This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USAID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR HAJJAR, HALMREST-SANCHEZ, 
BRYAN, KHANDAGLE AND MARX 
DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, BRAUSE, SKORIC AND PETERSEN, 
AFR/SA FOR POE AND COPSON, 
AFR/SD FOR ISALROW AND WHELAN 
 
STATE FOR AF/S DELISI AND RAYNOR 
 
NAIROBI FOR DCHA/OFDA/ARO FOR RILEY, MYER AND SMITH, 
REDSO/ESA/FFP FOR SENYKOFF 
 
NSC FOR DWORKEN 
 
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO UNOCHA, IFRC 
 
PRETORIA FOR USAID/DCHA/FFP FOR DISKIN AND FAS HELM 
 
ROME PLEASE PASS TO FODAG 
 
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM SENT AS HARARE 2160 SEPTEMBER 26 HAD TEXT 
ON THE  RIGHT MARGIN TRUNCATED.  THE CORRECTED COPY IS 
REPEATED BELOW. 
 
QUOTE 
UNCLASS HARARE 2160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  ZIMBABWE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: THE FOOD GAP 
REFS:  (A) Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment 
 
Report, 
16 September 2002, Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee 
(B) Harare 1141 
 
¶1.  Summary: The Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment 
Report prepared by the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee (VAC), in collaboration with a number 
of UN Agencies, NGOs, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and 
SADC, was released on 16 September 2002.  This report raises 
the anticipated emergency food needs for Zimbabwe by 14% 
(35,000 MT) over the current UN appeal to 486,000 MT for the 
period September '02 to March `03.  The report identifies an 
unmet cereal gap of 379,020 MT, beyond plans for a 
significant 
increase in the GOZ's total planned food imports to nearly 
1 million MT of grain, and an additional 218,000 MT of 
requested food aid.  The report, however, envisions 
virtually 
no role for the private sector to import grain, as a result 
of continuing GOZ restrictions on private sector food 
imports 
and sales.   If the report's optimistic assumption regarding 
increased GOZ imports does not come to fruition, or if 
donors 
do not respond adequately to the appeal for additional food 
aid, then the unmet cereal deficit could rise dramatically 
and 
the food crisis could deteriorate rapidly. 
 
¶2. While confirmed pledges have been received for about 25% 
of the WFP EMOP appeal to date, with unconfirmed pledges for 
another 25%, for a variety of reasons, the Mission believes 
that delivery of the remaining 50% (about 230,000 MT) before 
the next harvest season (March/April 2003) could prove more 
problematic.  The vulnerability assessment also fails to 
address the possibility that the GOZ may not be able to 
import 
all of the additional planned amount of 651,000 MT to meet 
its 
total commitment of one million MT by that time. 
 
¶3. If these optimistic projections of future food imports do 
not materialize, we estimate that the actual human food need 
gap (that amount not covered by actual production, and food 
imports by the GOZ, private sector, and donors) could 
increase significantly from 145,000 MT (assuming the GOZ 
meets its 
full commitment and the entire donor appeal is met) to as 
much as 1.2 million MT (if no additional GOZ and donor 
imports materialize).  Given current actions and 
constraints, 
the Mission suggests that a more likely food gap scenario 
might be around 600,000 to 700,000 MT (if the GOZ meets only 
half of its stated commitment and current trends in donor 
contributions continue).  This cable is to alert all 
concerned parties that extraordinary efforts will be 
required 
by both the GOZ, Zimbabwe's private sector and the 
international donor community to minimize this gap, and 
avoid 
a potentially serious national catastrophe in Zimbabwe.  In 
this interest, the Mission offers some suggestions for USG 
consideration in this regard.  End Summary. 
 
REFS:  (A) Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment 
Report, 
16 September 2002, Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee 
(B) Harare 1141 
 
¶3.  The recent Vulnerability Assessment Committee report on 
the current situation in Zimbabwe identifies a remaining 
uncovered human food gap of almost 379,000 Metric Tons (MT), 
without any allowance for a cushioning Strategic Reserve 
(ref. A, p. 8).  Based on this revised needs assessment, it 
calls for a 14% increase in proposed food aid imports from 
the 453,000 MT included in the current World Food Program 
(WFP) Emergency Operation (EMOP) appeal for Zimbabwe, based 
on the Zimbabwe Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission 
(CFSAM) conducted in May (2002) by WFP and the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) (Ref. B), to 486,000 MT 
(ref. A, p. 22). 
 
¶4.  This revised assessment of Zimbabwe's outstanding food 
gap is based on several critical assumptions, principally 
relating to future food import plans by both the GOZ and 
the donor community.  The Mission feels it is important to 
highlight these assumptions, as well as the resulting 
potentially serious implications for the on-going 
humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe should they not prove to be 
accurate predictions of what, in fact, actually occurs over 
the coming months. 
 
¶5.  Perhaps the most important assumption is that this 
estimated gap assumes an additional 651,000 MT of food 
imports by the GOZ (for a total of almost 1 million MT). 
Given the current parlous state of the Zimbabwean economy 
and government finances (particularly with respect to scarce 
Foreign Exchange (FX) resources), the Mission and greater 
U.N. and donor community retain serious doubts regarding 
the GOZ's ability to complete these ambitious plans and 
fulfil their stated future food import commitment. 
 
¶6. The second major assumption is the proposed 218,380 MT 
of additional international donor food aid imports projected 
to the next harvest in March/April 2003.  As noted above, 
the current WFP EMOP calls for 453,000 MT of food imports. 
As of September 20, the status of confirmed pledges to this 
appeal totalled 111,590 MT (about 25 percent).  An 
additional 
110,000 MT of unconfirmed pledges have also been reported by 
WFP, for a grand total of about 225,000 MT, or almost half 
(49%) of the total appeal.  Based on these figures, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the international community will 
be able to meet its share of the VAC import commitment noted 
above within the specified time period. 
 
¶5. However, even if all of these imports are successfully 
completed in time, according to the report, an estimated 
379,000 MT food gap remains.  Approximately 234,575 MT of 
this gap can be met if the full amount of the current WFP 
appeal is met, leaving an unmet remaining gap balance of 
approximately 145,000 MT.  Hence, even if the full current 
WFP request is met, additional efforts will be required to 
ensure adequate food stocks throughout the country until 
the next harvest. 
 
¶6. To date, approximately 70,000 MT of food aid has been 
imported (approximately 45,000 MT of which has been 
distributed).  The vast majority of this was accounted for 
REFS:  (A) Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment 
Report, 
16 September 2002, Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee 
(B) Harare 1141 
 
under WFP's original Zimbabwe EMOP which effectively ended 
in June 2002 when the current, larger EMOP began.  This 
means, effectively, that in order to meet the VAC 
projections 
the international community will need to import more than 
the 
entirety of the current WFP 450,000 MT request between now 
and end-March 2003.  Considering the lethargy of the 
response 
to date, the yet-to-be-satisfactorily-resolved problems 
associated with the biotech issue for US corn/maize imports, 
the continuing serious constraints imposed by government on 
NGO implementing partner capacity, and the increasing 
congestion being experienced in regional logistical 
operations 
(which can be expected to worsen considerably with the onset 
of the rainy season in about one month's time), this will be 
a tall task in itself, regardless of the government's 
success 
in meeting its respective commitments. 
 
¶7. The final point is that even if all of these significant 
commitments are met, a Zimbabwe food gap of about 145,000 MT 
will remain.  Thus, at least some additional assistance will 
be required.  Ideally, this additional increment could be 
met 
through local private sector imports.  In this interest, the 
initial CFSAM called for some 312,000 MT of private sector 
imports.  However, due to government restrictions, 
Zimbabwe's 
private sector has not been permitted to fulfil its planned 
role in responding to the crisis.  The figures noted above 
suggest the need for renewed efforts in attempting to get 
the 
GOZ to relax its current restrictions and allow private 
sector 
food imports to proceed.  However, this also assumes that 
the 
private sector will be willing and able to respond, as 
required, 
given current government market and pricing controls and FX 
constraints/restrictions.  Failing this, additional 
government 
and/or donor imports will be required (beyond the 
considerable 
amounts already discussed above). 
 
¶8.  To address this situation, the Mission suggests the 
following course of action: 
 
-A. Hold the GOZ accountable for meeting its planned future 
import commitment of 651,000 MT.  Otherwise, the donor 
community could be held responsible for over one million MT 
of food requirements, which we consider to be an unrealistic 
target even under the best of circumstances. 
 
-B. At the same time, given the high degree of scepticism 
regarding the GOZ's ability to meet these requirements, the 
donor community must also quietly plan, on a "contingency" 
basis, for the possibility that the GOZ will prove unable 
REFS:  (A) Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment 
Report, 
16 September 2002, Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee 
(B) Harare 1141 
 
to fulfil all or a part of its commitments. 
 
-C. Renew efforts to get the GOZ to reform current policy 
restrictions related to the FX market, imports, sales and 
prices of essential food and agricultural commodities, and 
the role of NGOs and the greater private sector in food 
imports and distribution operations, which are seriously 
impeding the collective ability to respond to the growing 
crisis. 
 
-D. Continue USG efforts to respond as soon and as much as 
possible to the current food crisis in Zimbabwe.  Regarding 
the particular USG issue associated with biotech food 
commodities: 
--Finalize and complete the current corn/maize swap deal 
with the GOZ as soon as possible; 
--Work with the GOZ to develop acceptable "permanent" 
solutions to the biotech issue for Zimbabwe; and 
--Determine realistic food assistance alternatives to 
biotech 
food (in the event that a more lasting local solution cannot 
be found in a timely manner).  Recent discussions with 
government suggest that some type of monetized wheat program 
may be one such possible alternative, albeit with only 
limited application in urban areas. 
 
-E.  Continue to urge other international donors to increase 
and accelerate their commitments to Zimbabwe (both through 
the WFP program as well as through supplementary bilateral 
activities). 
 
¶9. Comment:  The recent VAC report serves to underline the 
seriousness of the food security situation in Zimbabwe. 
It clearly highlights the worsening nature of the crisis, 
and the need for renewed efforts by all concerned parties 
to avoid a potential major humanitarian disaster.  The 
Mission believes it provides a timely reminder of the 
considerable efforts that will be required over the coming 
months in this interest.  Continuing USG attention and 
support in this endeavour, as suggested above, will be 
appreciated.  Sullivan 
 
UNQUOTE 
SULLIVAN