This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 09/23/12 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S THREATENED IMPEACHMENT -- 
WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 2763 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Efforts to impeach Obasanjo seem to be 
losing steam, but the ultimate outcome still remains 
uncertain. Many protagonists may not want to remove 
Nigeria's President from office, but rather to weaken 
him politically to the point that he fails to get the 
PDP President nomination or voluntarily withdraw from 
the race.  While constitutional issues abound as the 
catalysts for current action, political machinations 
drive events. When pulled into state-level political 
disputes, Obasanjo typically stands with governors. 
Many National Assembly members have concluded (often 
correctly) that Obasanjo opposes their re-election. 
Somebody has to go, and political survival drives the 
current impeachment drama. Corruption and greed also 
play as huge role. Obasanjo derides Nigeria's 
legislators, and he has had little time for 
cultivating them or attending to their concerns, 
legitimate or otherwise. Obasanjo's foes feed 
legislative anger.  While Obasanjo likely will keep 
his job, he clearly will emerge from this 
confrontation weakened and perhaps terminally wounded. 
End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) The National Assembly has chafed under 
Obasanjo's imperial style, resenting his ability to 
use Nigeria's long tradition of a strong Executive to 
govern essentially as he pleased without having to 
court their favor or pay more than cursory attention 
to Constitutional requirements.  Obasanjo's operatives 
openly campaigned for the removal of Assembly leaders 
not to the President's liking, and they enjoyed 
considerable success. Most Members were prepared to 
ignore an overbearing Executive branch, as long as 
they received certain perquisites (hefty allowances, 
cars and Federal contracts benefiting them 
personally).  But during late 2001 and into early 
2002, Obasanjo took three critical steps that jolted 
the legislators. First, he refused to implement 
"constituency projects" of 500 million Naira per 
Senatorial district. Second, he launched an 
investigation and audit of National Assembly spending 
and even dared Assembly Members to publish their 
salaries and emoluments.  Third, Obasanjo transitioned 
from a tendency to support governors in their frequent 
disputes with senators and representatives into a 
virtual policy of doing so.  The legislators saw their 
chance to direct money to their campaigns and into 
their pockets evaporating and Obasanjo turning more to 
their adversaries, the already well-funded governors. 
It all added up to one thing in their minds: Obasanjo 
wanted to stop them from being re-elected.  Meanwhile, 
Obasanjo's unsuccessful efforts to unseat Ghali 
Na'Abba had turned the House Speaker into an 
implacable foe, and the once-pliable Senate President 
had become bitter over Obasanjo's refusal to back him 
in a power struggle with the Governor of Ebonyi State. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Across broad swaths of the North and in parts 
of the South, political actors dependent on Federal 
largesse had grown increasingly concerned about two 
issues. First, Obasanjo was not directing enough 
Federal money their way.  Second, some Obasanjo 
associates were discussing plans for a clean sweep 
following the President's anticipated re-election; 
there would be a concerted post-election attack on 
crony contract awards and rent-seeking behavior. At 
the same time, public annoyance over Obasanjo's high- 
handed governing style was spreading from the 
legislature into society at large, unhappiness over 
steadily increasing prices was growing, and the 
President's love of foreign travel was being ridiculed 
in the face of his inability to obtain debt 
forgiveness, the centerpiece of his foreign policy. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Influential players and especially antagonists 
from the North began to urge a very willing National 
Assembly to challenge Obasanjo -- to force him to 
recognize their prerogatives and to play the 
corruption game as it has always been played. Having 
faced down all previous impeachment threats, Obasanjo 
did not take this one seriously, refusing a list of 
Assembly demands that notably included: 
 
 
-- Addressing a joint session of the National 
Assembly; 
-- Replacing his detested legislative liaison 
officers; and 
-- Implementing the constituency projects. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Obasanjo soon regretted his hard line, as the 
calls for his impeachment grew, and his backers in the 
National Assembly dwindled.  In recent days he has: 
 
 
-- Offered to address a joint session; 
-- Agreed to replace his combative House Liaison 
Officer; 
-- Decided to hire more liaison officers so that each 
of Nigeria's geo-political zones is represented; 
-- Submitted a supplemental 2002 budget reinstating 
the constituency projects; 
-- Given a conciliatory Independence Day speech that 
attributed the legislative-executive stand-off to a 
communications gap; and 
-- Submitted to the Assembly a bill that would resolve 
the contentious oil resource allocation dispute by 
eliminating the offshore/onshore dichotomy. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Behind the scenes, Obasanjo's advisors have 
embarked on a campaign to convince Assembly Members 
from their respective states to drop from the ranks of 
impeachment supporters.  Presumably, funds are also 
changing hands to get key Assembly Members to abandon 
the impeachment drive. The PDP National Secretariat 
has also been active, but its interventions have met 
with mixed success.  Former Heads of State Gowon and 
Shagari and other influential individuals have been 
enlisted to plead for Obasanjo to be permitted to 
finish his term. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) From meetings with numerous players in this 
game, we conclude that the impetus behind the 
impeachment threat is weakening but that its momentum 
remains substantial.  While the number of House 
Members supporting impeachment appears to have fallen 
from just over the required 240 to something under it, 
many senators and representatives will continue to 
press for the President's removal, not because they 
expect to succeed but because their own political 
survival depends on weakening Obasanjo to the point of 
becoming a political lame-duck, incapable of 
successfully contesting for re-election. 
 
 
¶8. (C) One of the reasons impeachment will not succeed 
is that it threatens the very fabric of Nigerian 
politics, as well as the fragile unity of Nigerian 
society.  The Yoruba Southwest, which voted heavily 
for Obasanjo's opponent and co-ethnic, Olu Falae, in 
1999, is now strongly behind the President. The 
impeachment drive, whose symbol is Speaker Na'Abba, a 
Northerner from Kano, is increasingly portrayed in the 
Southwest as a continuation of the 1993 election 
annulment and Northern efforts to recapture power 
without having to win an election (Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar would be the Constitutional successor). 
Fred Fasehun, a leader of the militant Oodua Peoples 
Congress (OPC) recently stated publicly that 
impeachment of Obasanjo was an impeachment of Nigerian 
democracy that could result in the disintegration of 
the country. Obasanjo's impeachment, Fashehun said, 
would shatter Nigeria's unity. While Fashehun is prone 
to hyperbole, the sentiment behind his statements 
resonates in the Yoruba Southwest and may have gotten 
the attention of the political elite. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Notwithstanding, many Northern political 
leaders continue to express support for impeachment, 
and Igbos clamoring for one of their own to be 
President in 2003 have joined the bandwagon.  But for 
neither of these groups is Obasanjo's actual removal 
from office desirable.  That would turn the Vice 
President, a smooth politician with plenty of money 
and formidable machinery into an incumbent President 
and complicate their calculations, which stress the 
importance of an "open field" for 2003.  Obasanjo's 
opponents will likely continue to inflict non-fatal 
wounds, such as pushing various alternative candidates 
to announce campaigns, in order to keep the President 
off balance, under pressure and unable to regain 
momentum in time to win his party's nomination. 
 
 
JETER