This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA AND SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 12-09-12 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PHUM CE LTTE
SUBJECT:  Just-concluded talks help peace process gain 
new traction as one-year milestone comes in sight 
 
Refs:  (A) Oslo 2723 (Notal) 
 
-      (B) Colombo 2246, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The just-concluded third session of 
GSL-LTTE talks has helped the peace process pick up 
significant new traction.  In particular, the LTTE's 
agreement to examine federalism as a potential solution 
to the conflict was a key shift by the group away from 
separatism or a confederal model.  The two sides' 
agreement to numerous confidence-building measures was 
also noteworthy.  Despite the progress, many questions 
remain about the exact nature of any federal-type 
solution.  Overall, in the wake of the recent talks and 
the Oslo donors' conference, the peace process seems 
stronger than ever as it moves toward its one-year 
anniversary.  END SUMMARY. 
 
============================ 
LTTE Shift toward Federalism 
============================ 
 
¶2. (C) The just-concluded third session of talks in Oslo 
helped the peace process pick up significant new 
traction.  (Note:  The talks took place December 2-5. 
The Norwegian government's press communique reviewing 
the results of the talks is contained in Ref A.  The 
next session of talks is scheduled for January 6-9, 
2003.)  In particular, the LTTE's agreement to explore 
the possible creation of a federal system within a 
united Sri Lanka as a potential solution to the conflict 
was a key shift by the group.  While the LTTE has been 
shying away from outright separatism in its public 
statements of late, this was the first time the LTTE has 
ever explicitly accepted the notion that it could work 
within a united Sri Lanka.  (Note:  According to 
Minister Milinda Moragoda, the LTTE proposed the 
federalism language on its own volition.) 
 
¶3.  (C) In judging the significance of the understanding 
on this issue, it is noteworthy that the LTTE's prior 
definitions of "Tamil Eelam" seemed to preclude any form 
of subordination by a Tamil (read LTTE)-controlled 
north/east unit to the government in Colombo.  In 
agreeing to examine federalism, however, the Tigers not 
only seem to be rejecting separatism, but also 
confederation, i.e., the setting up of a parallel 
administration in the north and east equal in status to 
Colombo.  In fact, just this last April, LTTE negotiator 
Anton Balasingham indicated that he considered LTTE 
leader V. Prabhakaran as "prime minister" for LTTE- 
controlled areas with PM Wickremesinghe in charge of the 
south.  The LTTE now seems to be indicating that it 
might be able to accept subordination to the GSL's 
president, prime minister, and parliament, in return for 
some form of autonomy.  It is not even close to being 
agreed to yet (see paras 5-7 for more on potential 
problem areas), but the LTTE effectively appears to be 
indicating that a governor or something similar (as 
opposed to a LTTE-selected "president" or "PM") could 
head up a north/east unit. 
 
================================ 
Key Confidence-Building Measures 
================================ 
 
¶4.  (C) In addition to the understanding re federalism, 
the two sides' agreement to numerous confidence-building 
measures was also noteworthy.  The following 
understandings, encapsulated in the press communique, 
stood out in potential importance: 
 
-- LTTE/Other Parties:  The LTTE agreed to accept the 
right of other political groups to carry out political 
activities.  In mentioning this agreement, the 
communique made specific reference to the right of other 
parties to carry out political work in Jaffna District 
and its islands.  (Note:  This issue came up because the 
LTTE, amid some violence, has been engaged in trying to 
prevent other Tamil parties from political work in the 
islands off Jaffna in recent weeks.) 
 
-- LTTE "Legal" System:  The LTTE agreed that its "law 
and order mechanisms" will not be extended beyond areas 
already under the group's control.  (Note:  Before the 
Oslo talks began, the government promised to raise the 
issue of the recent expansion of the LTTE's "court" 
system.  In agreeing to this language, the LTTE 
indicated that it would stop imposing its "legal" system 
on Tamils living in GSL-controlled sectors of the north 
and east.  The agreed language seems to permit the LTTE 
to continue imposing its "legal" system on Tamils living 
in areas under the group's control, however.) 
 
-- Movement of LTTE Commanders:  The LTTE agreed that 
the group would allow the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to supervise the transport and 
movement of LTTE commanders between sectors. 
(Note:  Reacting to GSL complaints, the SLMM has been 
urging the LTTE to ensure that its commanders work with 
the monitoring group on all significant movements, per 
the February ceasefire accord.  There have been several 
cases where LTTE commanders have moved from the northern 
sector to the east and vice versa without notifying the 
SLMM.) 
 
-- LTTE and Children:  The parties agreed that children 
should not be involved in political or military 
activities.  The LTTE also agreed to work with UNICEF to 
draw up an "action plan" in this area.  (Note:  The LTTE 
has made many promises of this sort in the past.  By 
most accounts, the LTTE remains engaged in forcibly 
recruiting children into its political/military system.) 
 
======================= 
Questions re Federalism 
======================= 
 
¶5.  (C) Despite all of the significant progress made at 
Oslo, much work is still needed on many issues involving 
federalism.  The concept itself is potentially quite 
controversial in Sri Lanka.  It is still not fully clear 
whether Sinhalese chauvinists in the south will in fact 
come to accept the notion of a federal system.  For 
decades, pro-Sinhalese elements have demanded that the 
country remain totally "unitary," i.e., no devolution of 
authority, no regional autonomy, etc.  Indeed, to 
suggest that Sri Lanka be anything less than a unitary 
state was seen almost as traitorous behavior and an 
infringement on Sri Lanka's putative identity as a 
Sinhalese Buddhist nation.  Through the years, there has 
been some modification in the intensity in which such 
views are held, but the anti-federalism streak has 
remained noticeable.  (Note:  In fact, it has been one 
of those perennial "third rail" issues mentioned below.) 
Given the potential for controversy over the issue, the 
exact parameters of any federal solution will require 
much negotiation, as well as great care in selling any 
understandings -- including possible constitutional 
proposals -- to the Sinhalese south.  (Note:  In a press 
conference held after the conclusion of the talks on 
December 5, government and LTTE negotiators indicated 
that constitutional changes, perhaps even a new 
constitution, would be necessary -- see Ref A.) 
 
¶6.  (C) One of the areas involving federalism that need 
further refinement concerns exactly to whom it might 
apply to.  According to the communique of the Oslo 
talks, the two sides agreed that federalism would be 
founded on "internal self-determination in areas of 
historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking people." 
The phrase "Tamil-speaking people" has proved 
controversial in the past.  A similar phrase was used in 
the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord and it was not 
clear at that time to which communities the phrase 
applied.  In Sri Lanka, for example, at least three 
distinct communities speak Tamil:  Tamils in the north 
and east; tea estate Tamils in the central highlands; 
and Muslims.  It is this last community, the Muslims 
(and especially those in the east), that is bound to be 
most worried about any "federal" solution being applied 
to them.  (Note:  Muslims in the east bitterly resent 
the LTTE and are fearful of coming under the group's 
control, given the LTTE's long-standing claim that all 
of the east should be under Tamil domination.) 
 
¶7. (C) Another area that needs further definition is the 
precise scope of a possible federal model and its 
application to Sri Lanka's domestic scene.  Would it 
apply to the center's relations with other areas, too?, 
i.e., would it be "symmetric" devolution? or would it be 
"asymmetric" devolution (applying to only the north and 
east)?   These issues have to be answered because it is 
possible that other regions of Sri Lanka might seek 
autonomous rights. 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶8.  (C) In the wake of the recent talks and the Oslo 
donors' conference before that, the peace process seems 
stronger than ever as it moves toward its one-year 
anniversary.  (Note:  The peace process started with the 
LTTE and GSL joining in unilateral ceasefires beginning 
December 24, 2001.)  Thus far, the process seems to have 
survived numerous "third rails" of Sri Lankan politics, 
which were supposed to knock it permanently off course. 
The GSL's legalization of the LTTE in September, for 
example, was supposed to lead to mass protests by 
Sinhalese chauvinists, but, in actuality, little 
happened.  At the same time, the introduction of the 
word "federalism" into the negotiations was supposed to 
ignite problems in the south -- so far, however, there 
has been little reaction.  There could still be problems 
over many issues, but the peace process seems to be 
maintaining immense public support at this time.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS