This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP 
USCINCPAC FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI: CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE 
 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez.  Reason: 1.5 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Razali told diplomats at an early evening 
briefing today that the dialog between the NLD and the SPDC 
appeared to be stalled as much by a personality conflict 
between Aung San Suu Kyi and Than Shwe as anything else. 
Each one is imperious in his own way and neither is ready to 
compromise.  The visit also made clear that Than Shwe was the 
decision-maker in Burma; any commitments made by Khin Nyunt 
had to be confirmed by Than Shwe.  That said, Khin Nyunt had 
broached the idea of reconvening a reformulated National 
Convention -- a suggestion that is apparently acceptable, at 
least in principle, to both ASSK and the ethnic parties. 
Khin Nyunt also suggested that 200 to 300 additional 
political prisoners and security detainees could be released 
by the close of the year, though, again, as with all other 
matters, Than Shwe failed to confirm the commitment. Finally, 
Razali confirmed that he would continue as Special Envoy, 
with his next visit possibly occurring early next year. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) UN Special Envoy Razali told diplomats November 15 
that he would continue in his role as facilitator for the 
talks between the NLD and the GOB.  He was, he said, 
beginning to get a feel for "the complexities of the 
situation".  He had met with Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt, Aung San 
Suu Kyi representatives of the ethnic communities and Senior 
General Than Shwe and understood now that there were at least 
"two levels of decision-making" within the SPDC.  Any 
commitments by Khin Nyunt had to be confirmed by Senior 
General Than Shwe.  Furthermore, there was probably blame on 
both sides for the lack of progress on the dialogue. 
 
¶3. (C) Razali described his meeting with Khin Nyunt as "very 
good, very candid and very relaxed."  Razali took Khin Nyunt 
up on his failure to deliver on his August promise to Razali 
regarding the start of real dialog. Khin Nyunt said he was 
doing his best, trying to act "as a catalyst between the NLD 
and the SPDC."' However, every aspect of exchanges with the 
NLD were examined every week in detail by the SPDC.  As a 
result, it was difficult to move forward on anything.  Khin 
Nyunt also told Razali that there was "a channel of 
discussion" between the NLD and the SPDC.  The Minister of 
Education (a cousin of Than Shwe, he is also Secretary 
General of the USDA), the Deputy Minister of Information and 
Brigadier General Than Thun had met four times with Aung San 
Suu Kyi in "round table discussions" which Khin Nyunt 
described as "positive and constructive."  in the same 
breath, however, he also complained that ASSK had to take the 
discussions more seriously.  Seemingly, she was disdainful of 
both the participants and the topics on the table.  In fact, 
Razali said, when he met with her, she was scornful of the 
meetings with the Minister of Education et al. 
 
¶4. (C) Khin Nyunt also told Razali that he is prepared to 
reconvene the National Convention with adjustments in its 
rules and procedures, though, when pushed on what adjustments 
would be made, was vague.  Similarly, Khin Nyunt also 
suggested that as many as 300 additional political prisoners 
and security detainees could be released before the close of 
the year. Aung San Suu Kyi, Razali said, agreed that the NLD 
would rejoin a properly reformulated National Convention. 
According to Razali, representatives of ethnic parties also 
accepted the idea of a reconvened Convention. 
 
¶5. (C) Than Shwe gave Razali only fifteen minutes, but that 
was enough to convince Razali that Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe 
were not always on the same page.  Than Shwe for instance did 
not commit to reconvening the National Convention and, 
according to Razali, even now he cannot say whether or not 
the GOB will go that route.  Similarly, when the topic turned 
to consultations with the NLD regarding humanitarian 
assistance for Burma -- an idea which Khin Nyunt had accepted 
-- Than Shwe, while not saying a word, gave every indication 
of acute discomfort.  He also failed to confirm Khin Nyunt's 
commitment on the release of political prisoners.  The most 
he would say is that he would "do the best for the country." 
Than Shwe also vetoed Razali's final meeting with Aung San 
Suu Kyi, which had been scheduled for Taungyi in Shan State, 
where she is traveling on NLD business.  According to Than 
Shwe, ASSK was on a "political tour" and any meeting by 
Razali with her while she was on that tour would show undue 
favoritism for the NLD. 
 
¶6. (C) In general, Razali concluded that the relationship 
between ASSK and Than Shwe was extremely difficult.  There 
was a great deal of suspicion of ASSK's activities and 
apparently Than Shwe felt that somehow, somewhere ASSK had 
offended him on two occasions, though nobody would say 
exactly what the offense was.  As for ASSK, she simply had a 
"hard personality" that Than Shwe (and others) had difficulty 
dealing with. 
 
¶7. (C) On other topics, Razali said that he had been warned 
not to raise Burma's economic situation with Than Shwe. 
Presumably, the senior general had gotten an earful from 
other ASEAN members during the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh. 
He also suggested that he might be back in January or 
February for what will be his tenth visit. 
Martinez