This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002813 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USCINCEUR FOR DCINC 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 09/30/2012 
TAGS: PBTS PREL MOPS MARR PINS IV NI UV
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA WANTS TIME TO IMPLEMENT BAKASSI 
RULING 
 
 
REFS:  A) ABUJA 2800, B) ABUJA 2787, 
  C) USDAO ABUJA 2723, D) ABUJA 2721, 
  E) USDEL SECRETARY 36, F) YAOUNDE 3401, 
  G) STATE 196196 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons: 
1.5(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  MFA convokes Ambassador, asserts GON 
will eschew force in Bakassi, whatever the ICJ 
decides, as long as Cameroon does the same.  However, 
Abuja will want "time to study the verdict," a Joint 
Implementation Committee and a second summit. 
"Provocation" and "atrocities committed" by 
Cameroonian gendarmes was Nigeria's justification for 
putting military forces into Bakassi nearly a decade 
ago, and other senior GON officials have sounded 
harder lines.  Hence, the MFA demarche is not entirely 
reassuring as a bellwether of events to come.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Acting on "instructions from a very high 
level," MFA Permanent Secretary Dan Hart October 7 
convoked the Ambassador to "apprise [Nigeria's] 
friends of our reaction" to the impending ICJ ruling 
on the Cameroon/Nigeria border.  DCM accompanied the 
Ambassador; Hart was alone.  Hart said the importance 
of the GON message was such that it should normally 
have been conveyed by a Minister, but both Sule Lamido 
and Dubem Onyia were abroad, so it fell to him. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Intimating that Abuja believed that the ICJ's 
decision would go against Nigeria, Hart said Nigeria 
would "ask for time to study the verdict." The GON 
sought a "joint implementation committee" to manage 
the post-decision process and might ask UNSYG Annan 
"to convene another summit."  Nigeria would continue 
with all confidence-building measures, ongoing and 
planned, Hart assured. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Jeter replied that the USG looked 
with favor on the revitalization of the Nigerian- 
Cameroonian Bilateral Commission.  Hart confirmed that 
the September 29-30 Ministerial meeting in Abuja had 
gone well.  Hart explained that, contrary to some 
media reports, Cameroonian President Paul Biya had 
never been expected at the session.  The State Visit 
to Nigeria discussed during the 5 September bilateral 
Summit in Paris was envisaged for later in the year. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador remarked that the Paris meeting 
was a good start to a critical bilateral dialogue. 
The U.S. knew of and appreciated Nigeria's previous 
efforts to initiate bilateral negotiations, and we 
commended the GOF and UNSYG for their facilitation of 
discussions now underway.  We hoped for continued 
(bilateral) progress toward a mutually-acceptable 
outcome, regardless of the verdict. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Hart agreed that this process was "in the 
African spirit of brotherhood" and averred that 
Nigeria would continue to pursue it.  "It cannot be 
otherwise," he continued.  "In view of the role we 
play, we cannot be seen to be belligerent."  However, 
he warned, if Cameroon were to prove belligerent, "we 
are capable of standing up for ourselves." 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Responding to a question from the Ambassador, 
Hart opined that the French could have done more to 
encourage bilateral dialogue.  The economic 
relationship between France and Nigeria should have 
made France "more positively assertive earlier."  But 
Hart acknowledged the accuracy of French claims that 
Biya was reclusive and often obdurate and commented 
that a good personal relationship between Presidents 
Chirac and Obasanjo had helped. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT: The case before the ICJ covers the 
border from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea.  However, 
control of Bakassi and the adjacent waters lies at the 
heart of the dispute.  Hart's demarche suggests that 
the GON intends to delay functional implementation of 
an ICJ decision that goes against Nigeria on the core 
Bakassi issue as long as it possibly can.  Given the 
stresses and constraints the ongoing electoral season 
imposes, the GON stance should be understood in 
Yaounde as about the most forthcoming Nigeria can be 
at this time.  Others in the GON, including the 
influential Minister of Defense (REF A) and his senior 
deputy (REF B) have taken much harder lines.  As we 
have reported previously, it is an article of faith 
among most Nigerians, including their elected 
representatives (REF B) that Bakassi is part of 
Nigeria.  No government facing a near-term election, 
especially one as embattled as Obasanjo's, can afford 
to concede the correctness of an ICJ decision that 
goes against Nigeria.  Given the ever-present danger 
of a military skirmish or an incident between GOC 
forces and Nigerian civilians escalating into 
something worse -- a danger that will be heightened by 
the decision, no matter its beneficiary -- the 
importance of restraint and bilateral negotiations 
(REF G) probably can never be repeated too often. 
 
 
¶9.  (C-Rel NATO) DATT COMMENT:  Recent DAO Yaounde and 
Abuja reporting contradicts Hart's assertion of a GOC 
build-up of forces in the Bakassi. 
 
 
JETER