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Viewing cable 02ROME4424, HUNGARIAN PM ASSURES HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ROME4424 2002-09-12 09:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T  ROME 004424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012 
TAGS: MOPS PREL HU IT PREL HU IT PREL HU IT IZ IZMOPS IZMOPS
SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN PM ASSURES HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR 
RIDGE OF CONTINUING GOH SUPPORT 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5 (B & D) 
 
======= 
SUMMARY 
======= 
 
1. (S) HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER MEDQYESSY ASSURED HOMELAND 
SECURITY DIRECTOR RIDGE OF GOH SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR, 
INCLUDING ITS CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO STEMMING FINANCIAL 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04424  121327Z 
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND TO HOSTING THE ILEA IN BUDAPEST. 
THE GOH WAS ALSO WILLING TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE BILATERAL 
INTEL-SHARING RELATIONSHIP IN A "COMPLEMENTARY" MANNER.  IN 
THE CONTEXT OF AN EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION 
AGAINST IRAQ, MEDQYESSY TOLD RIDGE "YOU CAN COUNT ON US" BUT 
APPEALED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION PRIOR TO ANY USE OF FORCE. 
THE PM'S CHIEF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ADVISOR, KLARA 
AKOTS, SECONDED THE PLEA FOR "NO SURPRISES" AND EXPLAINED 
THAT THE GOH WOULD NEED TIME TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR MILITARY 
ACTION AMONGST THE HUNGARIAN ELECTORATE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) GOVERNOR TOM RIDGE, ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY, MET ON 7 SEPTEMBER WITH HUNGARIAN PRIME 
MINISTER PETER MEDQYESSY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL COOPERATION IN 
THE WAR ON TERROR.  THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN CERNOBBIO, 
NORTH OF MILAN, WHERE BOTH RIDGE AND MEDQYESSY WERE ATTENDING 
THE ANNUAL AMBROSETTI CONFERENCE.  ALSO PRESENT WERE CHIEF 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ADVISOR TO THE PM KLARA AKOTS, A 
GOH INTERPRETER AND A GOH NOTETAKER, AND CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
SKODON. 
 
============================================= =========== 
GOH SUPPORT FOR WAR ON TERROR:  FINANCIAL CONTROLS, ILEA 
============================================= =========== 
 
3. (C) MEDQYESSY BEGAN THE MEETING BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE 
USG COULD DEPEND ON GOH ASSISTANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR.  THE 
GOH HAD ASSESSED 9-11 AS AN ATTACK ON THE WORLD COMMUNITY, 
NOT THE U.S. ALONE.  IT WANTED TO COOPERATE AS MUCH AS IT 
COULD IN THE WORLD'S RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS. 
 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04424  121327Z 
4. (C) THE PM SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT HUNGARY HAD BEEN ON A 
LIST OF NATIONS WHICH HAD INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BY CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THANKS TO NEW LEGISLATIVE MEASURES HAD 
BEEN REMOVED FROM THE LIST -- "THANK GOD."  (COMMENT:  WE 
ASSUME THE PM WAS REFERRING TO THE FATF "BLACKLIST."  END 
COMMENT.)  MEDGYESSY RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHOKING OFF 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND ASSURED THE GOVERNOR 
THAT THE GOH HAD DONE AND WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO HALT THE 
FLOW OF FUNDS.  THE PM ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE 
WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN 
BUDAPEST, PARTICULARLY ITS ANTI-TERROR TRAINING FOR BALKAN 
STATES, AND WAS AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO MORE TO COUNTER THE 
THREAT OF TERRORISM. 
 
5. (C) GOVERNOR RIDGE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE ON BEHALF OF THE 
USG FOR ALL THE GOH HAD DONE TO FIGHT TERRORISM.  HE WAS 
PLEASED THAT BUDAPEST WAS HOSTING THE ILEA; THERE WAS NO 
GREATER CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAN 
FINDING WAYS TO INTENSIFY THE INVOLVEMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE 
LIBERTIES AND FREEDOMS THAT WE ENJOY.  HE WAS ALSO PLEASED TO 
HEAR OF THE GOH'S COMMITMENT TO MORE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TRAINING, SOMETHING NEEDED NOT ONLY INTERNATIONALLY BUT 
DOMESTICALLY WITHIN THE U.S. AS WELL. 
 
======================== 
ENHANCING INTEL EXCHANGE 
======================== 
 
6. (S) MEDQYESSY SAID THAT IN A WORLD OF BURGEONING 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04424  121327Z 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, MANAGING AND CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE WAR ON TERROR. 
RIDGE AGREED, NOTING THAT THE USG HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT 
INVESTMENTS IN IT, BUT THEY HAD NOT NECESSARILY BEEN VERY 
SMART INVESTMENTS.  WE WERE GETTING MORE COMFORTABLE WITH 
EXCHANGING INFORMATION WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES BUT HAD TO DO A 
BETTER JOB OF PROVIDING IT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN A 
MANNER THAT DID NOT COMPROMISE SOURCES AND METHODS. 
 
7. (S) THE PM REPLIED THAT GOH INTEL OFFICIALS ALREADY 
PARTICIPATED IN EXCHANGES WITH THE USG, BUT HE COULD SAFELY 
SAY THAT IF THERE COULD BE EVEN CLOSER COOPERATION, IT WOULD 
BE A PLEASURE TO OFFER IT.  THE GOH HAD A STRONG ANALYTICAL 
CAPACITY, AND THE INTEL RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY GOOD AND VERY 
PROFESSIONAL.  THE NEW HEAD OF THE RELEVANT GOH AGENCY WOULD 
VISIT THE U.S. IN A FEW WEEKS, WHICH WOULD BE AN 
ENCOURAGEMENT TO MORE COOPERATION.  THE GOH WANTED TO SEE THE 
RELATIONSHIP DEVELOP, IN A COMPLEMENTARY WAY. 
 
8. (C) RIDGE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY NEW COUNTER-TERROR 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR INITIATIVES BEING DEVELOPED BY THE GOH, OR 
IF THERE WERE ANY THINGS THE USG COULD BE DOING BETTER FOR 
HUNGARY.  MEDQYESSY REPLIED THAT, QUITE HONESTLY, HE HAD NOT 
 
CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION.  THE GOH KNEW THAT THE USG WOULD 
HAVE TO CARRY THE GREATEST PART OF THE BURDEN IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR, BUT IT WAS WILLING TO THINK ABOUT WHAT IT COULD DO TO 
ASSUME SOME OF THAT BURDEN. 
 
====================================== 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 05        ROME  04424  121327Z 
THE ROOTS OF TERROR:  FACT AND FICTION 
====================================== 
 
9. (U) FOLLOWING THE PM'S COMMENT ABOUT THE SHARP NATURE OF 
THE CONFERENCE DEBATE ON THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM, GOVERNOR 
RIDGE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD TRIED TO HELP COUNTER SOME OF 
THE MORE DISINGENUOUS PROJECTIONS PUT FORWARD BY MEMBERS OF 
THE AUDIENCE, FOR EXAMPLE THE ARGUMENT THAT POVERTY OR SOCIAL 
INEQUITY WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF TERROR.  THERE WAS NO NEXUS AT 
ALL BETWEEN USAMA BIN LADEN'S TYPE OF TERROR AND POVERTY; 
ELIMINATING POVERTY WORLDWIDE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A NOBLE GOAL, 
BUT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 
TERRORISM. 
 
=================================== 
IRAQ:  GOH APPEAL FOR CONSULTATIONS 
=================================== 
 
10. (U) IN RESPONSE TO MEDQYESSY'S QUESTION ON USG POLICY 
TOWARD IRAQ, RIDGE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEGUN 
CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
IN THE PAST WEEK, AND WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN HIS 
FORTHCOMING UNGA SPEECH.  THESE ACTIONS WOULD HELP DISPEL THE 
MISTAKEN SPECULATION ABOUT USG PLANS TO ACT UNILATERALLY. 
RIDGE CAUTIONED THE PM NOT TO READ TOO MUCH INTO MEDIA 
REPORTS OF DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION.  AS 
SECRETARY POWELL HAD SAID, SOME OF THE REPORTED DIFFERENCES 
 
SIPDIS 
WERE REAL, SOME PERCEIVED, AND SOME IMAGINARY.  THE PRESIDENT 
WAS A DECISIVE LEADER WHO ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO EXPRESS 
DIVERGENT VIEWS, BUT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT AT ALL THAT 
SADDAM'S PURSUIT OF WMD CONSTITUTED A MENACE NOT JUST TO THE 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 06        ROME  04424  121327Z 
U.S. BUT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. 
 
11. (C) MEDQYESSY SAID HE EXPECTED SADDAM TO TRY AND BUY TIME 
BY ALLOWING UN INSPECTORS BACK INTO IRAQ, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED 
SADDAM WAS THINKING MUCH BEYOND THAT NEXT MOVE.  THE PM 
STRESSED THAT THE TIMING OF USG CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS NATO 
ALLIES ABOUT ANY USE OF FORCE WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT 
ISSUE; AKOTS, WHO HAD NOT SAID A WORD UP TO THIS POINT, ADDED 
EMPHATICALLY, "YOU ASKED HOW YOU COULD HELP US?  DON'T TAKE 
US BY SURPRISE."  GOVERNOR RIDGE AND CDA ASSURED MEDQYESSY 
THAT THE CIRCLE OF CONSULTATION WOULD WIDEN BEYOND THE PERM 
FIVE.  AKOTS SAID THE GOH REALIZED CONSULTATIONS WOULD 
NATURALLY TAKE PLACE ON MANY LEVELS -- THE UN, NATO, 
BILATERALLY -- AND HOPED THE USG RECOGNIZED THAT EACH SET OF 
CONSULTATIONS SERVED A DISTINCT PURPOSE AND SO WOULD HAVE TO 
BE APPROACHED DIFFERENTLY. 
 
12 (C) THE PM CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION ON IRAQ BY TELLING 
GOVERNOR RIDGE "WE ARE AND WILL BE RELIABLE PARTNERS; YOU CAN 
COUNT ON US."  GOVERNOR RIDGE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD CLEARLY 
UNDERSTOOD THE PM'S MESSAGE THAT THE GOH NEEDED MORE CLARITY 
ABOUT USG INTENTIONS, AND ASSURED HIM IT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING 
THROUGH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST. 
(FOLLOWING THE MEETING, AKOTS BUTTONHOLED CHARGE TO EXPLAIN 
THAT THE GOH DESIRE FOR MORE INFORMATION ON IRAQ WAS DRIVEN 
BY ITS NEED TO EDUCATE AND PREPARE THE HUNGARIAN ELECTORATE, 
WHERE SENTIMENT WAS CURRENTLY RUNNING AGAINST THE USE OF 
MILITARY FORCE.) 
 
13 (U) THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY EMBASSY BUDAPEST AND 
GOVERNOR RIDGE'S STAFF. 
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                              SECRET        PTQ0136 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  04424  01 OF 02  121152Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    UTED-00  VC-00 
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00 
      NSCE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------E645EE  121153Z /03 
P 120910Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5783 
INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 004424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012 
TAGS: MOPS PREL HU IT PREL HU IT PREL HU IT IZ IZMOPS IZMOPS
SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN PM ASSURES HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR 
RIDGE OF CONTINUING GOH SUPPORT 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5 (B & D) 
 
======= 
SUMMARY 
======= 
 
1. (S) HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER MEDQYESSY ASSURED HOMELAND 
SECURITY DIRECTOR RIDGE OF GOH SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR, 
INCLUDING ITS CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO STEMMING FINANCIAL 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04424  01 OF 02  121152Z 
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND TO HOSTING THE ILEA IN BUDAPEST. 
THE GOH WAS ALSO WILLING TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE BILATERAL 
INTEL-SHARING RELATIONSHIP IN A "COMPLEMENTARY" MANNER.  IN 
THE CONTEXT OF AN EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION 
AGAINST IRAQ, MEDQYESSY TOLD RIDGE "YOU CAN COUNT ON US" BUT 
APPEALED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION PRIOR TO ANY USE OF FORCE. 
THE PM'S CHIEF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ADVISOR, KLARA 
AKOTS, SECONDED THE PLEA FOR "NO SURPRISES" AND EXPLAINED 
THAT THE GOH WOULD NEED TIME TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR MILITARY 
ACTION AMONGST THE HUNGARIAN ELECTORATE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) GOVERNOR TOM RIDGE, ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY, MET ON 7 SEPTEMBER WITH HUNGARIAN PRIME 
MINISTER PETER MEDQYESSY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL COOPERATION IN 
THE WAR ON TERROR.  THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN CERNOBBIO, 
NORTH OF MILAN, WHERE BOTH RIDGE AND MEDQYESSY WERE ATTENDING 
THE ANNUAL AMBROSETTI CONFERENCE.  ALSO PRESENT WERE CHIEF 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ADVISOR TO THE PM KLARA AKOTS, A 
GOH INTERPRETER AND A GOH NOTETAKER, AND CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
SKODON. 
 
============================================= =========== 
GOH SUPPORT FOR WAR ON TERROR:  FINANCIAL CONTROLS, ILEA 
============================================= =========== 
 
3. (C) MEDQYESSY BEGAN THE MEETING BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE 
USG COULD DEPEND ON GOH ASSISTANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR.  THE 
GOH HAD ASSESSED 9-11 AS AN ATTACK ON THE WORLD COMMUNITY, 
NOT THE U.S. ALONE.  IT WANTED TO COOPERATE AS MUCH AS IT 
COULD IN THE WORLD'S RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS. 
 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04424  01 OF 02  121152Z 
4. (C) THE PM SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT HUNGARY HAD BEEN ON A 
LIST OF NATIONS WHICH HAD INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BY CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THANKS TO NEW LEGISLATIVE MEASURES HAD 
BEEN REMOVED FROM THE LIST -- "THANK GOD."  (COMMENT:  WE 
ASSUME THE PM WAS REFERRING TO THE FATF "BLACKLIST."  END 
COMMENT.)  MEDGYESSY RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHOKING OFF 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND ASSURED THE GOVERNOR 
THAT THE GOH HAD DONE AND WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO HALT THE 
FLOW OF FUNDS.  THE PM ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE 
WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN 
BUDAPEST, PARTICULARLY ITS ANTI-TERROR TRAINING FOR BALKAN 
STATES, AND WAS AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO MORE TO COUNTER THE 
THREAT OF TERRORISM. 
 
5. (C) GOVERNOR RIDGE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE ON BEHALF OF THE 
USG FOR ALL THE GOH HAD DONE TO FIGHT TERRORISM.  HE WAS 
PLEASED THAT BUDAPEST WAS HOSTING THE ILEA; THERE WAS NO 
GREATER CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAN 
FINDING WAYS TO INTENSIFY THE INVOLVEMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE 
LIBERTIES AND FREEDOMS THAT WE ENJOY.  HE WAS ALSO PLEASED TO 
HEAR OF THE GOH'S COMMITMENT TO MORE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TRAINING, SOMETHING NEEDED NOT ONLY INTERNATIONALLY BUT 
DOMESTICALLY WITHIN THE U.S. AS WELL. 
 
======================== 
ENHANCING INTEL EXCHANGE 
======================== 
 
6. (S) MEDQYESSY SAID THAT IN A WORLD OF BURGEONING 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04424  01 OF 02  121152Z 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, MANAGING AND CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE WAR ON TERROR. 
RIDGE AGREED, NOTING THAT THE USG HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT 
INVESTMENTS IN IT, BUT THEY HAD NOT NECESSARILY BEEN VERY 
SMART INVESTMENTS.  WE WERE GETTING MORE COMFORTABLE WITH 
EXCHANGING INFORMATION WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES BUT HAD TO DO A 
BETTER JOB OF PROVIDING IT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN A 
MANNER THAT DID NOT COMPROMISE SOURCES AND METHODS. 
 
7. (S) THE PM REPLIED THAT GOH INTEL OFFICIALS ALREADY 
PARTICIPATED IN EXCHANGES WITH THE USG, BUT HE COULD SAFELY 
SAY THAT IF THERE COULD BE EVEN CLOSER COOPERATION, IT WOULD 
BE A PLEASURE TO OFFER IT.  THE GOH HAD A STRONG ANALYTICAL 
CAPACITY, AND THE INTEL RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY GOOD AND VERY 
PROFESSIONAL.  THE NEW HEAD OF THE RELEVANT GOH AGENCY WOULD 
VISIT THE U.S. IN A FEW WEEKS, WHICH WOULD BE AN 
ENCOURAGEMENT TO MORE COOPERATION.  THE GOH WANTED TO SEE THE 
RELATIONSHIP DEVELOP, IN A COMPLEMENTARY WAY. 
 
8. (C) RIDGE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY NEW COUNTER-TERROR 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR INITIATIVES BEING DEVELOPED BY THE GOH, OR 
IF THERE WERE ANY THINGS THE USG COULD BE DOING BETTER FOR 
HUNGARY.  MEDQYESSY REPLIED THAT, QUITE HONESTLY, HE HAD NOT 
 
                          SECRET 
 
                              SECRET        PTQ0137 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  04424  02 OF 02  121153Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    UTED-00  VC-00 
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00 
      NSCE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------E645FC  121153Z /03 
P 120910Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5784 
INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 004424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012 
TAGS: MOPS PREL HU IT PREL HU IT PREL HU IT IZ IZMOPS IZMOPS
SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN PM ASSURES HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR 
RIDGE OF CONTINUING GOH SUPPORT 
 
CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION.  THE GOH KNEW THAT THE USG WOULD 
HAVE TO CARRY THE GREATEST PART OF THE BURDEN IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR, BUT IT WAS WILLING TO THINK ABOUT WHAT IT COULD DO TO 
ASSUME SOME OF THAT BURDEN. 
 
====================================== 
THE ROOTS OF TERROR:  FACT AND FICTION 
====================================== 
 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  04424  02 OF 02  121153Z 
9. (U) FOLLOWING THE PM'S COMMENT ABOUT THE SHARP NATURE OF 
THE CONFERENCE DEBATE ON THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM, GOVERNOR 
RIDGE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD TRIED TO HELP COUNTER SOME OF 
THE MORE DISINGENUOUS PROJECTIONS PUT FORWARD BY MEMBERS OF 
THE AUDIENCE, FOR EXAMPLE THE ARGUMENT THAT POVERTY OR SOCIAL 
INEQUITY WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF TERROR.  THERE WAS NO NEXUS AT 
ALL BETWEEN USAMA BIN LADEN'S TYPE OF TERROR AND POVERTY; 
ELIMINATING POVERTY WORLDWIDE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A NOBLE GOAL, 
BUT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 
TERRORISM. 
 
=================================== 
IRAQ:  GOH APPEAL FOR CONSULTATIONS 
=================================== 
 
10. (U) IN RESPONSE TO MEDQYESSY'S QUESTION ON USG POLICY 
TOWARD IRAQ, RIDGE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEGUN 
CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
IN THE PAST WEEK, AND WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN HIS 
FORTHCOMING UNGA SPEECH.  THESE ACTIONS WOULD HELP DISPEL THE 
MISTAKEN SPECULATION ABOUT USG PLANS TO ACT UNILATERALLY. 
RIDGE CAUTIONED THE PM NOT TO READ TOO MUCH INTO MEDIA 
REPORTS OF DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION.  AS 
SECRETARY POWELL HAD SAID, SOME OF THE REPORTED DIFFERENCES 
 
SIPDIS 
WERE REAL, SOME PERCEIVED, AND SOME IMAGINARY.  THE PRESIDENT 
WAS A DECISIVE LEADER WHO ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO EXPRESS 
DIVERGENT VIEWS, BUT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT AT ALL THAT 
SADDAM'S PURSUIT OF WMD CONSTITUTED A MENACE NOT JUST TO THE 
U.S. BUT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. 
 
11. (C) MEDQYESSY SAID HE EXPECTED SADDAM TO TRY AND BUY TIME 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  04424  02 OF 02  121153Z 
BY ALLOWING UN INSPECTORS BACK INTO IRAQ, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED 
SADDAM WAS THINKING MUCH BEYOND THAT NEXT MOVE.  THE PM 
STRESSED THAT THE TIMING OF USG CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS NATO 
ALLIES ABOUT ANY USE OF FORCE WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT 
ISSUE; AKOTS, WHO HAD NOT SAID A WORD UP TO THIS POINT, ADDED 
EMPHATICALLY, "YOU ASKED HOW YOU COULD HELP US?  DON'T TAKE 
US BY SURPRISE."  GOVERNOR RIDGE AND CDA ASSURED MEDQYESSY 
THAT THE CIRCLE OF CONSULTATION WOULD WIDEN BEYOND THE PERM 
FIVE.  AKOTS SAID THE GOH REALIZED CONSULTATIONS WOULD 
NATURALLY TAKE PLACE ON MANY LEVELS -- THE UN, NATO, 
BILATERALLY -- AND HOPED THE USG RECOGNIZED THAT EACH SET OF 
CONSULTATIONS SERVED A DISTINCT PURPOSE AND SO WOULD HAVE TO 
BE APPROACHED DIFFERENTLY. 
 
12 (C) THE PM CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION ON IRAQ BY TELLING 
GOVERNOR RIDGE "WE ARE AND WILL BE RELIABLE PARTNERS; YOU CAN 
COUNT ON US."  GOVERNOR RIDGE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD CLEARLY 
UNDERSTOOD THE PM'S MESSAGE THAT THE GOH NEEDED MORE CLARITY 
ABOUT USG INTENTIONS, AND ASSURED HIM IT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING 
THROUGH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST. 
(FOLLOWING THE MEETING, AKOTS BUTTONHOLED CHARGE TO EXPLAIN 
THAT THE GOH DESIRE FOR MORE INFORMATION ON IRAQ WAS DRIVEN 
BY ITS NEED TO EDUCATE AND PREPARE THE HUNGARIAN ELECTORATE, 
WHERE SENTIMENT WAS CURRENTLY RUNNING AGAINST THE USE OF 
MILITARY FORCE.) 
 
13 (U) THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY EMBASSY BUDAPEST AND 
GOVERNOR RIDGE'S STAFF. 
SEMBLER 
 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  04424  02 OF 02  121153Z 
 
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 2002ROME04424 - Classification: SECRET