This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: PM WORRIED ABOUT RUMORS OF KINGLY INTERVENTION 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1762 
 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1748 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1741 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 1515 
 
Classified By: POL PMAHONEY.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador and UK 
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba seemed clearly distressed by rumors that King Gyanendra 
wants to postpone the November 13 national elections, "seize 
power" by invoking Clause 127 of the Constitution, and 
substitute "his own man" for Deuba as head of government.  He 
reiterated several times that he feels his personal 
credibility is linked to the elections going forward as 
scheduled and asked both Ambassadors to send a "strong 
signal" to the Palace to allow polling to proceed.  He 
indicated he will re-impose the state of emergency 
selectively in certain areas after a meeting with leaders of 
the major political parties.  A September 11 press release 
from Maoist supremo Prachanda (septel) offering a ceasefire 
he dismissed as a ploy, but noted he had sent discreet 
feelers through an intermediary about the possibility of 
resuming dialogue.  The Army Chief told the UK Ambassador 
September 12 that recent Maoist successes have made the Army 
question its ability to provide adequate security for the 
elections.  End summary. 
 
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PALACE PLOY? 
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¶2.  (C) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador and 
with UK Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba admitted to "some suspicion that the Palace 
doesn't want elections" (Ref A).  Although the PM said that 
King Gyanendra has told him nothing directly, well-connected 
Palace emissaries have let it be known that the King wants 
elections postponed and wants Deuba to step down, to be 
replaced by "his own man"--Deuba said he had heard former 
Panchayat-era PM Kirti Nidhi Bista suggested-- as head of an 
interim government for two years.  Deuba said he has rebuffed 
the suggestion to postpone polling, stressing his position 
that the Government of Nepal (GON) should proceed with 
preparations to hold national elections on November 13. 
"Let's try first" before deciding that elections cannot be 
held, he stressed. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Amb. Bloomfield asked which government body has the 
authority to determine that elections should be postponed. 
Deuba responded that the Cabinet can recommend postponement, 
but such a decision would require his assent as Prime 
Minister.  Nonetheless, Deuba added gloomily, the King is 
rumored to be saying if the (security) situation does not 
improve, "he has to seize power" by invoking Clause 127 of 
the Constitution (Ref A).  "He's very much impatient to have 
some sort of role."  The King is "very clever," Deuba said. 
He is "creating perceptions" that the elections cannot be 
held in order to provoke a Constitutional crisis.  The King 
might then blame Deuba for having asked him to dissolve 
Parliament and call for elections.  But "the King cannot 
force me to resign," he declared, although he later indicated 
he would personally feel compelled to resign if he were 
unable to hold elections as promised. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Both Ambassadors attempted to press Deuba on whether 
he would participate in an interim Cabinet, should a 
determination be made that elections cannot be held.  Deuba 
was reluctant to accept even the hypothetical suggestion that 
elections be postponed, emphasizing that he believes his 
personal credibility is firmly linked to holding to the 
election schedule.  At another point in the conversation, 
however, he said he would be ready to take part in an 
all-party Cabinet--possibly also including technocrats.  He 
asked both Ambassadors to send a "strong signal" to the 
Palace that elections should go forward as scheduled. 
 
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SELECTIVE STATE OF EMERGENCY AN OPTION 
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¶5.  (C) Deuba said he plans to call an all-party meeting once 
the Election Commission announces its long-pending decision 
on which Nepali Congress faction may use the party symbol 
during elections.  (Note:  This decision is expected soon. 
End note.)  Deuba said he will raise re-imposition of the 
state of emergency, which expired August 28, in the meeting, 
adding that the other parties are sure to oppose the 
emergency.  (Note:  Nepali press on September 12 quoted the 
State Minister for Home Affairs as asserting the emergency 
will be re-imposed, regardless of the outcome of the 
all-party meeting.  End note.)  Deuba indicated he will use 
the parties' objections to the emergency to re-impose it on a 
selective basis, applying it only in those areas most 
affected by the insurgency.  When elections are to be held in 
those areas, the emergency could be lifted.  Controls on the 
press would have to be lifted if the emergency is applied 
only to certain parts of the country, Deuba acknowledged; 
"only the movement of the people would be suppressed." 
 
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PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Malinowski raised the September 11 press 
release from Maoist supremo Prachanda offering a ceasefire 
(septel).  The Prime Minister dismissed the offer as a 
typically insincere ploy by the insurgents.  If, however, the 
offer could be determined to be genuine, the door would be 
open for secret talks.  He said he had sent out feelers 
through a purported Maoist emissary to "discreet talks."  The 
Maoists are supposed to be holding an important meeting next 
week, after which the PM has been told to expect a reply. 
The PM said he emphasized in his message to the insurgents 
that at the very least they suspend violent activities during 
the elections.  Otherwise, if violence disrupts the elections 
and they cannot be held, he concluded, "my credibility will 
be damaged." 
 
¶7.  (C)  The problem is, Deuba noted, he can never be sure of 
the credentials of the supposed Maoist emissaries who contact 
him, or with what authority they may speak for the 
leadership.  Although there are many would-be mediators, "I 
don't know who the real person is."  Because of the Maoists' 
anti-royal rhetoric, the King himself "is not very keen" on 
brokering talks with the Maoists, Deuba said, but noted in 
the same breath rumors that had surfaced in the past linking 
the Maoists to India and the Palace. 
 
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CABINET CLEANING 
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¶8.  (C) Ambassador Malinowski asked if the PM were 
considering changes in his Cabinet (Ref B).  The PM replied 
that he is deferring that decision--like the decision about 
restoring the emergency--until after the Election Commission 
makes a determination about his party's election symbol. 
Deuba acknowledged that the King had earlier urged him to 
pare down his Cabinet, but noted that various factors, like 
having to await the Supreme Court's decision on the 
dissolution of Parliament (Ref D), had made him defer action. 
 Deuba said that he would dismiss some of his ministers 
accused of corruption.  Ambassador Malinowski said that some 
of those were among the most politically powerful figures in 
his party and asked what they might do in retaliation.  Deuba 
noted ruefully that he expected them to cause difficulties 
for him. 
 
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ELECTION SCHEDULE 
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¶9.  (C)  Deuba cited "strong rumors" circulating now that the 
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) does not support holding the 
elections.  Elections could be held "phase-wise" to allay 
security concerns, in up to six phases beginning in the 
Himalayan region, he suggested.  This schedule might not be 
completed before February, he acknowledged.  He asked both 
the U.S. and UK to send international observers to oversee 
the elections.  Amb. Bloomfield replied that the EU is 
deciding September 12 whether or not to send an observer 
mission. 
----------------------------------- 
NEW ARMY CHIEF QUESTIONS ELECTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pyar Jung Thapa, who 
assumed his position September 9, told the British Ambassador 
September 12 that recent Maoist successes in the field (Ref 
C) have made the RNA leadership question its ability to 
provide adequate security for the electons.  That the Maoists 
were able to assemble the forces necessary to attack in two 
different parts of the country--including a district 
headquarters--without detection has changed the thinking of 
both the RNA and the Election Commission, Thapa said.  Before 
people had thought the elections could be held in 2-5 phases; 
now it looks like 7-8 discrete phases may be necessary.  The 
RNA does not want to be discredited by a botched election, 
the Army Chief noted.  But "no one wants to grasp the nettle" 
and say out loud that elections cannot be held; neither the 
RNA nor the Election Commission feels in a position to do so. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (C)  Despite Deuba's assertions that the King can force 
him neither to resign nor to postpone elections, the PM is 
clearly rattled by mounting reports that the Palace is 
preparing to make a move.  Clause 127 does not stipulate that 
the King must seek the PM's approval before taking action. 
Rather, orders issued by the King under the Clause "shall be 
laid before Parliament"--which, in the absence of the Lower 
House, translates to the Upper House of Parliament, many of 
whose members are appointed by the King.  It is interesting 
that the PM did not allege, as have some other political 
players over the past few days, that the King's prospective 
actions represent a threat to democracy.  Instead, he 
obviously sees the threat in much more personal terms. 
Postponing the elections for him means undermining his 
credility as a leader and thus his longevity as a politician. 
 But without similar enthusiasm for elections from other key 
players--the Election Commission, the RNA, and most 
important, other party leaders who may see an opportunity in 
Deuba's  demise--it is unclear that the Prime Minister alone 
can withstand what may be the beginning of a full-court 
Palace press. 
MALINOWSKI