This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002057 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2012 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV MARR MASS NP PRELPHUMP
SUBJECT: SA DAS CAMP MEETING WITH NEPAL'S CHIEF OF ARMY 
STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARIAT C-TN2-00948 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASONS: 1.5 (B and D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In two separate meetings on October 22 2002, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Donald A. Camp, 
accompanied by LTC James E Oxley IV, Defense Attache7 and 
MAJ 
Pete Fowler, Security Assistance Office, met with Royal 
Nepalese 
Army Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pyar Jung Thapa and 
Major General (MG) Rookmangud Katwal of the National Security 
Council Secretariat.  COAS Thapa clamed that the army is 
doing 
well against the Maoists, whose numbers, he asserts, are 
shrinking.  Lack of adequate financial support and 
development 
planning from the civilian government, Thapa said, have kept 
the 
Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP) from 
taking 
root in Maoist affected districts.  The Indians have helped 
in 
turning over low-level Maoist cadres but have so far not 
succeeded in capturing any of the leaders.  MG Katwal told 
Camp that domestic political consensus is critical to 
defeating the 
Maoists, who are adept at exploiting the vacuum left by bad 
governance and driving wedges between competing political 
interests.  While Thapa appears correct that support for the 
Maoists is dwindling, the race is on for who or what will 
capture popular support. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In two separate meetings On October 22 2002, South 
Asia 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald A Camp met with Royal 
Nepalese Army Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pyar Jung 
Thapa and MG Rookmangud Katwal of the National Security 
Council 
(NSC) Secretariat. 
 
Meeting with COAS Thapa 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Maoist Situation: General Thapa admitted that, while 
the 
Maoists may make some good ideological points, over time they 
have proven they cannot deliver.  Asserting that the Maoists 
do not take care of people, Thapa explained that they have 
promised land, jobs and opportunities and brought nothing but 
destruction. Maoists steal food from people, force induction 
into their ranks, and destroy key infrastructure.  According 
to 
General Thapa, people are fed up.  During the first five 
years 
of the insurgency Maoists had some strength and, being the 
clever 
and adaptive people they are, chose to go against the police 
who have a bad reputation of repression.  The Maoists found 
some popular support because the people did not like the 
police.  When the army entered the battle last November, the 
Maoists told the people that the army was going to be just 
like 
the police.  While the army did suffer some initial setbacks, 
to the Maoist's surprise the army now is doing well.  Maoist 
numbers are shrinking.  Because of army action and a 
corresponding loss of support by the people, Maoists are 
forced 
to attack soft targets.  This change is further alienating 
the 
Maoists from the people.  The Chief went on to say that the 
Maoists are nothing like the North Vietnamese Army (NVA); it 
was clear that the NVA avoided destroying key infrastructure 
that would alienate the people. 
 
¶4. (C) RNA Problems and Strengths: General Thapa thanked the 
USG for assisting with M16A2 rifles and highlighted the 
importance of the weapons.  The RNA's self-loading rifles 
(SLR), provided over 30 years ago by India for free, served 
the 
army well, but today are worn out.  Thapa said that soldiers 
have no confidence in the SLR, and said that the same weapons 
are problems for the Maoists.  He illustrated that point by 
telling of a captured video of a Maoist leader in an attack 
on 
an RNA position.  The video showed the leader trying to clear 
multiple stoppages of several of his captured RNA weapons 
before being shot by the defending RNA.  The army is also in 
need of more defensive equipment like night vision goggles 
and attack helicopters. Thapa indicated that another problem 
is the 
creation of rehabilitation programs.  For example, the RNA 
has 
tried to have NGOs assist with women the RNA has liberated, 
but 
has not received much help. 
 
On a more positive note, the COAS said that RNA intelligence 
is getting much better.  The Maoists keep good diaries, which 
have been captured after battles. More importantly, the RNA 
is gaining momentum because the Nepalese people like to back 
winners.  When the Maoists looked strong the people 
gravitated to them.  Today, that has changed. On human 
rights, the COAS believed that a few soldiers have committed 
violations but that the RNA is taking the right steps to 
bring justice and stop future violations (NFI). 
 
¶5. (C) Nepal's Political Situation: General Thapa assured DAS 
Camp that Nepal continues to support the USG war on terrorism 
as it did shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  He also reiterated 
Nepalese appreciation of USG diplomatic support.  The COAS 
said 
that the King remains committed to the multiparty system and 
would hold local elections first, before national elections. 
(Note: He did not provide a timeline.  End Note.) 
 
Should national elections take place first, the winning party 
would 
try to influence elections at the local level, something the 
present government wants to avoid. 
 
General Thapa also highlighted the need for some local 
representation at the grass roots level.  With the local 
bodies dissolved, only administrators, drawn from outside the 
local area, are running the local governments. 
 
¶6. (C) Nepal's Integrated Security and Development Program 
(ISDP): General Thapa termed ISDP in Gorkha a success (Note: 
Gorkha is the only area still implementing ISDP following the 
imposition of the emergency in November 2002. End Note.), but 
said there were several problems with resources and basic 
good 
governance that had to be improved in future ISDP programs. 
The biggest problem has been not in the realm of security but 
in that of development programming.  Development money in 
sufficient 
amounts never arrived in Gorkha from the central government. 
Seventy irrigation projects were never completed, and 
additional 
road construction, critical to improving living standards for 
the people, were not even started. 
 
Those that were started, were never completed.  General Thapa 
replied that, despite the lack of resources, the Army has 
used its resources and what little the government did provide 
to restart uncompleted road and other projects.  Thapa said 
that the Army has been able to do projects for less than half 
the cost of the civilian administrators.  He was optimistic 
that the new government 
would remedy the situation but believed that, in the future, 
the Army would be more involved in development.  DAS Camp 
asked 
what the potential strain on the army would be when it did 
both 
development and security. 
 
General Thapa said that the Army would continue to use its 
civilian-oriented engineer capability but, for the most part, 
would only organize the civilians who do the work.  When 
asked about future ISDP locations, General Thapa said the 
districts of Bardia, Ramechhap, Dang and around the city of 
Trisuli. 
 
¶7. (C) ISDP Strategy re-look: The COAS believed that the ISDP 
strategy might have to change from focusing on the worst 
areas 
that require a huge amount of resources to propping up the 
weaker districts, in particular those districts around 
Kathmandu.  For the worst affected areas in the west, the 
Chief 
said, building roads to the Maoist heartland was a priority. 
General Thapa told of his suggestion that the government 
create 
a duty free zone in the Dang valley because of the valley's 
importance in controlling access into Rolpa and Rukum 
districts.  General Thapa also said that there was a need to 
augment security forces and was considering the use of 
village 
defense forces.  When asked about how he sees such forces 
working, the chief said that civilians would assist the 
military with gaining better intelligence in order to use 
army 
forces more effectively.  On the issue of arming the defense 
forces, the chief only said perhaps they could be armed with 
shotguns. (Note:  Post has not seen any use of armed militias 
supported by the government, and except for General Thapa's 
comments, little evidence the army is willing to arm 
civilians. 
End Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) Indian Support for Solving the Insurgency: In response 
to a question on India's role in assisting Nepal against the 
insurgents, General Thapa said they have been helpful.  He 
said 
the Indians have turned over low-level leaders but also 
complained that when Nepal asked the Indians to arrest the 
top 
leaders living in India, the Indians said they needed 
specific 
data on their whereabouts.  The Chief did note a change for 
the 
better in India's assistance after they realized that the 
Nepalese Maoists were involved with India's antigovernment 
organizations.  He also noted that the King had effectively 
pressed for more Indian help during his last trip to India. 
Today the Indians have mobilized their special security 
police 
to the India-Nepal border but, the chief said, the Indians 
are 
continually upset about what India claims is Nepalese support 
for Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate. 
 
Meeting with General Katwal from Nepal's NSC 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Maoist's situation: MG Katwal said that the Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) understands that there is a strong link 
between human rights and keeping the support of the people 
and 
believes human rights abusers must be punished.  Katwal also 
stressed the need for increased international assistance in 
logistic support and mobility. (Note: MG Katwal has often 
made 
the point that the RNA needs a full range of military 
assistance from tents to helicopters.)  He expressed 
appreciation for USG military support and said that the 
Nepalese Government needed help in rehabilitating and housing 
former Maoists.  MG Katwal said that aid is an important 
component of any solution to the Maoist problem, but 
emphasized 
that aid must reach the people now in order to be beneficial. 
He also indicated that it would be beneficial if aid were 
provided in such a way as to be recognized with the 
Government 
of Nepal in order to strengthen democracy. 
 
Indian Support for Solving the Insurgency 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Though he praised US diplomatic efforts towards India 
to date, Katwal stressed the need for the USG to keep up the 
pressure, stating that the US must make the Indians 
understand that our intention is to help the GON bring the 
Maoist situation under control. He said India believes the US 
is trying to establish a 
strategic foothold in Nepal.  Katwal cautioned that the 
Indians 
still want to guard their hegemony in the region. 
 
¶11. (C) Nepal's Political Situation: On Nepal's current 
political situation, Katwal said that the new government must 
formulate a national strategy on democracy and create 
domestic 
consensus against the Maoists.  The Maoists, who are quick to 
adapt and seize opportunities, are exploiting the vacuum 
created by bad governance.  They drive wedges between parties 
and always go after whatever party is in power.  The parties 
not in power, because of their own selfish ambition to be in 
charge, fail to support the government, which assists the 
Maoists.  Today the Maoists are attempting to pull the 
political parties together against the King, who is the only 
unifying force in the country.  Parties are threatening to 
join 
with the Maoists, which in the worst case will lead to the 
monarchy fighting the Maoists.  Katwal said the government 
will 
have to negotiate with the Maoists but that should be from a 
position of strength.  Katwal made the point that Nepal's 
democracy needs time to mature but worried that by the time 
democracy matures, the Maoists will be on top. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) While many points covered by both the COAS and MG 
Katwal have been heard in the past, what is different now is 
that we are hearing some of the same arguments by the King 
and 
his appointed government.  General Thapa is correct that the 
Maoists have not delivered; what is also true is that the 
government too has not delivered.  It appears that many 
people 
in the countryside are fed up with both the Maoists and the 
government.  This being said, the race is on for who or what 
will capture their support.  It is still too early to tell if 
the King can act as the catalyst to stem the rot of bad 
governance and bring real reforms at the grass roots in order 
to make Nepal's democracy prosper. 
 
¶13. (C) DAS Camp has cleared this report. 
 
MALINOWSKI 
MALINOWSKI