This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USCINCPAC FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012 
TAGS: PREL PHUM AU BM
SUBJECT: DOWNER PUSHES REFORM DURING VISIT TO RANGOON 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez. Reason: 1.5 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Australian Foreign Minister Downer told Than 
Shwe and Khin Nyunt that the GOB should move convincingly to 
open a political dialogue with the NLD "within the next one 
to two weeks."  He also urged the government to free all 
political prisoners.  Khin Nyunt replied that he "fully 
subscribed" to Downer's views on the need for prompt action 
on political transition; however, neither he nor Than Shwe 
made any commitments regarding a timetable for dialogue or 
the release of political prisoners.  Aung San Suu Kyi 
welcomed Downer's visit ("every bit of help was needed"), but 
was resolutely skeptical about the GOB's plans for dialog. 
She told Downer that there was no dialog with the government 
and that she was not convinced that the GOB was committed to 
political change.  She was also skeptical about Australian 
aid initiatives, including the Australian human rights 
training program.  She was not opposed to assistance per se, 
provided it was "transparent, accountable, and independently 
monitored."  However, she did object to any assistance whose 
"nature and manner" was determined by the government.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Australian Ambassador Trevor Wilson told diplomats 
October 4 that Australian Foreign Minister Downer had been 
nervous about the public reaction to his decision to visit 
Burma, but left satisfied with the results of the visit.  He 
had come at the urging of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail and 
wanted to convey Australia's views directly to Burma's 
leaders.  That plus the opportunity to form his own views 
about the situation in Burma made for a good visit. 
 
The Message 
 
¶3. (C) Downer conveyed the same message in separate meetings 
with Senior General Than Shwe, Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt, 
Foreign Minister Win Aung, and Home Minister Tin Hlaing. 
Australia was concerned about the slow pace of political and 
economic change in Burma.  It was essential, he said, that 
Burma move as soon as possible ("within one to two weeks") on 
political reform and transition in a way that was convincing 
to the international community.  This basically meant 
substantive talks with the NLD on political transition.  It 
was also essential that Burma publicize those moves and 
supplement them with measures to establish good faith, 
basically through the release of all political prisoners. 
Downer predicted that such moves would have "a big impact" 
internationally, and would help restart foreign investment 
flows for Burma. 
 
¶4. (C) On the economy, Downer told both Than Shwe and Khin 
Nyunt that Burma had to adapt to globalization; it could not 
cut itself off from the world.  It needed technocrats to run 
the economy and assistance to deal with its many humanitarian 
problems.  Political transition, however, was the key.  If it 
did not move forward on political transition, it would not 
get the support it needed from the world community. 
 
Secretary One 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶5. (C) In reply, Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt told Downer that he 
"fully subscribed" to Downer's views about taking steps to 
show that the process of political transition was on track. 
He also stated that that he believed it was essential that 
the GOB cooperate with UN Special Envoy Razali, UN Special 
Rapporteur Pinheiro, and the ILO.  However, neither he nor 
Senior General Than Shwe made any commitments to Downer 
regarding the timing of any steps in regard to political 
transition.  Neither did any member of the government make 
any commitments regarding the release of political prisoners. 
 
¶6. (C) Khin Nyunt did claim that the dialog with the NLD was 
not stalled.  He also called Aung San Suu Kyi's shift to "a 
more constructive approach" a very positive step, one that 
had allowed the government and the NLD to deal with each 
other on a basis of mutual understanding "like members of one 
family." 
 
Than Shwe 
 
¶7. (C) Than Shwe did not mention either the dialog or Aung 
San Suu Kyi.  However, he did emphasize that he did not want 
the military to remain in power forever, or ever again have 
to assume power in Burma.  That was not good for the either 
the country or the military.  Rather, he wanted to build a 
democratic system that would endure.  For Burma, that 
required national unity, education, and economic development. 
 Than Shwe did not respond to Downer's points regarding the 
economy, but also did not object to Downer's grim description 
of Burma's economic prospects, and did not ask for any type 
of Australian assistance. 
 
Home Minister Tin Hlaing 
 
¶8. (C) Downer told Home Minister Tin Hlaing that there was no 
reason for the GOB to hold any political prisoners and that 
he hoped that all would be released quickly.  He also told 
Tin Hlaing that Australia was very satisfied with its 
counternarcotics cooperation with Burma and had just decided 
to assign a second liaison officer from the Australian 
Federal Police to the Embassy in Rangoon.  Australia was also 
happy with its human rights training for Burmese police 
officers, but wanted to expand the program to include 
organizations like the NLD.  Tin Hlaing said that the GOB was 
"prepared to consider that," however, according to Ambassador 
Wilson, details on the expanded program still have to be 
worked out. 
 
Aung San Suu Kyi 
 
¶9. (C) Aung San Suu Kyi told Downer that she was glad he had 
come.  "Every bit of help was needed," she said, to move the 
GOB forward on political transition.  However, she stated 
categorically that no dialog was taking place with the 
government.  She also said that there had been no significant 
contacts between the GOB and the NLD, and that she was not 
convinced that the GOB was committed to the process of 
political change.  In regard to aid, she also told Downer 
that she was not opposed to any type of assistance for Burma, 
provided that assistance was "transparent, accountable, and 
independently monitored."  However, she had reservations 
about any assistance provided to the government and "would 
not support" any assistance whose "nature and manner" was 
determined by the government.  She was also skeptical about 
the value of Australia's human rights training for the 
government.  Progress on human rights, she said, would depend 
on political change.  No amount of training could substitute 
for that.  She also said that she prefers a coordinated 
approach to aid; an approach that was coordinated among 
donors would have more impact on the GOB; it would also leave 
fewer "loopholes" for the government to exploit. 
 
Comment 
 
¶10. (C) It is hard to say what impact Downer's visit will 
have on the reform process here.  His comments regarding 
political transition, the economy, and the growing 
humanitarian problems in Burma were certainly on the mark. 
However, it is hard to tell how seriously the government took 
those remarks.  While Khin Nyunt asserted that he "fully 
subscribed" to Downer's views on the need for prompt and 
convincing motion in regard to political transition, Than 
Shwe did not take up that theme, nor did anyone else echo it. 
 As usual, we will simply have to wait and see whether there 
is any significant motion over the next several weeks. 
 
¶11. (C) The Australians' initiative on human rights training 
for organizations "like the NLD," and the Home Minister's 
response to that initiative, was also interesting.  It may be 
that the GOB is now ready to consider opening the doors 
somewhat in regard to involving the NLD in assistance 
programs, if only as recipients.  If true, even that would be 
a step forward, although the entire initiative still needs to 
be discussed with the NLD.  According to Ambassador Wilson, 
Downer did not discuss Australia's plans for the program with 
Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
¶12. (C) Finally, it was gratifying to hear how direct Downer 
was with Than Shwe.  According to Ambassador Wilson, Khin 
Nyunt and Win Aung had both asked Downer to go easy on Than 
Shwe and not be so rude as Japanese Foreign Minister 
Kawaguchi in raising awkward issues.  To his credit, Downer 
ignored the GOB advice and followed Kawaguchi's example. 
Than Shwe needs to hear what Downer had to say and, in Post's 
view, it is good that Downer was willing to take the 
political risks and political heat associated with this visit 
in order to put his points across. End Comment. 
Martinez