This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 008852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINS TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEC. 9-10 WASHINGTON VISIT OF AK PARTY CHAIRMAN R. TAYYIP ERDOGAN 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6856 
     ¶B. ANKARA 8252 
     ¶C. ANKARA 7683 
     ¶D. ANKARA 8448 
     ¶E. ANKARA 8382 
 
 
 (U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: As Turkey's strongest politician Tayyip 
Erdogan is key to our ability to influence the AK Party 
government and public opinion on Iraq and other strategic 
U.S. interests.  His heightened sense of pride is 
undiminished, indeed boosted, by the Kemalist State's 
continuing attempts to spike his return to full public life; 
treating him as if he were already head of government will 
thus pay enormous dividends for U.S. influence in Turkey and 
underscore to the EU our strong support for a date for 
Turkish accession talks from the Copenhagen summit.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Coming off a smashing electoral victory by his AK 
(Justice and Development) Party and a tour of 14 EU capitals 
where he was welcomed like a head of government, unelected 
Tayyip Erdogan is the new colossus in Turkish politics.  What 
gave Erdogan's party its victory on Nov. 3 were his 
reputation as a responsive mayor of Istanbul, his advocacy of 
fair and just reforms, and his political magnetism across 
Anatolia, a magnetism enhanced by the State's controversial 
decision to rule him ineligible to stand for election (ref 
A).  Erdogan is now determined to parlay his victory and new 
national stature into a restoration of his political rights 
so he may enter Parliament and assume the prime ministership 
by late winter or early spring. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Despite his popularity in urban sprawls and across 
Anatolia, Erdogan is far from being universally liked. 
Indeed, he is loathed by most of the Establishment.  The 
Establishment prefers to portray him as a mediocrely 
educated, local tough guy made (too) good, a charismatic but 
dangerous preacher-politician who will lead Turkey to the 
Sharia.  Many political and bureaucratic insiders tell us 
that, for this reason, the Deep State (ref B) will do all in 
its power through legal maneuver or provocations to try to 
keep Erdogan permanently off balance. 
 
 
¶4. (C) In this context Erdogan's visit to Washington is an 
excellent opportunity to promote core U.S. interests by (1) 
demonstrating that we respect the democratic election results 
in Turkey and the AK government's commitment to further 
democratization; (2) strengthening our influence with AK and 
Erdogan as the paramount politician in Turkey today; and (3) 
convincing Erdogan, the one politician who can deliver Turkey 
at this stage, to make the right decisions on Iraq, Cyprus, 
and domestic political and economic reform. 
 
 
--------------- 
Erdogan The Man 
--------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) Erdogan's charisma, defensiveness, strong intuition, 
commanding (even authoritarian) presence, common touch -- 
rare among Turkish politicians -- and slight swagger come 
from having to make his way as a youth in the gritty Istanbul 
neighborhood of Kasimpasa, attending a preacher (imam-hatip) 
high school, and playing professional soccer.  He is both 
prone to emotional reactions and cool in wielding political 
power.  He has a huge self-image and heightened sense of 
pride, both easily wounded when he thinks he is not being 
shown due respect, and reacts badly to criticism.  Yet he has 
proved he has a strong pragmatic streak as mayor of the 12 
million-strong Istanbul, in trying to break out of sclerotic 
approaches to Cyprus, and in having a well-tuned (if 
acquired) sense of timing on when to push and when to hold 
back on sensitive questions like the headscarf issue. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Not knowing any foreign language and lacking a strong, 
well-rounded education, Erdogan relies on his intuitions, 
presence, and ability to bond to manage meetings with foreign 
interlocutors.  He will listen intently and expects his 
interlocutors to treat him and the subject seriously, even 
earnestly.  At the same time, he is open to the well-timed 
joke or lighter comment.  In the latter regard, Erdogan is a 
passionate fan of Fenerbahce, nicknamed the Yellow Canary, 
one of the big three Istanbul (and Turkish) soccer clubs; a 
gift with a yellow or yellow and blue motif would be a hit, 
especially if accompanied by a comment relating to his 
passion for soccer.  Erdogan's style is to make his points 
initially softly and laconically; if he meets resistance he 
ratchets up his second response, becoming more stern with 
each exchange on the topic.  He reacts badly to overt 
pressure or implied threats.  The best way to convince him to 
take a tough decision is to appeal calmly but man-to-man to 
his sense of destiny as Turkey's leader. 
 
 
--------------- 
Erdogan's Party 
--------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ref (C) lays out AK's strengths and challenges as they 
may affect U.S. interests.  In the latter regard, we are 
seeing a post-election differentiation, and thus more of an 
opening for intra-party tension, in two areas.  First, 
between the party's parliamentary group (which just elected a 
more religiously conservative set of whips than P.M. Gul 
expected) and party leadership (which is more weighted to the 
pragmatic group around Erdogan and Gul).  Second, between 
fiery parliamentary Speaker Arinc and the calmer Gul (ref D). 
 Erdogan will have his hands full keeping the party together 
as the strains of governing and legislating and outside 
pressures from the Establishment, public opinion, and foreign 
policy demands play on the fractions and fissures already 
extant in this conglomerate party.  Many of our contacts from 
left to center-right predict that AK will split within a 
year.  Perhaps this assessment is wishful thinking tinged 
with envy, but AK indeed faces marked internal stresses going 
forward. 
 
 
-------------------- 
Erdogan's Government 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) Erdogan is not yet in the government, but by 
dominating the news he has ensured that everyone here and 
abroad recognizes him as de facto -- and future de jure -- 
head of government.  Gul's cabinet (ref E), formed under 
Erdogan's guidance, mixes men with experience dealing with 
the Deep State or bureaucracy -- Defense (DefMin Gonul is 
respected by President Sezer, who is otherwise wary of the 
new government), Interior, MFA, Education -- with insiders 
from Erdogan's Istanbul municipal administration and some 
with wheeler-dealer business connections. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Gul will rapidly shepherd through Parliament 
EU-related democratic reforms and the constitutional changes 
designed to open the door for Erdogan's assumption of the 
prime ministership, perhaps in mid- to late winter.  A large 
question remains whether AK has a skillful enough pool of 
talent to staff the Undersecretary levels and below.  We thus 
share Turkish observers' questions about how well AK will be 
able (a) to respond pragmatically on foreign policy; (b) to 
maintain credible economic reform and banking supervisory 
standards; and (c) to carry out its intended strong reform 
and anti-corruption drives when faced with deeply entrenched 
interests and practices. 
 
 
------------------------ 
How to Influence Erdogan 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶10. (C) Given Erdogan's wariness toward the Turkish 
bureaucracy, it will be key to draw Erdogan aside from his 
bureaucratic minders to elicit his true thinking on sensitive 
topics.  At the same time, U.S. interlocutors can enhance the 
impact of their message if they have aides cultivate his 
closest advisors, especially Erdogan's closest foreign policy 
advisor Omer Celik.  In the wake of the Dec. 3 
Wolfowitz-Grossman visit, we suggest the following approach 
to Erdogan on four key questions: 
 
 
--Iraq: emphasize the benefits to Turkey of full cooperation 
in coalition preparations for a possible military operation 
and convince Erdogan he can sell maximum cooperation as not 
letting foreigners control Turkey's future: "if you don't 
play the game you don't make the rules." 
 
 
--EU and reform: in reiterating the strength of our support 
for Turkey's candidacy, give Erdogan our latest information 
on EU member states' stance (as we have been doing regularly 
in Ankara) to prepare him for his lobbying in Copenhagen, 
emphasize the crucial impact of further reform, and urge him 
to portray the Summit decision on Turkey positively. 
 
 
--Cyprus: urge Erdogan to get Denktas to reach a settlement 
soonest. 
 
 
--Economic reform, anti-corruption, anti-torture measures, 
and open government: note that Erdogan's party will be 
measured at home most by these four yardsticks, note the 
centrality of maintaining reform momentum and strong, clean 
banking regulation for the government's image and for 
preserving market confidence (Erdogan is coming under the 
sway of corrupt and failed bank owners). 
PEARSON