This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/12 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS KPKO NI IV
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IVOIRIEN CEASE-FIRE WILL TAKE MORE WORK 
 
 
REF: (A) Jeter-Perry 10/11/02 Telcon 
(B) SECSTATE 196827 
 (C) ABIDJAN 3330 
 (D) ABIDJAN 3381 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: During an October 9 conversation with 
Ambassador Jeter, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas 
summarized his visit to Cote d'Ivoire, stating Gbagbo's 
insistence that the mutineers relinquish their weapons and 
his reluctance to "legitimize" the rebels were the main 
hurdles to a cease-fire agreement.  Chambas found the rebel 
leaders disciplined and relatively flexible.  They 
disavowed an intention to overthrow Gbagbo and Chambas saw 
no evidence of Burkinabe involvement.  Chambas planned to 
return to Cote d'Ivoire October 12 hoping to carry with him 
an amended cease-fire agreement that Gbagbo might sign.  As 
part of a cease-fire arrangement, Chambas envisioned 
deployment of 250-500 monitors and suggested that ECOWAS 
would ask the USG and other governments to provide 
logistical and financial support for their eventual 
deployment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During an October 9 meeting with Ambassador 
(accompanied by PolCouns and POLMIL), ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary Chambas and Deputy Executive Secretary Diarra 
 
SIPDIS 
indicated they had made some progress and were somewhat 
encouraged by their meetings with the rebel leaders. 
However, they were ultimately unable to get Gbagbo to sign 
the cease-fire agreement.  Despite the difficulties with 
Gbagbo, Chambas and Diarra underscored ECOWAS' commitment 
to peacefully resolve the crisis.  Chambas shared his plans 
to return to Cote d'Ivoire on October 12 to begin another 
round of discussions. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The ECOWAS officials recognized that more than 
Ivoirien stability was at stake.  Should this situation 
linger other countries, such as Liberia and Burkina Faso, 
could be drawn into the tempest.  Moreover, the already 
weak national economies in Cote d'Ivoire's immediate 
neighborhood would suffer should the Ivoirien economy be 
paralyzed; already prices in Mali had risen exorbitantly, 
Diarra noted.  Due to rising Ivoirien xenophobia, thousands 
of Burkinabe and Malians have already returned home, 
placing unneeded strain on those nations' weak social 
services. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Gbagbo the Reluctant and Stubborn 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Gbagbo was the hurdle to a quick cease-fire, 
Chambas explained.  Gbagbo claimed the draft cease-fire 
proposed was unsatisfactory because it "legitimized" the 
rebels and their seizure of territory.  Gbagbo wanted a 
document that gave an unequivocal ECOWAS endorsement of his 
government.  Gbagbo emphasized an agreement must 
specifically state that negotiations between the sides are 
based on the recognition that his administration is the 
legally constituted government of Cote d'Ivoire and that 
its authority must be accepted by the rebels. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) As a corollary, Gbagbo was adamant that the 
mutineers disarm before a cease-fire could be established. 
Chambas felt that Gbagbo took this inflexible tack because 
he was hamstrung by hard-liners within his own 
administration and military.  The Minister of Defense and 
the Colonel in charge of the soldiers deployed in the 
Bouake area wanted to "redeem their honor" after being 
stung by the rebels.  The military wanted an offensive and 
would react negatively if Gbagbo appeared too soft on the 
rebels.  Also, the tide of public opinion in Abidjan 
supported the hard-liners, Chambas noted. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Chambas believed the key to getting Gbagbo's 
signature was to amend the agreement in such a way that 
demonstrated the superior legal status of the Government 
yet without alienating the rebels by implying that they are 
common criminals.  Chambas said the angle he planned to 
take was to present a new document to Gbagbo, telling him, 
that after consultations with President Wade, the document 
was amended to accommodate the GOCI's reservations. 
(COMMENT: While we cannot be sure, the Senegalese document 
contained in reftel D may have been transmitted to the GOCI 
by Dakar without Chambas' input. It might not be what he 
had in mind.  This may indicate that coordination between 
Wade and Chambas is not perfect.  We hope that it clarifies 
rather than muddies the situation.  END COMMENT) 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Chambas stated that after returning to Dakar from 
Abidjan, he and President Wade agreed that Malian President 
Toure (ATT) would head the ECOWAS contact group on Cote 
d'Ivoire.  The contact group would be ineffective without 
one of the six Presidents having a mandate to act on behalf 
of the entire group.  Gathering six Presidents for meetings 
would prove difficult, Chambas feared.  ATT was selected 
because of Mali's manifest interests in events in Cote 
d'Ivoire and because Gbagbo trusts him.  Chambas added that 
Gbagbo also placed great trust in Ghana's Kufuor, who has 
been in regular contact with Gbagbo urging him to exercise 
restraint and statesmanship. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
The Rebels: More Reasonable than Expected 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The rebel leaders made a better than expected 
impression on Chambas and Diarra.  Chambas stated that the 
rebels appeared disciplined, rational and also flexible in 
their discussions.  The two primary rebel leaders agreed to 
a cease-fire and disavowed that they wanted Gbagbo's 
removal.  They argued for the safe return of Ivoiriens 
still in exile.  When Ambassador Jeter asked Chambas about 
the practicality of President Obasanjo's informal proposal 
to provide the rebels safe-haven outside of Cote d'Ivoire, 
Chambas replied that most of the rebels were in their 
twenties and thirties.  He saw the provision of educational 
opportunities, hopefully in a "distant and cold climate", 
as a safety valve for many of the rebels.  Others would 
simply like to remain in Cote d'Ivoire, but without the 
threat of retribution from the authorities. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) When asked about foreign involvement in the 
conflict, Chambas and Diarra said the GOIC provided no 
"credible evidence" of mercenaries or foreign government 
support.  The rebel leaders admitted to Chambas that many 
rebels had lived in exile in Burkina Faso prior to the 
rebellion.  However, during his conversations with GOBF 
officials, he was reminded that it has long been Burkinabe 
policy to grant asylum to Ivoirien exiles.  Even Gbagbo was 
a past beneficiary of Burkinabe hospitality.  It would be 
wrong to deduce Burkinabe complicity just because some of 
the rebels had lived there. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Turning to ECOWAS participation in the cease-fire 
arrangement, Chambas envisioned 250-500 monitors from the 
member states.  If it would enhance the confidence of 
either side, ECOWAS was willing to ask non-ECOWAS African 
states to furnish a complement of monitors as well.  He did 
not foresee this presence to be the inter-positional force 
advocated by some in the region.  Instead, he saw this 
deployment as having a mandate limited to monitoring cease- 
fire compliance.  He felt a presence of this size would be 
a sufficient confidence-builder, provided the two sides 
actually had the will to observe the cease-fire.  Chambas 
intimated that ECOWAS probably would look to the U.S., 
U.K., France and other donors for financial and logistical 
assistance for the deployment. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT: Chambas has his work cut out for him.  He 
must diplomatically thread the needle by amending the 
cease-fire agreement to Gbagbo's liking while not 
alienating the rebels.  Additionally, he must contend with 
the mercurial interventions and unpredictability of ECOWAS' 
Chairman Wade.  Despite these obstacles, there is no doubt 
that ECOWAS remains actively engaged, as evinced by 
Chambas' planned return to Cote d'Ivoire.  More 
importantly, ECOWAS remains committed to a negotiated 
settlement.  We must continue to encourage Chambas while 
also urging leaders in the region whom Gbagbo trusts (ATT, 
Kufuor and Obasanjo) to point their Ivoirien counterpart 
toward the negotiation table.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) UPDATE: Chambas phoned Ambassador on October 11 to 
report that Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio was currently 
in Abidjan and had established contact with the rebels.  As 
reported Ref. A, Chambas provided his view that Gbagbo 
seemed to be softening his hard-line stance, and now 
appeared more disposed toward an agreement with the rebels. 
JETER