This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 002003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS EAID ELAB CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DAS CAMP AFFIRMS U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE 
PROCESS 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 2000 (B) COLOMBO 1992 (C) COLOMBO 1858 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission W. Lewis Amselem: Reasons 1.5 (b 
,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During his October 24-27 visit to Sri Lanka, 
South Asia Bureau DAS Donald Camp delivered a message of firm 
U.S. support for the peace process.  At the same time, Camp 
encouraged both government and opposition leaders not to let 
cohabitation stresses threaten the progress made thus far 
toward peace.  Pressing the GSL to sign an ICC Article 98 
Agreement, Camp received continued assurances from the Prime 
Minister that Sri Lanka would sign the agreement soon.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The PM on Peace and Internal Politics 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) DAS Camp and the Ambassador called on Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe on October 24.  Camp opened the meeting 
by expressing the high level of hope in the USG for Sri 
Lanka's peace process.  As impressed as the U.S. is with what 
Sri Lanka has achieved on peace, Camp continued, we are 
concerned that internal politics might threaten the progress 
made.  As reported ref A, Wickremesinghe then reviewed his 
take on the current rift within the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(not a problem) and cohabitation strains with President 
Kumaratunga (still a problem).  Camp asked Wickremesinghe 
what his government could do to get the President's 
unequivocal support for the peace process.  Wickremesinghe 
said there was little hope of getting the President on board, 
but asserted that his government for its part would continue 
to try to work with her. 
 
¶3. (C) Camp told the PM he welcomed the appointment of 
Devinda Subasinghe as Sri Lankan Ambassador in Washington. 
Camp said he had known Subasinghe for years and that 
Subasinghe himself knows Washington well; he would be an 
asset to Sri Lanka.  The Ambassador suggested, as he has in 
the past, that GSL might find it useful to post a Defense 
Attache in Washington, in light of increasing military 
exchanges between our two governments.  Wickremesighe said he 
thought it was a good idea and would look into it further. 
 
-------------------- 
Article 98 Agreement 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Camp thanked Wickremesinghe for his government's 
"political decision" to sign an ICC Article 98 agreement, and 
asked when Sri Lanka would be ready to sign. Wickremesinghe 
recalled that he had assured A/S Rocca in New York (during a 
meeting on the margins of the UNGA) that Sri Lanka would 
sign; it is now just a question of getting the Foreign 
Ministry bureaucracy to move.  Camp noted that many nations 
had already signed Article 98 agreements with us.  Signing 
soon would win GSL valuable positive attention among 
Washington decision-makers; waiting too long could result in 
other countries stealing Sri Lanka's thunder.  Wickremesinghe 
assured Camp that he would push the MFA to sign soon. 
 
¶5. (C) Camp raised Article 98 in a meeting with Foreign 
Minister Tyronne Fernando the following day, reiterating the 
same points he made to the PM.  Fernando noted that the MFA 
legal division had proposed an additional paragraph for the 
agreement (ref B) that would make it easier for GSL to sign. 
The Ambassador expressed skepticism that the additional 
paragraph would be acceptable to Washington, saying that 
Washington had put a lot of work into the text of the 
agreement and that many other countries had signed it without 
modifications.  Fernando asked Camp and the Ambassador to 
await Washington's official response to the proposed 
additional text and revisit the issue afterward, if necessary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Key Ministers, GoN Ambassador Discuss Situation 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (C) Over drinks at the Ambassador's Residence on October 
25, DAS Camp met with G.L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda, two 
key ministers, and Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg.  G.L. 
Peiris kicked off the discussion with a long discourse 
focused on how much he distrusted President Kumaratunga.  On 
this point, Peiris said the President wanted to destroy the 
peace process to ensure her own political gain.  Her (October 
24) speech made clear that she was laying the basis to 
undermine government's peace initiative and also its economic 
policies.  Peiris said this latter issue, in particular, was 
of concern because the government was picking up much 
criticism over cost of living increases and cuts in welfare 
subsidies which had been mandated by the IMF.  He said he had 
little doubt that the President was working in tandem with 
the radical JVP (Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna) party to drive 
home such points with the public in an effort to completely 
undermine the PM.  Despite all the problems he had with the 
President, Peiris said he still supported trying to work with 
her in some way, including through regular briefings on the 
status of the peace process, but he was not optimistic of 
success. 
 
¶7. (C) Moragoda noted that it was this sort of criticism on 
the economic front that made the government propose the 
conference in Oslo in late November.  Moragoda added that the 
GSL hoped that donors could announce "quick impact" projects 
at the conference that would support the peace process in 
this time of difficulty.  Westborg agreed that the conference 
was critical, particularly as it came at a time when the 
government was having a tough time getting the "economic 
wheels turning."  Questioned about participation by other 
countries, Moragoda said British Minister Clare Short had 
indicated that she might be able to attend.  Norway and Sri 
Lanka continued to work with India on the issue.  India was 
naturally concerned about the issue of Tiger participation, 
but Moragoda said he was reasonably confident that something 
could be worked out.  Westborg confirmed that Anton 
Balasingham, the Tigers' spokesman and lead negotiator, would 
represent the group in Oslo.  He noted that the Tigers had 
been talked out of demanding "an equal seat at the table" 
with the government in Oslo.  All they really wanted, 
Westborg related, was to be "treated with dignity."  Both 
Moragoda and Westborg expressed appreciation to Deputy 
Secretary Armitage for his commitment to participate at the 
 
SIPDIS 
Oslo conference. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked about criticism from the President's party (such 
as that from former Foreign Minister Kadirgamar) that the 
government was not dealing with the tough issues in its talks 
with the Tigers, Peiris replied that the government had no 
intention of following a "failed" model.  Explaining his 
point, Peiris said the previous government had wasted great 
time (in 1999-2001) by demanding that the Tigers agree to 
this or that point before agreeing to come to face-to-face 
negotiations and in fact talks never did take place.  The 
current government, however, was elected on a platform 
committing itself to trying to end the war.  To implement 
this objective, the government had decided to get to talks as 
soon as possible, including by removing the legal ban on the 
Tigers.  Peiris remarked that the government was committed to 
a course of "consistent confidence-building" with the Tigers. 
 Once "confidence had been built," then the tough issues 
could be grappled with -- "You cannot put the cart before the 
horse in these matters," he underlined. 
 
¶9. (C) In a separate meeting with Minister for Employment and 
Labor and Chief Whip Mahinda Samarasinghe, DAS Camp heard 
that the majority of MPs are committed to peace, and though 
elections may consolidate the UNF's position, the negative 
effects on the peace process would be unacceptable. 
Samarasinghe criticized President Kumaratunga's actions, 
saying that she is not acting in a way that recognizes that 
she must get along with the PM.  He praised the Ambassador's 
public and private support of the peace process and USAID's 
assistance with his Productivity Policy.  Samarasinghe 
discussed the strong role of labor unions and the difficulty 
he is experiencing in passing labor reforms.  Camp explained 
that the USG wants to support the peace process, as well as 
economic and labor reforms, and that we will be as helpful as 
we can.  Samarasinghe concluded with specific requests for 
Dept. of Labor assistance to establish a Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and for USAID assistance to monitor the 
implementation of the National Productivity Policy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Muslim Leader Reviews Party Infighting, Talks 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) DAS Camp and DCM also met with Rauf Hakeem, the 
Minister of Ports and Shipping, and head of the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC).  Asked about the troubled situation 
in his party (see ref A), Hakeem admitted that he was having 
serious problems controlling a group of rebel SLMC MPs.  He 
complained that the rebels had little understanding of the 
complexities of negotiating with the Tamil Tigers, but 
insisted on making demands that would make it impossible to 
continue negotiations.  Hakeem said he understood that 
Muslims in the east were worried about their situation given 
the pressure they were under from the Tamil Tigers.  The 
answer to their problems, however, was not to destroy the 
peace process with unreasonable demands, but to work the 
process so that Muslim views were truly heard.  In doing 
this, Muslims should continue to demand and expect that 
pressure would be put on the Tigers to honor the February 
cease-fire accord.  The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 
had to do a better job of holding the Tigers accountable for 
their actions, particularly the Tiger-instigated hartals 
(strikes), which were very destructive for Muslim businesses, 
Hakeem stressed. 
 
¶11. (C) Queried about the second round of talks scheduled to 
begin on October 31 in Thailand, Hakeem remarked that he 
might not be attending.  His SLMC opponents would criticize 
him no matter what he did and he was reluctant to give them 
any openings at this time.  On the other hand, Hakeem 
continued, he wanted to ensure that Muslims were not 
forgotten in the peace process and that fact might motivate 
him to attend.  Given all the pros-and-cons, he had not 
finally made up his mind on the question of attending and 
planned to meet the PM on October 26 to discuss the issue. 
Hakeem added that it was also not clear when or whether he 
would be meeting Tamil Tiger leader V. Prabhakaran.  (Note: 
After the conclusion of the first round of talks in 
mid-September, it was announced that Hakeem would meet with 
Prabhakaran soon.)  Hakeem said the Tigers were giving 
signals that they did not want the meeting to take place at 
this time, perhaps because of the problems in the SLMC. 
Hakeem said he was still willing to meet Prabhakaran, but was 
not sure that a meeting would take place anytime soon. 
 
---------------------------- 
Meetings with the Opposition 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) DAS Camp focused on peace process and cohabitation 
issues during his October 25 meeting with Mahinda Rajapakse, 
Leader of the Opposition People's Alliance (PA).  Camp 
queried Rajapakse on what the UNP has to do on the peace 
process to satisfy the PA.  Rajapakse commented that the 
President thinks the peace process "is her baby" and she 
wants credit for it.  Camp cited a number of speeches made by 
the Prime Minister acknowledging the President's early 
efforts at peace.  Rajapakse said recognition is not enough; 
the President and her party deserve a representative at the 
talks. 
 
¶13. (C) Camp emphasized to Rajapakse the USG's hope that the 
peace process not founder because of political problems in 
Colombo.  The USG would like to see the parties cooperate on 
the issue of peace, Camp said.  Rajapakse agreed, but 
highlighted some concerns of the opposition.  First and 
foremost, the LTTE is still recruiting and fundraising. 
Second, many Sinhalese are convinced that the Norwegians are 
too sympathetic to the LTTE, and many in the PA share that 
concern.  Finally, the proposed Joint Task Force that is to 
oversee development spending in the north and east must be 
accountable to the Parliament, Rajapakse said; the people 
will not be willing to let the LTTE control development 
money.  Camp responded that the U.S. believes the Norwegians 
are working in good faith for peace.  Regarding the Joint 
Task Force, Camp said the U.S. always insists on proper 
accountability procedures for its development assistance and 
Sri Lanka will be no exception. 
 
¶14. (C) DAS Camp and Ambassador Wills met with former foreign 
minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a key adviser of President 
Kumaratunga, on October 25.  Asked about the nationally 
televised speech given by the President on October 24 (see 
ref A), Kadirgamar commented that the President had had to 
give the speech in order to highlight her concerns about the 
direction of the peace process.  The President strongly 
supported the objective of peace, but was concerned that the 
government was not informing the country of exactly what it 
had in mind.  Indeed, the government and the Norwegian 
facilitators have noted that the GSL and the Tigers might 
take "years" to reach substantive agreement on what a final 
settlement might look like.  That is much too long.  The 
government should tell the country by "mid-year next year 
(2003)" precisely what it has in mind, Kadirgamar asserted. 
If the government fails to do this, the President will be 
forced to make an issue of it, he averred.  DAS Camp 
underscored the USG's strong support for peace process.  It 
was vital that the PM and the President work together in the 
national interest, DAS Camp stressed.  Ambassador Wills 
emphasized that Sri Lanka had a "once in a generation chance 
for peace" and it was important that this opportunity not be 
squandered due to political infighting. 
 
¶15. (C) In response to a query on how cohabitation was 
working, Kadirgamar replied that President Kumaratunga 
accepted the current situation and had made clear she was 
willing to reach out to the government in her October 24 
speech.  Cohabitation was here to stay in Sri Lanka just as 
it was a permanent feature of politics in some European 
countries, and both parties had to get used to that fact. 
The President had no intention of calling elections and the 
government should accept that, Kadirgamar stated.  Kadirgamar 
went on to note that a good model for future cohabitation 
cooperation was the semi-regular schedule of meetings the two 
sides had agreed to on peace process and national security 
issues (see ref C).  Wrapping up, Kadirgamar related that the 
government had to understand that any agreements it reached 
with the Tamil Tigers would be subject to parliamentary 
approval and perhaps even a referendum.  It would be best if 
it worked with the President and her party now on these 
issues, and not surprise them with the unexpected, he noted. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) DAS Camp's visit reinforced the message of U.S. 
support for the peace process delivered earlier by Deputy 
Secretary Armitage (in August) and SA A/S Rocca (in March). 
 
SIPDIS 
The GSL and the opposition also heard clearly his message 
that the U.S. does not want to see the peace process derailed 
by internal politics.  Fortunately the peace process appears 
to be gaining strength, in spite of cohabitation tensions and 
strains within the government coalition. 
 
¶17. (C) The GSL remains committed at the political level to 
signing an Article 98 agreement, and DAS Camp's visit did 
much to help push this forward.  Winning over the bureaucrats 
at the MFA, especially the lawyers, will take additional 
work.  Post is confident that GSL will sign the kind of 
Article 98 agreement that we want; we are working to ensure 
that happens sooner rather than later. 
 
¶18. (U) DAS Camp did not have the opportunity to clear this 
message prior to departing Colombo. 
WILLS