This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 002091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2012 
TAGS: PGOV NP
SUBJECT: TO JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN:  THE NEPALI PARTIES' 
DILEMMA 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 2025 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) King Gyanendra's dismissal of the government of 
former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and appointment of 
an interim government have spotlighted long-standing 
tensions--and mutual suspicions--between the political 
parties and the Palace.  Conversations with leaders of the 
two largest political parties reveal a deep-seated mistrust 
of the King and his motives that interprets his action as 
part of a carefully orchestrated plan to sideline and 
undermine the parties.  The Palace, for its part, has made 
little effort so far to mask its disdain for the self-serving 
political leaders.  India reportedly is undertaking a 
campaign to persuade Nepal's leading politicians to take part 
in the interim government.  Given India's influence in 
Nepal's domestic politics, at least some of the 
parties--perhaps the Communist Party of Nepal - United 
Marxist Leninist (UML)--may take the bait.  Unfortunately, 
only the Maoists, with their well-known proclivity for 
driving wedges among competing political interests, stand to 
benefit from the ongoing polarization between the Palace and 
the parties.  End summary. 
 
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PARTY/PALACE POLARITY 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Since King Gyanendra's October 11 appointment of an 
interim government under Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand, the mainstream political parties have remained 
pointedly aloof from the Cabinet.  The stalemate is fueling a 
growing polarity between the Palace and parties that could 
undermine any efforts to re-establish dialogue with the 
Maoists.  When the King used his constitutional authority to 
sack the government of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba October 4, he invited all of the mainstream political 
parties to give him, within five days, nominations of members 
to an interim Cabinet.  One week later, when the parties 
ostensibly failed to provide him the nominations within the 
stipulated deadline, the King appointed his own candidate, 
Lokendra Bahadur Chand, as caretaker Prime Minister, as well 
as eight other members of an interim Cabinet.  The 
politicians immediately cried foul, with the leaders of the 
two largest political parties, the Nepali Congress and the 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML), 
crying the loudest and longest.  Despite PM Chand's overtures 
to party leaders to nominate members to fill the remaining 
seven vacant slots in his Cabinet, only the Nepal Sadbhavana 
Party, whose Acting President Badri Prasad Mandal the King 
made Deputy PM, has announced it is ready to take Chand up on 
his offer.  (We expect Chand's National Democratic Party, 
a.k.a RPP, to make a similar announcement soon.) 
 
¶3.  (C)   The Palace's version of events thus far is fairly 
straightforward.  The King, acting on a commitment to 
multi-party democracy, invited the parties' participation in 
the interim government, but the parties, recalcitrant and 
fractious as usual, could not agree on a slate of names 
within the stipulated time frame.  The King's previously 
stated commitment to multi-party democracy and holding 
elections as early as possible, however, remains unchanged. 
He has told us that he consulted constitutional experts 
before undertaking his action, and is confident of its 
constitutionality.  The Chand government continues to seek 
the parties' nominations for the rest of the Cabinet, as well 
as their consensus on an early date for elections (Ref A). 
 
¶4.  (C)  The two largest parties, however, tell a somewhat 
different story.  Conversations with Nepali Congress 
President and former PM G.P. Koirala and UML leader Madhav 
Nepal, as well as with other members of the Nepali Congress 
and UML leadership, reveal a long-standing, deep-seated 
mistrust of the Palace and its motives--with some even 
intimating the current imbroglio is the outcome of a 
carefully hatched plot by the King and his royalist cronies 
to undermine democracy.  They view the affable, ever-amenable 
Chand as no more than a stooge to carry out the Palace's 
bidding.  Koirala and Nepal have each recounted events that 
suggest the Palace misrepresented its intentions in private 
consultations with the parties.  According to both Koirala 
and Nepal, in private audiences on or before October 11 the 
King asked for their approval of Chand as PM.  Both tell us 
they gave their approval--or at least offered no 
objection--with the understanding that the new PM would then 
consult with the party leaders on nominations for the rest of 
the Cabinet.  That consultation would preserve "the spirit of 
Clause 128" of the Constitution, in their view, which covered 
the formation of the the first Cabinet under democracy. 
Clause 128 stipulated that that first Cabinet consist of 
'representatives of the main political parties" chosen on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister.  Both tell us they went 
away from their meetings with the belief that the King had 
agreed to that arrangement--only to be surprised late October 
11 by the announcement of eight other Cabinet members along 
with Chand.  (The Nepal Sadbhavana Party leadership did not 
know its Acting President was to be join the Cabinet until 
the announcement, according to the party's General Secretary.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  Besides feeling they had been hoodwinked, Koirala 
and Nepal cited an additional barrier to their parties' 
participation in Chand's Cabinet.  Both argue that the King 
has never actually ceded to the new PM the executive power he 
assumed after his October 4 dismissal of Deuba.  (Koirala 
said Chand had admitted as much to him, adding that the King, 
rather than Chand, picked the rest of the Cabinet.)  The lack 
of executive authority makes Chand no more than "a titular 
Prime Minister," Koirala told us, and his Cabinet a "puppet 
government," in Nepal's view, which would be "suicidal" for 
any self-respecting democratic party to join.  A Prime 
Minister should be accountable to the people first, rather 
than to the Palace, Nepal noted.  Under the current 
situation, however, the reverse holds true, he asserted.  "If 
the government is only a tool (of the Palace), why should we 
join?" 
 
¶6.  (C)  Both Koirala and Nepal argue that the interim 
government needs the political parties to gain popular 
support.  Koirala said he had advised the King to form a 
Cabinet with political party members to give himself a buffer 
between the vicissitudes of government and popular 
discontent.  The King violated the preamble of the 
Constitution, which awards sovereignty to the people, when he 
arrogated executive powers to himself, Koirala charged.  Both 
Nepal and Koirala said the King must "correct his mistakes" 
by giving Chand the authority to reform his Cabinet in the 
"spirit of Clause 128," i.e., in consultation with the 
parties, if he truly wants to broaden partisan participation 
in the caretaker government.  The UML might take part in such 
a reformed Cabinet; Koirala's Nepali Congress, he claims, 
would stay out, but would not agitate against it. 
 
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GYANENDRA:  "AMBITIOUS" AND DECISIVE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Some observers who have met the King describe him as 
shrewd, articulate, and far more decisive than his late 
brother.  One former Nepali ambassador to the UK who knew 
Gyanendra years before he became King describes him as 
"ambitious" and critical of his late brother's passivity 
during the drive for democracy.  Others, while stopping short 
of criticizing the King himself, say they are uneasy because 
of the close coterie of pro-monarchist advisors that surround 
him.  In private discussions (both with the Ambassador and as 
reported by other interlocutors), the King has made no secret 
of his impatience with the political parties, citing them for 
corruption, self-interest, and ineffectuality in dealing with 
the Maoists, points echoed by the Royal Nepal Army 
leadership.  Despite this antipathy, at least some of the 
King's advisors agree that the new government needs 
multiparty participation--both to afford the King political 
cover and to make the government more credible to Nepalis and 
to the international community.  (No one, however, makes the 
argument that including the parties will increase the 
government's effectiveness or competence.)  The King's 
rigidity in setting conditions for participation in the 
government has made it increasingly difficult for the parties 
to accept his terms.  We have heard reports that the Indian 
government, through its Embassy in Kathmandu, will step up 
efforts over the next few weeks to persuade political parties 
to take part in the government.  To make this work, the 
Palace may have to back down from some of its previous 
preconditions for Cabinet membership--perhaps scrapping the 
prohibition against members contesting the next election. 
(We have heard reports that the King may be willing to do 
this.)  In addition, the Indians may ask that the King make 
clear that he has handed back executive power to the Prime 
Minister. 
 
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THE MAOISTS 
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¶8.  (C) But the mainstream parties and the Palace are only 
part of the political equation.  The Maoists, who seem to 
thrive on the political factionalization endemic in Nepal, 
must also be factored in.  The insurgents have responded in 
typically cryptic fashion to interim government overtures for 
dialogue, neither categorically ruling them out nor accepting 
them.  Instead, they have called for the King, members of 
political parties, and civil society to work together toward 
"a conducive atmosphere" for dialogue--predicated on the 
well-nigh impossible condition of the King first agreeing to 
a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.  (Note: 
In Maoist parlance, revision of the Constitution is shorthand 
for severing the King's authority over the Army and other 
changes that would provide a foothold for the 
militants--including ultimate abolition of the monarchy--in 
the Nepali power system.  End note.) In the meantime, they 
are keeping up their campaign of killing, extortion, and 
strike-calling, confident that the stalemate between the 
parties and the Palace will keep the heat off them. 
Pratyoush Onta, a Nepali scholar, told us the Maoists are 
masters of the art of obfuscation and "rhetorical confusion," 
never missing a chance to sow dissension among various 
political forces and reap advantage from polarities that may 
develop.  Unfortunately, Onta says, the parties--and now, 
apparently, the Palace as well--time and time again play into 
the Maoists' hands, allowing themselves to be manipulated 
into the insurgents' divide-and-conquer game. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (C)  Mistrust of the Palace by political leaders like 
G.P. Koirala and Madhav Nepal is an outgrowth of the years of 
repression and personal hardship suffered in the struggle 
leading to the restoration of democracy in 1990. 
Unfortunately, the current King's firmness in dealing with 
the parties--as well as his alleged disingenuousness in 
revealing his intentions--have done little to dispel that 
mistrust.  The King may well have cause to be impatient with 
the parties' penchant for bickering and preoccupation with 
short-term political gain.  But the King needs the parties' 
participation--and their popular base, however battered--if 
the interim government is to accomplish the many ambitious 
tasks set for it, such as setting a date for elections and 
initiating dialogue with the Maoists.  Without the parties' 
participation, the King's reassurances of his commitment to 
multi-party democracy and early elections will begin to wear 
thin.  Presenting a united front before the Maoists, 
moreover, has to be the first step in seeking dialogue with 
the insurgents.  Otherwise, the insurgents can later renege 
on any agreement reached, claiming it did not have popular 
support.  Like it or not, the King must offer the parties 
some face-saving concession--perhaps scrapping the 
prohibition against Cabinet members contesting the election 
and/or allowing Chand to restructure the Cabinet--if he truly 
wants to obtain the multi-partisan, consensus government he 
says he wants.  The question then will be whether the party 
leaders will rise above their narrow personal and partisan 
interests and work together, under the King's leadership, for 
the good of the nation and the restoration of full democracy. 
 
MALINOWSKI