This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001995 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T AND SA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2012 
TAGS: MARR PREL MASS PGOV PTER PHUM CE LTTE
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY AFTER DOD 
ASSESSMENTS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR E.A. WILLS; REASONS 1.5 (b, d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  DOD has just completed three major assessments of 
the SL military.  These assessments make plain that the Sri 
Lankan military forms a central component of the GSL's 
strategy to secure peace in the country after 20 years of 
civil war.  The GSL needs the support of the military to make 
peace work here.  The GSL, in turn, wants and needs American 
engagement with the military to help ensure that support, and 
to make Sri Lanka's armed services more professional, more 
respectful of human rights and less vulnerable to the 
blandishments of Sinhalese extremists.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Over the past several weeks, three separate DOD 
assessment teams have visited Sri Lanka:  NDU, which looked 
at military education; PACCOM, which assessed operational and 
equipment matters; and DPE, which evaluated doctrinal issues. 
Although we await submission of the teams' final reports, 
some dominant themes have emerged from the preliminary 
assessments as they were briefed to the CT: 
 
--  the GSL has no national security or national military 
strategy; 
 
--  the military has pursued a war-fighting strategy almost 
devoid of accurate, real-time tactical intelligence; 
 
--  widespread recognition exists that the SL military has 
followed outdated doctrines and a defensive strategy, 
including maritime interdiction, for which it is ill-equipped 
and undermanned; 
 
--the military has been severely handicapped by the lack of a 
merit-based personnel system and by very limited professional 
education opportunities. 
 
¶3.  (C)  As we have noted in our prior reporting, the 
military plays a key role in the GSL's ongoing peace effort. 
The military's support of or at least acquiescence to the 
ceasefire, negotiations with the LTTE, and loosening of the 
once-restrictive security environment that characterized Sri 
Lanka is essential for the GSL to keep the Sinhalese majority 
on-side.  The GSL, again as we have reported at length, has 
come to us for help in maintaining the military's support, by 
holding out to it the hope of having its serious deficiencies 
rectified.  The GSL wants a modern, confident military 
willing to take a chance on peace because it knows it could 
prevail, or come a lot closer to prevailing than it ever has 
before, if war resumed.  In addition, of course, the presence 
of such a military induces the LTTE to continue down the path 
of peace.  Velluparai Prabhakaran only respects strength and 
exploits weakness.  Thus, it is in the GSL's interest, and 
ours, to have a strong Sri Lankan military. 
 
¶4.  (S)  If we intend to help the GSL modernize and 
professionalize its military, we need to respond to 
reasonable requests for military assistance.  The ongoing and 
very effective JCET and other exercise/training/education 
programs, including in human rights, need to continue and 
even pick up.  But even more critical, we will need to help 
the military deal with at least some of the deficiencies our 
assessment teams have identified.  Most of those deficiencies 
have to do with structure, doctrine, and training.  To 
address some, however, the SL military needs modern military 
equipment, some of which the US is best positioned to 
provide.  In particular, the Navy needs a variety of gear 
that will enable it to patrol and protect the country's 
coastline and territorial waters from poachers, smugglers, 
and LTTE resupply efforts.  The Air Force and Navy need 
proper training and equipment to conduct SAR operations in 
case of a downed aircraft (military or civilian) or a 
foundered ship. 
 
¶5.  (S)  There are many, many more examples of potential 
equipment needs that the assessment report from PACCOM will 
cite.  We know that we cannot address all of the deficiencies 
and that the GSL military will never become a "Mini-Me" 
version of the US military.  We do, however, think that with 
appropriate help from us (and, perhaps others) the SL 
military can continue to evolve into a pro-American 
institution that respects human rights and is ready, willing 
and able to play a full and effective role in Sri Lanka's 
national security strategy and, later on, in international 
peacekeeping efforts. 
 
¶6.  (C)  As soon as we have received all the assessments we 
would like to re-engage with Washington agencies on how best 
to address the SL military's pressing needs.  We understand 
the the 04 budget allotments for FMF for Sri Lanka are fixed. 
 But we wonder whether an 03 supplemental could include 
additional FMF funds to permit the USG to engage with the GSL 
military. 
WILLS