anti-Turkish EU.  Note: Both 
also feel that Turkey may have made a tactical error in 
pushing for a "date" for negotiations.  It may be possible, 
they claim, to come up with some other sufficiently 
positive message that might convince the Euro-skeptics in 
Turkey. End Note. 
 
 
Doomed to Failure? 
------------------ 
¶6. (C) Our more pessimistic interlocutors believe that the 
deal will either be dashed to pieces on the rocks of the 
Copenhagen Summit or will founder on the shoals of Greek 
Cypriot opposition.  Bekiroglu, for example, suspects that 
the entire Annan plan is an EU trap.   Having "bought" the 
support of a select group of influential Turkish 
journalists (including Mehmet Ali Birand and Murat Munir), 
the EU seeks only to secure Turkish acquiescence and a 
Greek vote for EU enlargement at Copenhagen.  Others, 
including Bogazici University Professor Gun Kut, argued 
that the plan is simply to pro-Turkish to ever be approved 
by the Greek Cypriots.  Even assuming that Ankara throws 
its weight behind a settlement, they expect the Greek 
Cypriots to reject the plan in the proposed referendum (the 
publication of a recent poll showing that 64 percent of 
Greek Cypriots oppose the plan has not gone unnoticed in 
Istanbul) or simply put forth unacceptable demands to 
ensure a breakdown in negotiations. 
ARNETT