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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
02ROME5090	2002-10-17 16:25	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Rome

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012 
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING:  ITALIAN READOUT 
 
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, 
REASON 1.5 (B & D ) 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  182140Z 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING 
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN 
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16.  THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE 
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS 
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE, 
ANYTIME."  PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE 
COULD NOT CROSS:  AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE, 
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL 
SANCTION.  PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT 
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH 
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO 
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS."  ON 
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND 
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN 
PRAGUE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON 
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN, 
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ.  UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM 
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO 
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  182140Z 
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16.  ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL 
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI 
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH 
PUTIN. 
 
--- 
WMD 
--- 
 
¶3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED 
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY 
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS 
MEETING WITH PUTIN.  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD 
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF 
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE 
PM AGREED.  THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS 
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG 
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED 
MORE OF HIS WMD. 
 
¶4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN 
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS 
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ 
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED.  THE PRESS, 
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER 
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD.  CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED 
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING."  (LATER ON 
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE 
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES, 
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  182140Z 
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY, 
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.") 
 
----------- 
UNSC ACTION 
----------- 
 
¶5. (S)  CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY 
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO 
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO 
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME."  PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI, 
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET 
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ.  THE 
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT 
CROSS:  A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER 
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF 
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE 
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN 
SANCTION). 
 
¶6.  (S)  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE 
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR 
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM 
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY 
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE 
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY." 
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED 
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW 
 
                          SECRET 
 
                              SECRET        PTQ5680 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  182140Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   COR-01   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01 
      TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00 
      ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /008W 
                  ------------------FA735C  182140Z /40 
O 171625Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012 
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING:  ITALIAN READOUT 
 
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY 
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE 
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRANEMWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY." 
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  182140Z 
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW 
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED 
"NO, I DO NOT." 
 
--------------------------- 
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S)  CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO 
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE 
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED 
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  TO DO OTHERWISE 
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD."  BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT 
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN 
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF: 
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN 
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH 
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS."  PUTIN 
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A 
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD 
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST 
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶8. (S)  CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD 
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL), BUT BECAUSE THE 
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION 
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED.  PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  182140Z 
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE 
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS 
INTEREST.  CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN 
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO 
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE 
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN 
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET 
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA). 
 
----------- 
NATO SUMMIT 
----------- 
 
¶9.  (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A 
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND 
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO 
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD. 
 
-------------------- 
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S. 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD 
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL 
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 
¶11.  THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS 
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE 
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  182140Z 
WITHIN THE U.S.  CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR 
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS 
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED 
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH 
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING.  SEMBLER 
 
                          SECRET 
 
> 
@@@OASYS@@@ 
 
                              SECRET        PTQ1845 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  172304Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00 
      NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00 
      P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00 
      PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /007W 
                  ------------------F99139  172304Z /40 
O 171625Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6399 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012 
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING:  ITALIAN READOUT 
 
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5 
(B & D) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  172304Z 
¶1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING 
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN 
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16.  THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE 
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS 
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE, 
ANYTIME."  PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE 
COULD NOT CROSS:  AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE, 
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL 
SANCTION.  PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT 
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH 
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO 
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS."  ON 
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND 
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN 
PRAGUE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON 
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN, 
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ.  UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM 
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO 
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE 
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16.  ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL 
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI 
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH 
PUTIN. 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  172304Z 
 
--- 
WMD 
--- 
 
¶3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED 
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY 
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS 
MEETING WITH PUTIN.  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD 
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF 
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE 
PM AGREED.  THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS 
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG 
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED 
MORE OF HIS WMD. 
 
¶4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN 
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS 
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ 
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED.  THE PRESS, 
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER 
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD.  CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED 
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING."  (LATER ON 
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE 
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES, 
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY, 
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.") 
 
----------- 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  05090  01 OF 02  172304Z 
UNSC ACTION 
----------- 
 
¶5. (S)  CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY 
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO 
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO 
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME."  PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI, 
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET 
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ.  THE 
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT 
CROSS:  A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER 
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF 
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE 
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN 
SANCTION). 
 
¶6.  (S)  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE 
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR 
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM 
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY 
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE 
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY." 
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED 
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW 
 
                          SECRET 
 
                              SECRET        PTQ1847 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  172305Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00 
      NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00 
      P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00 
      PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /007W 
                  ------------------F9913F  172305Z /40 
O 171625Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012 
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING:  ITALIAN READOUT 
 
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED 
"NO, I DO NOT." 
 
--------------------------- 
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S)  CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO 
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  172305Z 
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED 
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  TO DO OTHERWISE 
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD."  BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT 
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN 
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF: 
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN 
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH 
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS."  PUTIN 
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A 
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD 
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST 
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶8. (S)  CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD 
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL), BUT BECAUSE THE 
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION 
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED.  PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT 
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE 
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS 
INTEREST.  CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN 
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO 
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE 
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN 
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET 
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA). 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  05090  02 OF 02  172305Z 
 
----------- 
NATO SUMMIT 
----------- 
 
¶9.  (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A 
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND 
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO 
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD. 
 
-------------------- 
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S. 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD 
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL 
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 
 
¶11.  THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS 
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE 
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING 
WITHIN THE U.S.  CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR 
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS 
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED 
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH 
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING. 
SEMBLER 
 
                          SECRET 
 
> 
 2002ROME05090 - Classification: SECRET

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Viewing cable 02ROME5090, BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT