Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 02COLOMBO1979, SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY USTR HUNTSMAN'S NOVEMBER

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #02COLOMBO1979.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02COLOMBO1979 2002-10-23 04:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Colombo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY USTR AMBASSADOR HUNTSMAN FROM AMBASSADOR 
WILLS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  10/23/2012 
TAGS: ECON ETRD CE WTO USTR ECONOMICS LTTE
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY USTR HUNTSMAN'S NOVEMBER 
VISIT TO SRI LANKA 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.  Reasons 1.5 (b, d) 
 
----------------- 
Executive Summary 
----------------- 
 
1.  (U) I extend to you a warm welcome in advance of your 
visit to Sri Lanka next month for the first meeting of the 
U.S. - Sri Lankan Trade and Investment Council (TIC).  I am 
sending this message now, nearly a month before your visit, 
because I know that you and your team are already busy 
preparing for your meetings here.  I see your visit, and the 
Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA) process in general, as 
critical to advancing U.S. trade interests here in Sri Lanka, 
and I want to provide now the context needed to make your 
visit a success. 
 
2.  (C) Your visit comes at an exciting time, with Sri Lanka 
facing its best chance for peace in many years.  A cease-fire 
has been in place since December 2001, and the government and 
Tamil Tigers just sat down for constructive face-to-face 
talks, which are due to continue later this year.  The 
situation remains fluid, however, with the intentions of the 
Tamil Tigers unclear.  The peace process could also be 
undermined by domestic fissures, such as cohabitation 
stresses between the PM and the President, and tensions 
between the Muslim community and the LTTE.  Even if GSL and 
the LTTE do reach a peace settlement, its efficacy and 
durability will depend largely on economic factors - 
specifically the extent to which Sri Lanka is able to achieve 
economic growth island-wide in the coming years.  Strong 
growth will vest all Sri Lankans in peace; if growth falters, 
the government and the peace process will be especially 
vulnerable to the pressures noted above. 
 
3.  (C) The U.S. is by far the largest trading partner of this 
trade-dependent nation, consuming nearly 40% of total exports 
in 2001.  It is thus no exaggeration to say that the U.S. 
trade relationship plays a critical part in Sri Lanka's quest 
for peace.  The Sri Lankans understand this, and they are 
likely to ask you for trade concessions in support of the 
peace process.  Still, as much as we want to see Sri Lanka 
achieve peace and increased prosperity, I do not believe we 
should be seduced into granting one-way trade concessions. 
Far from it: I see your upcoming visit and the longer-term 
TIFA process as an opportunity to push GSL to make the right 
choices on economic reform and further opening its markets to 
U.S. goods.  Making these tough choices will do more to 
strengthen Sri Lanka's economy and bolster the chances for 
long-term peace than trade concessions from the U.S. ever 
could.  For me, trade concessions should be reciprocal. 
 
4.  (SBU) Consistent with the draft agenda that your team has 
developed, I see three main areas where your visit can 
advance U.S. interests.  First, the TIFA can promote U.S. 
exports by focusing the GSL's attention on the massive 10:1 
trade imbalance between our two nations, and by discussing 
specific ways to right it.  Second, the TIFA can help GSL 
summon the courage to make the difficult economic reforms 
necessary to improve the investment climate here.  Third, the 
TIFA can identify ways to work with GSL in promoting our 
common WTO goals, thereby lending additional support to 
objectives one and two above.  I believe strongly that 
pursuing these goals with vigor will result in big benefits 
to U.S. business, not just in Sri Lanka but in South Asia as 
a whole.  If GSL makes real progress on these fronts, I 
believe further that it is in the U.S. interest to consider 
an FTA with Sri Lanka.  End Executive Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Promoting U.S. Exports 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The bilateral trade picture is dominated by a massive 
10:1 trade imbalance in Sri Lanka's favor.  The imbalance is 
mainly due to large Sri Lankan apparel exports to the U.S. 
($1.5 billion in 2001, or nearly 75% of total Sri Lankan 
exports to the U.S.)  Sri Lanka's success in apparel 
manufacturing is partly attributable to a favorable deal on 
U.S. quotas, and partly attributable to Sri Lanka's success 
in positioning itself as a low-cost, reliable supplier to the 
upper-middle end of the U.S. retail sector (with The Limited, 
Inc., Liz Claiborne and Federated Department stores some of 
the major importers of Sri Lankan apparel). 
 
6.  (SBU) While the U.S. absorbs nearly 40% of Sri Lankan 
exports, our share of Sri Lankan imports is less than 4%. 
(Note: Main U.S. exports to Sri Lanka are wheat (35% of the 
total), followed by yarns/fabric and electrical machinery. 
End Note.)  Yet Sri Lanka runs an overall trade deficit of $1 
billion.  It is importing plenty of goods, just not from the 
U.S.; main sources of Sri Lanka's imports are India (10%), 
Hong Kong (8%) and Singapore (7%).  While this trend is due 
in part to stronger commercial and historical links with 
Asia, it is also due to a lack of transparency that 
disadvantages American suppliers. 
 
7.  (U) I have been pushing GSL hard on every bid that comes 
up here, and have made good progress recently with 
significant power deals going the way of AES and General 
Electric.  Still, there is a lot of business here yet to be 
won by U.S. companies.  Your visit is an opportunity to put 
GSL on notice that we are keeping score, and that doing more 
for U.S. exports will help the overall trade relationship. 
Key areas where U.S. exports can be competitive are mass 
transit (buses, locomotive engines), power equipment, and 
textile fabric. 
 
8.  (SBU) Sri Lanka flirted last year with a ban on biotech 
foods that would have set a precedent injurious to our global 
trade interests.  This mission's aggressive lobbying, along 
with a strong letter from USTR Zoellick, helped convince GSL 
to drop the ban.  Your visit is an opportunity to press GSL 
to keep its market open to biotech products and especially to 
steer clear of any harmful labeling schemes. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Improving the Investment Climate 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Sri Lanka is eager to lure more U.S. investment to the 
country.  Sri Lanka as a whole is under-invested, and U.S. 
investment here (book value) is a modest $150 million.  The 
ethnic conflict is only partly to blame; the local investment 
climate, while much better than elsewhere in South Asia, is 
far from perfect.  Sri Lanka has the advantage of having 
opened its economy in the late 1970s, earlier than its 
neighbors.  That wave of reforms led to a surge in foreign 
investment (mainly from Asia) and a rise in living standards 
in and around Colombo, where most of the investment was 
focused. 
 
10.  (U) Twenty five years later, in spite of a long-running 
civil war, Sri Lankans enjoy the highest GDP per capita 
($850) of any nation in the region (except tiny Maldives). 
Now GSL stands on the brink of enacting a second wave of 
economic reforms that have the potential (against a backdrop 
of peace) to lead to unprecedented rates of economic growth. 
GSL has been vocal about what reforms need to take place - 
better protection of intellectual property, further 
privatization, shrinking of the regulatory role of 
government, more employer-friendly labor laws and improved 
transparency.  Yet GSL has taken very little action, 
preferring to move with caution given the government's thin 
parliamentary majority and the fragility of the peace 
process.  A downturn in economic growth or increase in 
joblessness - precisely the kind of short-term pain that 
reforms often produce - could leave GSL vulnerable to attack 
from a leftist/socialist party that can sway large numbers of 
voters. 
 
11.  (U) GSL is right to be wary of moving too fast, but at 
the same time it cannot let another year slip by without 
taking steps to improve the investment climate.  Your visit, 
and the longer-term TIFA process, can give GSL the 
encouragement it needs to enact reforms decisively.  Once the 
peace process is on solid footing, any delay in these reforms 
could endanger the prospects for foreign investment, and 
economic growth, for the rest of the decade. 
 
------------------------- 
Pursuing Common WTO Goals 
------------------------- 
12.  (U) Sri Lanka ought to play a bigger role - and a 
constructive one - in WTO fora than it has in recent years. 
(Note:  It was a virtual non-participant at Doha last year; 
consumed with internal politics, it did not send a 
Ministerial representative and made do instead with a few 
delegates from its local Embassy.  End Note.)  As a 
trade-dependent nation it has much to gain from faster 
elimination of trade barriers worldwide.  You can expect 
enthusiastic cooperation from GSL on the Doha Development 
Agenda. 
 
13.  (SBU) I cannot promise, however, that Sri Lanka will be 
able to execute on a par with its enthusiasm.  Frankly, Sri 
Lanka will need our help if it is to help us in the WTO. 
That is why I was happy to see your agenda for the TIC 
included WTO capacity building programs.  I am confident that 
a U.S. investment in Sri Lanka's WTO capacity will pay off in 
the form of an enthusiastic (and increasingly capable) 
partner on trade issues. 
 
------------------------------- 
South Asia:  The Bigger Picture 
------------------------------- 
 
14.  (U) With just 19 million of South Asia's 1.3 billion 
people, Sri Lanka would seem at first glance to form a small 
part of our overall trade interests with the subcontinent. 
But Sri Lanka is capable of playing a catalytic role in 
opening the region up to U.S. exports, and we can use the 
TIFA process to help it assume this role. 
 
15.  (U) First, Sri Lanka can serve as an attractive entry 
point into South Asia for U.S. companies.  Sri Lanka has an 
FTA in place with India, is currently finalizing one with 
Pakistan and plans to negotiate one with Bangladesh.  These 
agreements are admittedly far from "free," being plagued by 
negative lists and restrictions on both sides.  Yet they have 
the potential to make Sri Lanka into a hub for South Asian 
trade.  The Indo-Lankan FTA, for example, would allow U.S. 
businesses to export products to Sri Lanka and re-export them 
(with local value-addition) to India on preferential duty 
terms.  With import duties into Sri Lanka low and still high 
in other South Asian nations, these agreements mean Sri Lanka 
can act as an attractive gateway to a largely closed South 
Asian market. 
 
16.  (U) Second, Sri Lanka has the potential to act as a model 
for economic reform and open markets in the rest of South 
Asia.  For 25 years Sri Lanka has been the region's most open 
economy.  Now, especially if it is freed of the ethnic 
conflict that has hobbled growth, Sri Lanka can quickly 
become a force for liberalization in the region.  We have 
seen in East Asia how small, dynamic economies such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore have prodded their larger neighbors toward 
greater economic openness.  South Asia lacks a Hong Kong or 
Singapore; Sri Lanka can play that role.  We can use the TIFA 
process to help it do so. 
 
-------------------------- 
Conclusion:  Toward an FTA 
-------------------------- 
 
17.  (SBU) You are well aware that Sri Lanka is eager to enter 
into FTA negotiations with the U.S.  I believe there is 
considerable merit in the idea of a U.S.-Sri Lankan FTA, 
especially if it includes a rule of origin on apparel exports 
requiring Sri Lankan apparel to use U.S. inputs in order to 
qualify for duty free treatment.  Sri Lanka has no domestic 
textile industry to speak of and currently imports about $1 
billion in fabric a year, nearly all of it from Asia.  Under 
an FTA, the duty break on the finished garment would more 
than compensate for the higher cost of U.S. fabric, creating 
an economic incentive for Sri Lankan apparel producers to use 
U.S. material.  An FTA with Sri Lanka could therefore mean 
big business for the U.S. textile industry. 
 
18.  (SBU) I see the TIFA process as an opportunity for Sri 
Lanka to prove it is ready for an FTA with us.  To do so, GSL 
will need to boost U.S. exports (particularly where it is the 
customer), improve the local investment climate and work with 
us productively in the WTO.  If GSL shows real progress on 
these fronts during the coming year, I believe it would serve 
our regional trade interests well to consider an FTA with Sri 
Lanka. 
WILLS