This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON PLEASE PASS DEPSECDEF 
CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: BACKGROUND ON CHP CHAIRMAN DENIZ BAYKAL 
 
 
REF: A. 95 ANKARA 12868 
     ¶B. 95 ANKARA 10386 
     ¶C. ANKARA 8079 
     ¶D. ANKARA 7726 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons: 1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Combining a sharp intellect with a divisive 
manner, Deniz Baykal is back in Parliament as opposition 
leader of a CHP reeling from the thrashing it received at the 
hands of Islam-influenced AK Party in Nov. 3 national 
elections.  Aware of widespread public perceptions that he is 
a "factionalist", Baykal has tried to assure the public that 
he will lead a responsible opposition.  His de facto role as 
parliamentary representative of the Establishment, however, 
will encourage him to sharpen differences between CHP and the 
AK government.  End summary. 
 
 
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General Bio Data 
---------------- 
 
 
¶2. (U) Baykal was born in 1938 to a middle class family in 
Antalya, now a booming tourist resort on the Mediterranean 
coast.  He is a graduate of Ankara University, earning both a 
law degree and a doctorate in political science in 1963. 
Baykal was a Fulbrighter in 1965, studying for two years at 
Columbia U. and U.C. Berkeley.  He claims he was active in 
the free speech movement there.  Baykal is married, with a 
son and daughter, both of whom are physicians.  He speaks 
good English. 
 
 
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Baykal's Character 
------------------ 
 
 
¶3. (C) Baykal is known as a man of sharp intellect with a 
photographic memory.  He is reportedly able to listen at 
length without interrupting (rare for a Turkish politician), 
and then to summarize his interlocutor's points concisely and 
accurately.  In American terms he is a policy wonk, quickly 
mastering details and concepts of both domestic and foreign 
policy.  At the same time he is not a warm man in front of 
crowds and has an aggressive, biting debating style. 
Fiercely competitive and ambitious, he is able to win intense 
loyalty from his closest followers, but is seen in general as 
overly shrewd and as an opportunist.  His image is colored 
most by his history of disruptive political tactics over 
minor issues both within CHP (the Republican People's Party, 
founded by Ataturk and considered the Party of the State par 
excellence) and on the political scene in general.  In short, 
he is considered the current political scene's most 
polarizing figure. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Baykal's personal character is reflected by the course 
of a long career in politics, which formally began with the 
CHP in the 1960s and included several months' incarceration 
(along with then CHP leader Bulent Ecevit and other senior 
politicians across the spectrum) after the 1980 military 
coup.  His taste for political infighting and factionalism 
engendered a profound antagonism among his many 
former-allies-turned-rivals -- including Ecevit, with whom he 
formally and bitterly parted ways in the 1980s. 
 
 
¶5. (C) In the 1987 elections, Baykal was elected to 
Parliament under the banner of the Social Democrat Peoples' 
Party (SHP), becoming the SHP Secretary-General shortly 
thereafter.  He used the post in an attempt to topple SHP 
leader Erdal Inonu by launching a purge of Inonu supporters 
from key party positions.  Having failed ultimately to oust 
Inonu, Baykal left SHP for the newly-revived CHP (closed 
after the 1980 coup), becoming its chairman in 1992.  In 
1995, as junior partner and briefly FonMin in a coalition 
under P.M. Tansu Ciller's DYP (True Path Party), Baykal 
promoted a government crisis that brought down the 
Government, paving the way for early elections that 
eventually brought Turkey's first Islamist-led government to 
power in 1996.  Baykal, who was lending essential support 
from outside to Mesut Yilmaz's 1997-98 ANAP-led coalition, 
also provoked that government's collapse over a minor issue. 
Disgusted with Baykal's wrecker tactics, voters booted him 
and CHP out of Parliament in the 1999 elections. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Following the 1999 election debacle, Baykal resigned 
his chairmanship, but planted his loyalists in enough places 
that he was able to engineer a comeback a year later. 
However, memories of Baykal's character traits have lingered, 
especially among his natural left-of-center constitutents 
These memories were partly responsible for CHP's inability to 
unite the left-of-center vote and thus for CHP's trouncing by 
AK Party in the Nov. 3 elections (refs C, D), even in 
traditional CHP strongholds in the West of Turkey.  Although 
CHP now joins AK as one of only two parties in the 
Parliament, CHP activists and officials are deeply 
disappointed by their distant second-place finish.  Much of 
the blame has been placed on Baykal; CHP and Baykal also 
suffered from their reputation as elitists sharply out of 
touch with the average Turkish voter. 
 
 
------------------- 
Meeting with Baykal 
------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) In meetings with USG officials, Baykal will try to 
leave the impression that he has changed into a conciliatory 
statesman.  He will be alert for any intimation he can take 
to his party, the Establishment, and the voters that the USG 
is uncomfortable with AK or wants to see AK leader Erdogan, 
who is formally banned from politics and thus unable to serve 
as Prime Minister, kept on the political sidelines.  Our 
willingness to work with the new government is clear and we 
must be careful to avoid giving Baykal any cause to 
misrepresent our stance. 
 
 
¶8. (C) On foreign policy issues, Baykal supports pressing for 
an accession negotiation date from the EU.  He has not been 
helpful to our efforts to press the GOT and Turkish Cypriots 
toward a settlement.  On Iraq Baykal has been careful not to 
commit himself either way despite the general anti-war (and 
reflexive anti-American) sentiment in his party.  However, in 
an end-September public statement he hinted that, under 
certain circumstances, he might be prepared to accept a 
regime-change solution in Iraq when he acknowledged that "we 
have to be prepared for situations that may occur outside our 
will or expectations." 
 
 
¶9. (C) Baykal is trying to promote the image of CHP as a 
reformist party.  He may well wish to highlight his party's 
call for lifting of parliamentary immunity and contrast this 
stance with that of AK, which is trying to sidestep the 
issue.  Several AK ministers, associates of Erdogan from his 
days as Istanbul Mayor, are like their leader facing 
allegations of corruption, which AK regards as a political 
effort by the Deep State to hold a tight rein on the party 
and the government.  However, Baykal has also reiterated his 
conditional support for some changes to the Turkish 
constitution that could help pave the way for Erdogan's 
return to elective politics. 
 
 
PEARSON