This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. 
MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  11-05-2002 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PINR CE NO TH LTTE
SUBJECT: Reviewing recent talks, Norwegian envoy upbeat, 
but stresses that process still has long way to go 
 
Refs:  (A) Bangkok 7737 
-      (B) Colombo 2064, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a November 4 meeting with 
Ambassador Wills, Norwegian Ambassador Westborg was 
upbeat about the recently concluded second session of 
GSL-LTTE talks, but stressed that the process still had 
a long way to go.  He took note of the LTTE's apparent 
downgrading of its long-standing demand for an "interim 
administration" and the group's willingness to 
participate in a sub-committee on political issues.  He 
confirmed that the sub-committee on humanitarian issues 
would be a decision-making body.  Westborg hoped that 
Muslim-LTTE relations would improve due to the talks and 
he provided insights on LTTE dynamics.  Unlike some of 
the effusive press coverage, Westborg's review was sober 
and we thought it hit the mark.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
Westborg:  Upbeat but Cautious 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Wills, accompanied by polchief, met 
late November 4 with Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg, 
a member of the GoN peace facilitation team at the just- 
concluded second session of talks held between the Sri 
Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE).  (Note:  The talks took place October 31 - 
November 3 at a hotel outside of Bangkok -- See 
Reftels.)  Westborg was upbeat about the outcome of the 
talks.  "The two sides accomplished many small things, 
which added up to a lot," he commented.  These 
accomplishments had been achieved despite two 
"torpedoes" that could have broken up the talks.  First, 
the LTTE side did not let a Colombo court's recent 
conviction in absentia of its leader, V. Prabhakaran, of 
involvement in a 1996 terror attack disrupt the talks 
(see Ref B).  Second, the LTTE reacted calmly to the 
news that six of its cadre had been arrested carrying 
arms off the eastern coast on November 1. 
 
¶3.  (C) Despite the positive outcome of the talks, 
Westborg stressed that it was important not to get 
carried away.  Some of the press coverage had been too 
effusive in asserting, for example, that the talks had 
led to a "breakthrough" for the peace process.  "The 
process still has a very long way to go and everyone 
should realize that," Westborg underlined.  Caution in 
these type of situations was important, as many things 
could happen.  The Ambassador noted that he appreciated 
Westborg's sober assessment, adding that Norway deserved 
congratulations for keeping the process together and 
increasing its momentum. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
"Interim Administration," Political Sub-Committee 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked for other insights into the talks, 
Westborg replied that it was important not to overlook 
LTTE senior negotiator Anton Balasingham's comment that 
the group "may or may not" support formation of an 
"interim administration" for the north and east.  (Note: 
See Ref B Para 4 for the text of Balasingham's remark, 
which was made at the November 3 press conference 
concluding the talks.)  The peace track has had its ups- 
and-downs over the years, but one constant has been the 
LTTE's demand for the setting up of an interim 
administration to be followed down the road by a final 
settlement, he noted.  While not foreclosing on that 
demand, Balasingham's comment called it into question. 
In doing this, Westborg related, the LTTE seemed to be 
acknowledging that the whole issue of an interim 
administration had become more trouble than it might be 
worth.  There was serious opposition in the south to the 
notion that the GSL would turn over the north and east 
to an administration effectively controlled by the LTTE. 
In addition, Westborg commented, the LTTE was probably 
becoming worried that if it was given control of an 
interim administration it would actually have to govern. 
The group probably realized that this would be difficult 
to do, especially in areas it was not in total armed 
control of, and it did not want to be called to account. 
 
¶5.  (C) The LTTE's apparent downgrading of the need for 
an interim administration was matched in importance by 
its acceptance of the idea of forming a sub-committee on 
political matters, Westborg remarked.  (Note:  At the 
talks, the GSL and the LTTE agreed to set up three sub- 
committees focused on political, humanitarian and de- 
escalation issues -- See Reftels.)  What was especially 
important about this sub-committee's ambit, he 
continued, was that it would reach for "broad political 
understandings."  The sub-committee also could meet at 
any time the parties wanted it to, not only at plenary 
sessions of the talks. 
 
¶6.  (C) In the short-term, Westborg allowed, the 
formation of the sub-committee would also undercut 
President Kumaratunga's public assertion that the talks 
were not dealing with "core" issues.  (Note:  FYI: 
Westborg said he planned to brief Kumaratunga on the 
talks on November 5.)  This was an advantage for the 
government.  In the longer term, the political sub- 
committee could also be the forum where the LTTE and GSL 
tackle tough issues related to managing the north and 
east until a final settlement is reached, particularly 
if the idea of forming an interim administration is 
dropped. 
 
¶7.  (C) In reference to "core" issues, the Ambassador 
asked whether the issue of decommissioning of LTTE 
weapons had been raised.  Westborg replied that it had 
not, but he acknowledged that it was an issue that would 
have to be addressed in the future.  Ambassador Wills 
agreed, noting that the idea that the LTTE might 
maintain an army and a navy would be controversial, 
indeed unacceptable, in the south.  It would be 
understandable if the group wanted to have a police 
force, but a military force would add an element of 
unpredictability that would prove tough to digest.  The 
Ambassador added that any notion that the Sri Lankan 
security forces would completely withdraw from the north 
and east, as some pro-LTTE Tamils were advocating, was 
also a non-starter. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Review of Humanitarian Sub-Committee 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Shifting focus, Westborg also reviewed what the 
two sides had agreed to regarding the  "Immediate 
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and 
East" Sub-Committee.  He underscored that this sub- 
committee had replaced the "joint task force" ("JTF") 
idea (which had been agreed to at the first session of 
talks in mid-September).  The humanitarian sub-committee 
would deal with the same issues as the "JTF," however. 
It would be a joint government-LTTE "decision-making 
body" for prioritizing and disbursing assistance to the 
north and east, he stated.  What was slightly different 
was that the sub-committee was part and parcel of the 
peace talks, and not some quasi-independent body, which 
was what the "JTF" was being made out to be by some 
critics.  The sub-committee would report to the Sri 
Lankan prime minister and the LTTE, but would not 
require parliamentary oversight. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. had not yet 
made up its mind about the new sub-committee.  Because 
of the LTTE's involvement, we reserved judgment at this 
time, he noted.  Westborg replied that he understood 
that, but wanted to stress that the sub-committee would 
be focused on "helping the people of the north and 
east."  If it was backed by donors and was successful, 
the sub-committee could reinforce the ceasefire and help 
the peace process gain traction.  In addition, via its 
participation in the sub-committee, the LTTE would be 
obliged to respect human rights norms, and be otherwise 
accountable to the populace in the north and east.  The 
Ambassador replied that he appreciated that explanation, 
but the U.S. would have to study the issue further. 
 
---------------- 
Muslim/LTTE Ties 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Questioned about LTTE-Muslim relations, 
Westborg said he hoped that the situation would improve 
due to the talks.  The LTTE and Rauf Hakeem, a senior 
minister and the Muslim representative on the GSL team, 
had agreed to consult closely and to energize local 
"peace committees" focused on ironing out problems.  The 
LTTE had made the right noises about wanting to work 
with the Muslim community.  That said, Westborg 
continued, it was still unclear whether Hakeem really 
had control of Muslim opinion or whether he remained in 
danger of being sidelined by radicals within his own 
party.  It was important that Hakeem rise to the 
occasion and begin to articulate his views better to 
Muslims in the east.  There was a lot of distrust toward 
Hakeem, however, with many in the east seeing him as an 
outsider.  (Note:  Hakeem is not from the east -- see 
below.)  In an effort to assist Hakeem, Westborg said he 
planned to brief eastern Muslims on the results of the 
talks soon. 
 
¶11.  (C) (((Note:  In a brief story highlighting 
Hakeem's apparent lack of understanding of the east, 
Westborg related the following:  Karuna, the LTTE 
military commander in the east, had mentioned at the 
talks the group's intent to return to Muslims their 
farmland in the east.  Hakeem had not picked up on the 
importance of this pledge, however, and had to have it 
pointed out to him.  Westborg explained that to Hakeem 
the issue of Muslims and land did not click, as he was 
from Kandy and Colombo where Muslims were mostly 
involved in trade and the professions.  In the east, 
however, a good percentage of Muslims owned farmland, 
but Hakeem did not seem to realize this.  End Note.))) 
 
------------- 
LTTE Dynamics 
------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Queried about the dynamics of the LTTE 
delegation at the talks, Westborg said it was clear that 
S.P. Thamilchelvam, the chief of the LTTE's political 
wing, was an important player.  Thamilchelvam was 
clearly very close to Prabhakaran and felt comfortable 
taking decisions on some issues.  That was not the case 
with Balasingham, the ostensible leader of the 
delegation, who felt compelled to refer all issues, even 
small ones, back to the Wanni (the LTTE-controlled area 
in northern Sri Lanka).  As for Karuna, Westborg said he 
was clearly important in the east, but he was not a key 
LTTE player on overall political strategy. 
 
¶13.  (C) With respect to Prabhakaran, Westborg said he 
was not sure what made him tick, but the LTTE seemed to 
be edging closer than ever to supporting autonomy within 
Sri Lanka and not separatism.  In agreeing to move along 
the peace track, Prabhakaran seemingly was reacting to 
pressure from his supporters, both those at home and 
abroad.  Politics was complicated in the Wanni and 
Westerners made a mistake in thinking that Prabhakaran 
was all-powerful simply because of his brutal record. 
He was more like an "Oriental potentate," who was 
obliged to work in sophisticated, cunning fashion to 
gain support from often competing groups.  Asked what 
Prabhakaran might do in case peace was achieved, 
Westborg replied that he would probably "go into 
reserve," i.e., he would not be the public face of the 
Tigers.  Instead, he might pull the strings from behind 
the scene as Mao did for much of his rule in China. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Unlike some of the effusive press coverage, 
Westborg's review was sober and we thought it hit the 
mark.  The talks have made solid progress, but there 
have only been two full plenaries.  There is still 
plenty of room for disagreement between the two sides on 
a slew of make-or-break issues.  We expect that much of 
the give-and-take will now be channeled into the various 
sub-committees.  That, however, would be a real 
accomplishment in and of itself because the Norwegians 
have clearly convinced both sides to buy into a process. 
Westborg noted that the process has not yet suffered any 
major reverses.  With the peace process taking on a life 
of its own, however, serious bumps in the road just may 
be controllable as disagreements are channeled into the 
sub-committees or elsewhere.  All of this argues for the 
likely viability of the peace process into the near- 
term.  Nonetheless, even Westborg -- who has as much 
experience as any outsider in dealing with the LTTE -- 
still cannot say for sure what the group's long-term 
intentions are.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶15.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS