This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 004887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S RADEMAKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 179633 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 183733 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04887  01 OF 03  080737Z 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: A/S FOR ARMS CONTROL STEPHEN RADEMAKER FOR REASONS 1.5 ( 
B) AND (D) 
 
--------- 
 SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1.  (C) ITALIAN MFA ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, MEETING WITH A/S 
RADEMAKER ON SEPTEMBER 25, WELCOMED THE NEW US POSITION ON 
THE 5TH BWC REVCON.  AFTER RECEIVING CLARIFICATION OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC, AND 
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR SKEPTICISM THAT THE NAM WOULD ACCEPT AN 
AGREED WESTERN GROUP POSITION, ITALY PROMISED TO WORK TOWARD 
ONE IN NEW YORK.  US UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DID NOT SIT 
WELL, HOWEVER, AND ITALY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE BWC CAN 
BE STRENGTHENED WITHOUT SOME SORT OF VERIFICATION REGIME. 
THE MFA'S LEAD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR TOLD A/S RADEMAKER 
THAT A 10 MINUTE MEETING AT THE NOVEMBER 11 REVCON WOULD BE 
DISASTROUS FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE.  MFA 
POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAGONA SAID THE WG SHOULD WORK TOWARD A 
COMMON POSITION IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO INSURE THAT 
THE ONUS OF FAILURE AT THE REVCON WOULD NOT FALL ON IT.  HE 
ASSURED THE A/S THAT ITALY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US 
WOULD IN NO WAY BE DAMAGED BY DIFFERENCES OVER THE BWC. 
 
¶2.  (C) ON CTBT, ITALY WILL CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR 
UNIVERSALIZATION AND BELIEVES THAT US NON-RATIFICATION GIVES 
PAKISTAN AND INDIA AN EXCELLENT EXCUSE FOR NOT JOINING THE 
NPT.  ITALY IS COMMITTED TO REINVIGORATING THE OPCW AND WANTS 
THE 2003 CWC REVCON TO FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON EVALUATING ITS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04887  01 OF 03  080737Z 
WORK RATHER THAN OPENING UP A REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION. 
ESPECIALLY AFTER THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT, ITALY BELIEVES THE 
ALLIES SHOULD BE MORE SENSITIVE TO RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON CFE. 
THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE 
POLITICAL WILL TO RATIFY THE ADAPTED TREATY EXISTS, ONE 
ITALIAN OFFICIAL ARGUED.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C)  ON SEPTEMBER 25, A/S RADEMAKER MET WITH MINISTER 
CARLO TREZZA, MFA COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 
DISARMAMENT.  TREZZA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER ALESSANDRO 
CEVESE, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
OFFICE, AND COUNSELOR PAOLO CUCULI, A MEMBER OF CEVESE'S 
STAFF.  POL-MIL COUNSELOR ROBBINS AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ALSO 
PARTICIPATED.  FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, A/S RADEMAKER MET 
BRIEFLY WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS 
(ALSO POLITICAL DIRECTOR), GIANCARLO ARAGONA. 
 
------------------------------------- 
BWC 5TH REVCON - GRASPING OPPORTUNITY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  A/S RADEMAKER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY CONVEYING REF 
(B) POINTS.  IN DOING SO, HE STRESSED THAT THE US IS NOT OPEN 
TO NEGOTIATION, BUT WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS IN THE HOPE THAT 
A COMMON WESTERN GROUP POSITION CAN BE AGREED.  IN THAT VEIN, 
THE A/S LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT THE US EXPECTED WG 
MEMBERS TO STAND BY AN AGREED POSITION THROUGHOUT THE REVIEW 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04887  01 OF 03  080737Z 
PROCESS.  HE REFERRED HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO THE NINE ELEMENTS 
OF THE 2001 US PAPER FOR IDEAS ON WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE. 
NEVERTHELESS, THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A SHORT 
MEETING ON NOVEMBER 11 IF THIS NEW WAY FORWARD SPUTTERS OR 
OTHERWISE RUNS UP AGAINST US REDLINES. 
 
¶5.  (C)  TREZZA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GESTURE, BUT 
SAID HE WANTED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING 
THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC BEFORE MOVING INTO SPECIFICS. 
VERIFICATION, TREZZA SUGGESTED, HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES.  INDEED, ITALY HAS ALWAYS 
INSISTED ON IT.  RESPONDING TO TREZZA'S CONCERN THAT "US 
SKEPTICISM TOWARD THE VALUE OF INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION 
APPEARS TO BE GROWING," A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED THAT THE US 
COMMITMENT TO A ROBUST OPCW AND IAEA ENFORCEMENT ROLE SHOULD 
BE SUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THAT IDEA. 
 
¶6.  (C)  SATISFIED THAT VERIFICATION IS STILL A CORE CONCEPT 
IN THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, TREZZA ASKED WHY THE BWC 
STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION.  A/S RADEMAKER EXPLAINED THAT 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNIQUE; BIO-DEFENSE WORK--ALLOWED 
UNDER THE BWC--IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PROHIBITED OFFENSIVE 
WORK.  THE LAWFULNESS OF SUCH ACTIVITY TURNS ON INTENT, WHICH 
IS NOT READILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERIFICATION.  MOREOVER, THE 
BIOTECH SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES HAS A POWERFUL INTEREST 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4105 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  04887  02 OF 03  080738Z 
ACTION AC-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  COME-00  INL-00 
      DOEE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01 
      TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   M-00     NRRC-00 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OES-01   OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00 
      TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /008W 
                  ------------------F33A8D  080738Z /38 
P 080701Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6209 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SECDEF WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 004887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S RADEMAKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS 
 
IN PROTECTING AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.  CEVESE ALLOWED 
THAT THIS LATTER CONCERN HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED BY ITALIAN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04887  02 OF 03  080738Z 
INDUSTRY. 
 
¶7.  (C) TREZZA AVERRED THAT ALL MAJOR MULTILATERAL ARMS 
CONTROL TREATIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN BASED ON DEALS.  CAN WE 
AVOID COMPROMISING OVER THE BWC, HE ASKED?  EXACTLY, A/S 
RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WE PROBABLY COULD NOT; THIS IS WHY THE 
US IS OPPOSED TO THE PROTOCOL.  ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED 
NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOMETHING TO THE NAM IN EXCHANGE 
FOR AN UNVERIFIABLE PROTOCOL -- A VERY BAD BARGAIN INDEED. 
 
¶8.  (C) MOVING PAST THEOLOGY, TREZZA FIRST DISMISSED THE 
NOTION OF HOLDING A "10 MINUTE SESSION" AS LACKING IN 
CREDIBILITY.  WE WILL BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS 
AND FROM PUBLIC OPINION IF WE GO DOWN THAT ROAD, HE ARGUED, 
ADDING THAT THE WESTERN GROUP WOULD APPEAR TO BE ON THE 
DEFENSIVE IF IT SHOWS UP IN GENEVA UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS 
SUBSTANCE.  ITALY ALSO BELIEVES THAT "NAMING NAMES" IS 
PROBLEMATIC.  IT IS NOT OPPOSED TO BEING EXPLICIT IF CALLING 
COUNTRIES ON THE CARPET CAN BE DONE THROUGH AN AGREED 
INSTRUMENT, BUT DOES NOT VIEW UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AS 
CONSTRUCTIVE. 
 
¶9.  (C) IN TERMS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION, WESTERN 
STATES HAVE ALWAYS DEFENDED THE POSITION OF VERIFICATION, 
ACCORDING TO TREZZA, WHO ADDED, "IT WILL BE RATHER 
EMBARRASSING TO REVERSE THIS POSITION SIMPLY BECAUSE THE US 
DOES NOT AGREE."  CEVESE WAS FLUMMOXED BY THE US "TAKE IT OR 
LEAVE IT" APPROACH AND WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE US 
DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR THE FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION CANNOT 
NEGOTIATE.  NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED THE A/S THAT ITALY 
WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04887  02 OF 03  080738Z 
POSITION. CEVESE SAID THAT IF THE US COULD NOT BE MOVED TO 
SHOW EVEN MORE FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PROVE 
THAT THE BWC IS IMPORTANT EVEN WITHOUT A VERIFICATION 
MECHANISM.  A REALISTIC FOLLOW UP PROCESS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL 
IS NEEDED, HE ARGUED.  CEVESE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE 
USEFUL TO CREATE A MECHANISM WITHIN THE BWC TO FURTHER THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION. 
 
¶10.  (C) CUCULI RAISED SEVERAL TECHNICAL ISSUES.  ITALY 
UNDERSTANDS THAT ROUTINE VISITS COULD ENDANGER INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, BUT LIMITING INSPECTIONS TO SEVERE 
VIOLATIONS MIGHT BE LESS HARMFUL.  EXPOSING VIOLATORS IS THE 
CRUX OF THE MATTER AND BWC ARTICLE 6 PROCEDURES HAVE NOT 
WORKED.  ITALY IS CONFIDENT THAT THE US, FRANCE, AND THE UK 
WILL NOT PLAY THE VETO CARD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT 
IS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RUSSIA AND CHINA.  IF WE REJECT A NEW 
VERIFICATION REGIME DO WE REALLY WANT TO RELY ON NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION?  THE CASE OF CUBA, WHICH HAS TOUGH LEGISLATION 
ON THE BOOKS, SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE, CUCULI ARGUED.  ITALY 
SUPPORTS THE PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE BWC DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH 
PROTECTION. 
 
¶11.  (C) THE US IS NOT PERSUADED THAT OTHER STATES SHARE OUR 
SKEPTICISM ON INSPECTIONS, A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WHICH IS 
WHY THE US HAS LIMITED ITSELF TO ARTICLE V UNDER THE BWC. 
THE US POSITION IS THAT THE BWC IS UNVERIFIABLE; TO TRY AND 
MAKE IT SO IS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. 
 
---------------------- 
CTBT - STILL PERPLEXED 
---------------------- 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04887  02 OF 03  080738Z 
 
¶12.  (C)  CEVESE SAID ITALY BELIEVES THE CTBT WOULD BE AN 
IMPORTANT DETERRENCE MECHANISM, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS 
POSSIBLE TO DETECT WHETHER NUCLEAR TESTING IS BEING 
CONDUCTED.   ITALY STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNIVERSALIZING THE CTBT 
AND IS "DEMARCHING EVERYONE" ON THE SUBJECT.  CEVESE 
INSINUATED THAT US NON-RATIFICATION IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO ARMS 
CONTROL IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.  WHY SHOULD INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
RATIFY IF THEY KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF 
DOING SO?  AT THE 2000 NPT REVCON ALL STATES PARTIES AGREED 
THAT THE CTBT WAS A CRUCIAL COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL NPT. 
WITH A FUNCTIONING CTBT IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE BRING INDIA 
AND PAKISTAN INTO THE NPT, CEVESE ARGUED. 
 
¶13.  (C)  IN RESPONSE, A/S RADEMAKER ASSURED CEVESE THAT THE 
US SHARES ITALY'S CONCERNS ABOUT INDIA AND PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH 
IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT STRIPPING AWAY PRETEXTS WILL 
CONVINCE EITHER COUNTRY TO JOIN THE NPT.  THE US SUPPORTS A 
FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT) IN PART AS A MEANS OF 
ADDRESSING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. 
 
-------------------- 
CWC -- FOCUS ON OPCW 
-------------------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4106 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  04887  03 OF 03  080738Z 
ACTION AC-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  COME-00  INL-00 
      DOEE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01 
      TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   M-00     NRRC-00 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OES-01   OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00 
      TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /008W 
                  ------------------F33A92  080738Z /38 
P 080701Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SECDEF WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 004887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S RADEMAKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS 
 
¶14.  (C)  ITALY IS COMMITTED TO TURNING AROUND OPCW, IN 
PARTICULAR REESTABLISHING A ROBUST VERIFICATION SYSTEM.  AT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04887  03 OF 03  080738Z 
THE 2003 CWC REVCON NEXT YEAR THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON 
ASSESSING THE OPCW, NOT THE CONVENTION ITSELF.  IT IS NOT 
TIME TO MODIFY THE CWC, CEVESE ASSERTED.  ITALY WANTS TO 
AVOID GIVING THE NAM AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE 
CONVENTION AS SUCH, AND EXPECTS CHINA TO HONOR ITS 
PRINCIPLES.  CEVESE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY 
CHALLENGES, AND SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO MILITARY VESSELS IN 
ITALIAN WATERS.  HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE US 
POSITION.  A/S RADEMAKER AGREED TO CHECK ON SPECIFICS. 
 
------------------------ 
CFE -- WINKING AT RUSSIA 
------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (C) ITALY EXPECTED THAT SOMETHING IMPORTANT WOULD HAVE 
CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE  NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT.  WE 
SHOULD TRY TO BE MORE POSITIVE AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION 
RUSSIAN CONCERNS, CEVESE SUGGESTED.  THE ARGUMENT THAT THE 
ADAPTED TREATY CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL GEORGIA AND 
MOLDOVA RATIFY IT IS FALLACIOUS, BECAUSE "ALL CONCERNED" KNOW 
THAT PRESSURE FROM NATO MEMBERS WILL BRING THEM AROUND.  WE 
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO RUSSIA THAT THERE IS POLITICAL WILL 
BEHIND RATIFICATION BEFORE MOSCOW WILL INITIATE ITS OWN 
PROCESS, CEVESE SAID.  ITALY, HOWEVER, REJECTS ANY LINKAGE 
BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND RATIFICATION BY THE BALTIC STATES. 
A/S RADEMAKER INFORMED CEVESE THAT THE US POSITION IS 
STRAIGHTFORWARD: RUSSIA FIRST NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ITS 
ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS.  HE URGED CEVESE TO CONSIDER THE 
HARMFUL EFFECTS IF NATO SOLIDARITY ON THIS CORE ISSUE 
DISINTEGRATES. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04887  03 OF 03  080738Z 
--------- 
LANDMINES 
--------- 
 
¶16.  (C) CEVESE ASKED IF ITALY COULD EXPECT ANY FORTHCOMING 
CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON THE OTTAWA CONVENTION.  A/S 
RADEMAKER SAID THAT WHILE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT 
REVERSE THE US POSITION, LANDMINE POLICY WAS UNDER REVIEW AND 
ITALY WOULD PROBABLY LIKE THE CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD BE 
RELEASED SOON. 
 
--------------- 
ARAGONA MEETING 
--------------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  DG FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ARAGONA TOLD A/S 
RADEMAKER THAT THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC PROTOCOL CAUSES 
ITALY CONCERN.  NEVERTHELESS, AFTER LISTENING TO A/S 
RADEMAKER'S REVIEW OF THE NEW US POSITION, HE DIRECTED CEVESE 
TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION.  ARAGONA 
ALLOWED THAT DESPITE THE LONG ODDS OF GETTING AN EVENTUAL 
AGREEMENT WITH THE NAM, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WG PRESENT A 
UNITED FRONT SO THE ONUS OF FAILURE WILL NOT FALL ON ITS 
SHOULDERS.  NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE US NOTION 
THAT A COMMON POSITION MUST BE CAST IN STONE BECAUSE THIS 
WILL MAKE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT.  ARAGONA 
REASSURED A/S RADEMAKER THAT ITALY'S CURRENT DIFFERENCES WITH 
THE US OVER THE BWC WILL NOT AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS. 
INDEED, ITALY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD AND 
STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04887  03 OF 03  080738Z 
¶18.  (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S RADEMAKER. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
> 
 2002ROME04887 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL