This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/BCLTV, INL AND DRL 
CINCPAC FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: NLD STATUS REPORT: SIX MONTHS AFTER ASSK'S RELEASE 
 
REF: RANGOON 575 AND 578 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:  Almost six months after her release from 
house detention, ASSK continues with a disciplined, 
non-confrontational strategy to rebuild her political forces 
while attempting to draw the regime into dialogue on national 
reconciliation.  She has succeeded in reviving NLD 
leadership, reopening offices, and rebuilding ties with other 
political entities, including ethnic groups.  She has 
traveled to various locations outside Rangoon, met with UN, 
NGO and foreign officials, and refined her stance on 
international assistance and other issues.  While carefully 
avoiding any direct criticism of the regime, ASSK has 
expressed her dismay at deteriorating social and economic 
conditions and consistently called on the SPDC to join with 
the NLD in fostering positive change.  She also continues to 
press the SPDC for the release of all political prisoners, 
and restoration of political freedoms for Burma's people and 
its political parties.  In sum, ASSK has kept the moral 
pressure on the regime, while slowly but surely expanding the 
political space for political parties and other members of 
the opposition.  However, she has been careful throughout not 
to give the SPDC any reason to end the NLD's somewhat 
increased liberties.  End Summary 
 
Building Trust, Rebuilding the Party 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The May 6 release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), after 
almost 19 months of house detention (reftels), was expected 
to mark the end of confidence building and the beginning of 
substantive dialogue on national reconciliation between her 
party, the National League for Democracy, and the ruling 
junta, the State Peace and Development council (SPDC). 
Unfortunately, the SPDC has not responded to the NLD and 
international community's calls for dialogue, political 
reform, and the release of all political prisoners.  It has, 
however, released about 158 political prisoners since May. 
At the same time, SPDC economic policies are creating greater 
hardships throughout the country.  The SPDC also began 
arresting and sentencing political activists in greater 
numbers than it had since confidence-building talks began in 
October 2000.  Altogether, about 45 persons were detained in 
August and September, although about half of these were 
subsequently released.  Meanwhile, ASSK has maintained a 
well-disciplined, non-confrontational strategy to rebuild her 
political forces while attempting to draw the SPDC into 
dialogue. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  In the first few weeks after ASSK,s May 6 release, 
government officials harassed some of the individuals and 
organizations that she visited.  She was prohibited from 
visiting government projects, UN organizations were warned 
not to meet with her, and staff of an international NGO were 
harassed after her visit to their project site.  Discreetly 
and patiently, ASSK worked with military intelligence (MI) to 
address these and other actions that contradicted the 
government's commitment to allow her freedom of movement. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  ASSK has also kept her own party under control. 
She has prohibited any NLD criticism of the SPDC.  The NLD 
made no public mention of the limitations on her movements or 
harassment of those with whom she met.  When she traveled to 
project sites and witnessed the desperate conditions people 
live under she made no public criticism of the SPDC. 
Instead, she cited the conditions as an imperative for the 
SPDC, NLD, and others to work together to address the needs 
of the people.  Even when the SPDC arrested NLD youth in 
Rangoon for carrying illegal literature and NLD leaders in 
Shan State for "acts against the state," she did not speak 
out except to insist that they receive legal representation 
and due process. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  ASSK also avoided any public criticism of the SPDC 
on human rights issues including the allegations of military 
rapes in Shan State.  Despite rumors of some grumbling within 
the NLD over this conciliatory stance, ASSK has enforced 
strict party discipline.  As a result, there have been no 
instances of lower level leaders or members publicly 
criticizing the regime. 
 
Pressure Builds for Action 
 
¶6. (SBU)  While ASSK has used the time since her release to 
travel to five locations in states and divisions to reopen 
party offices (now up to 66 out of 330) and rebuild party 
organization, she has also had to contend with increasing 
internal and international pressure for a change in the 
decade old political stalemate between the NLD and the SPDC. 
The international community viewed her release with optimism 
and donor countries, the UN, and NGOs began positioning for 
increased assistance to the country.  At the same time, the 
increasingly dire humanitarian crisis in Burma put pressure 
on ASSK to agree to increased levels of humanitarian support. 
 With no real political progress, however, she has emphasized 
that foreign assistance would be welcome only if it did not 
directly benefit the SPDC and was carefully targeted and 
monitored to ensure that it reached the people.  Based on 
this criteria, she has endorsed HIV/AIDS funding by the U.S. 
($1m to international NGOs) and the U.K. ($15 million to UN 
agencies and international NGO,s) and other discrete 
assistance projects in the country. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  ASSK has also faced pressure from ethnic groups who 
support the NLD but who want their interests represented in 
any dialogue with the SPDC.  Shortly after her release ASSK 
met with ethnic leaders and convinced them that dialogue with 
the SPDC must begin with the NLD and later, at an appropriate 
stage, expand to include ethnic groups.  She reassured them 
that the NLD would be negotiating for all the people of 
Burma, not just the NLD constituency.  Special Envoy Razali 
also advocated this approach, and encouraged ethnic leaders 
to meet and develop common positions so they would be 
prepared when tripartite dialogue began.  As months went by 
and the SPDC failed to initiate dialogue with the NLD, ethnic 
groups became increasingly frustrated by the lack of 
progress. 
 
The CRPP: A Shift in Tactics? 
 
¶8. (SBU)  On October 23 the NLD and ethnic parties announced 
the expansion of the Committee Representing the Peoples, 
Parliament (CRPP), a Committee the SPDC views as a direct 
challenge to its legitimacy.  The CRPP, after all, had 
declared when it was founded in 1998 that the SPDC was not 
the legitimate government and that the CRPP would act as a 
parliamentary body until the military allowed a return to an 
elected government.  Widespread arrests of Members of 
Parliament-elect and political activists (some of whom remain 
in prison) followed. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  The revival and expansion of the CRPP now (to 
include leaders of four ethnic parties that received a 
substantial number of ethnic votes in the 1990 elections) 
appears to be a calculated move to consolidate ethnic support 
behind the NLD, facilitate coordination among the ethnic 
groups and the NLD, and prod the SPDC toward substantive 
dialogue.  Apparently, ASSK believes changed circumstances 
will prevent another crackdown similar to the one in 1998. 
She has demonstrated that she can maintain confidentiality in 
her discussions with the SPDC, that she can maintain party 
discipline to work constructively with the regime, and that 
she enjoys the support of at least some ethnic leaders. 
Apparently, ASSK hopes this will be enough to deter the SPDC 
from initiating a new round of political arrests. 
 
Next Steps.... 
 
¶10. (SBU)  While there is no sign that the SPDC is yet moving 
toward substantive dialogue with the NLD on constitutional 
issues, deteriorating economic conditions and international 
pressure for change may combine to spur the regime in that 
direction.  Special Envoy Razali will return to Rangoon on 
November 12 and will likely call for the SPDC to follow 
through on its earlier commitments to work with the NLD, 
increase political freedoms, and release political prisoners. 
 The international community is also pressing the regime for 
political reforms to address reports of human rights abuses 
and the looming humanitarian crisis.  Many here believe the 
SPDC has backed itself into a corner with its poor management 
of the economy.  In any case, the NLD has continued to press 
for change, albeit quietly. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Looking ahead, however, there must be questions as 
to how long the current disciplined dialogue will endure 
without real progress on central issues.  Unquestionably, the 
continued confidence-building has been welcome.  Given the 
hate that has built up in Burma over the past 60 years, there 
will be scope for additional confidence-building between all 
the communities for at least the next several generations. 
Nevertheless, unless all parties are soon showed a goal, and 
a road map for democratic change, then even the small measure 
of goodwill that has been built up between the government and 
the opposition could be washed away.  Both sides seem to 
recognize this, but both must equally be willing to act on 
critical issues.  ASSK now is ready to act.  We have seen no 
indication, however, that the SPDC is willing to meet her, 
even halfway. 
Martinez