This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: SPECULATON BUILDS FOR POSSIBLE ROYAL INTERVENTION 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0740 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1008 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1316 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 1748 
 
Classified By: POL PMAHONEY.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
-------------------------- 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The Embassy believes that King Gyanendra is now 
actively considering use of his Constitutional authority to 
dismiss the current government, appoint an interim 
government, and postpone general elections scheduled for 
November 13.  The King's decision is likely shaped by 
numerous factors, including the deteriorating security 
situation and declining confidence in Prime Minister Deuba 
and his troubled Cabinet.  The King will probably weigh 
reactions from foreign allies important to Nepal, such as the 
U.S., UK, Japan, India, and China, before making a final 
decision.  We believe that the King may elicit USG reaction 
during a September 12 meeting (arranged at the request of the 
Palace) with the Ambassador.  The Ambassador is also meeting 
with the Prime Minister the morning of September 12, where 
the same subject may arise.  Department is requested to 
review suggested Para 13 talking points on this subject and 
convey any changes to Embassy by COB September 11.  End 
summary and action request. 
 
---------------------- 
ELECTION PREPARATIONS: 
PLODDING AT BEST 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Since the May 22 dissolution of Parliament, 
preparations for mid-term national elections, scheduled for 
November 13, have proceeded haltingly at best.  Campaigning 
has been hindered by the unpredictable security situation, as 
well as by the bitter fight between rival factions of Prime 
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's own Nepali Congress Party. 
Despite frequent suggestions from within the government, the 
security forces, political parties, and NGOs that voting will 
be held in staggered phases across the country to minimize 
the security risk, the Election Commission has yet to 
announce such a schedule.   (Note:  We have just heard the 
schedule may be out before the end of the week.  End note.) 
Many sources point to the Commission's continued failure to 
publish an election schedule--as well as its apparent 
procrastination in deciding which rival Nepali Congress 
faction is legitimate--as evidence of increasing uncertainty 
that polls can be held by the November 13 date. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Overshadowing any preparation for elections is the 
very real threat of Maoist violence directed against 
candidates, voters, and election officials.  Maoist 
insurgents have pledged to disrupt the elections, and the 
sharp, recent surge in violence has demonstrated their 
apparently undiminished ability to do so.  Attacks against 
local-level mainstream political cadre are increasing.  A 
human rights activist who recently held public programs in 
Syangja and Pyuthan Districts told us that local Maoists were 
poised to disrupt the programs until they learned the topic 
was human rights, rather than elections.  (One Maoist cadre 
reportedly told the organizer, "We're not against human 
rights.  We're just against free and fair elections.")  A 
former MP who flew into Gorkha District to inspect damage to 
a bridge said he was immediately surrounded by armed Maoists 
upon landing.  Once the Maoists learned he was not there to 
promote the elections, however, they let him continue his 
visit. 
 
------------------------ 
DEUBA'S DECLINING STOCK 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C)  Despite this grim scenario, Prime Minister Deuba 
claims to be as committed as ever to beginning 
elections--even if only partial elections--by November 13. 
Sources close to the PM indicate that he feels he has staked 
his credibility as a leader on keeping to the November 13 
deadline--however unrealistic it may be.  Elections held on 
this date run a substantial risk of being flawed, incomplete, 
and marred by violence. If he is unable to hold elections by 
that date, he has told the British DCM, he will step down. 
 
¶5.  (C) Deuba's insistence on holding the elections, viewed 
against the backdrop of mounting security concerns both 
within and outside of Kathmandu, may do little to promote 
public confidence in his judgment.  For many observers, ugly 
intra-party feuds and petty partisan squabbling seem to have 
commanded most of the PM's attention over the past few 
months, rather than more pressing matters of general national 
concern, such as the insurgency or the troubled economy. 
Recent corruption scandals sparked by the widely applauded 
new anti-corruption bill have spotligthed a variety of pulic 
officials, including one of his closest advisors (Ref D), and 
have focused popular dissatisfaction on the widely perceived 
lack of good governance in successive governments since the 
restoration of democracy 12 years ago. 
 
------------------ 
DECLINING OPTIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ref C outlined three possible scenarios after the 
dissolution of Parliament:  a) flawed and/or partial 
elections beginning o/a November 13; b) indefinite 
postponement of the elections, pending improvements in the 
security situation; and c) royal intervention under Clause 
127 of the Constitution.  Given the sharp deterioration in 
the security climate since the summer and given Deuba's 
reported unwillingness to postpone elections, the Embassy 
finds increasing evidence that royal intervention is under 
active consideration. (Comment:  Clause 127 grants the King 
broad authority to "issue necessary Orders to remove (any) 
difficulty" that may arise in the implementiation of the 
Constitution.  The language is sufficiently vague to appear 
to give the King ample latitude to take any steps he deems 
necessary--possibly including the dissolution of a sitting 
government--to restore order.  End comment.)  Many observers 
believe that if elections do begin by November 13, the 
Constitution may be interpreted as requiring the current 
government to step down.  (Note:  This last is subject to 
judicial interpretation.  The Constitution contains no 
specific provision for what happens in the event elections 
are not held on time.  End note.) 
 
¶7.  (C)   The military, motivated by increasing concerns 
about its ability to provide security for elections, may also 
be advising the King to take action to defer the November 13 
polling date.  The Election Commission has revised an earlier 
estimate of polling places needed for the election upward 
from 7,000 to 10,000.  One high-ranking military officer said 
privately that the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) would be hard 
pressed to provide adequate security for so many additional 
polling places.  The main public line of the RNA to us and 
others, however, is that the military will be ready and able 
to provide security. 
 
¶8.  (C)   The King had previously told the Ambassador that he 
agreed to Deuba's request to dissolve Parliament contingent 
upon the PM's formation of a smaller, more capable Cabinet, 
free from chronic political in-fighting and committed to 
tackling corruption (Ref B).  The ongoing inner Nepali 
Congress Party squable between Deuba and Party President 
Koirala has kept the Prime Minister from acting on the King's 
request, however.  Instead, the PM has clung to his allies 
that remain in the Cabinet, the seniormost member of which is 
now deeply embroiled in a corruption scandal himself.  Palace 
sources have told the Japanese embassy that Deuba's position 
is growing increasingly "weaker."  The King, through his 
advisors (Ref C), has also intimated in the past that he was 
considering using Clause 127 to postpone elections until the 
security situation improves and form an interim government 
focused on addressing the nation's most pressing problems. 
Over the past week, speculation among a variety of 
well-placed sources that the King may be ready to act has 
become louder.  Sepculation regarding the composition of such 
an interim government (alternatively described as 
multi-partisan, non-partisan technocrats, or some combination 
of the two) also abounds.  Today's rumors include former 
Prime Minister Chand or former Prime Minister and former 
Leader of the Opposition Madhav Nepal to head a new 
government.  (Comment:  Chand, who served as Prime Minister 
three times previously and who is associated with the old and 
discredited panchatat system would be hard for many Nepalis 
to swallow.  Nepal heads the major opposition party, but the 
Nepali Congress Party had a majority in the Parliament that 
was dismissed in May.  Thus the choice of either could be 
problematic.  End comment.) 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  A reliable source close to the King has told us that 
the King would want the major political parties to come to 
him with the suggestion that he bless an interim government. 
On September 10 a military advisor to the King told DATT that 
the King is contemplating invoking his authority under Clause 
127, but would consult with the U.S., UK, and Japan before 
doing so (septel IIR).  On September 11 the Palace notified 
the Ambassador that the King wishes to meet him the evening 
of September 12.  He also will be meeting with the British 
Ambassador that same day (at British request, however).  We 
expect the King to elicit USG reaction to invocation of 
Clause 127 during this meeting.  (Note:  The Ambassador and 
the British Ambassador are also scheduled to meet the Prime 
Minister the morning of September 12.  We expect the same 
topic may arise during the meeting with the Prime Minister as 
well.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
CONSTITUTIONALITY, CONSENSUS ARE KEY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Recent Maoist success in staging large-scale attacks 
against the Army and police in different parts of the 
country, combined with a series of bomb explosions in the 
heart of Kathmandu, have made the GON's ability to hold free 
and fair elections more questionable than ever.  Holding 
elections in the current environment seems certain to put 
voters, candidates, and election officers at significant 
risk.  Maoist intimidation, moreover, will doubtless depress 
voter turn-out substantially.  In some areas, it remains 
doubtful that polling can take place outside of district 
headquarters.  Elections held under such circumstances are 
almost certain to be flawed, undermining the legitimacy of 
any government so elected.  Should the current government 
postpone elections, however, Deuba's personal 
credibility--and possible motives of self-interest in 
postponing facing disgruntled voters in the polls--could be 
questioned. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Of the three possible scenarios outlined in Para 6 
above, royal intervention under Clause 127 of the 
Constitution may be the most practical, provided three 
factors are observed.  First, the intervention should be 
performed in strict accordance with the (admittedly broad) 
provisions of the Constitution.  Second, the King should 
attempt to obtain multi-partisan national consensus for such 
action.  Third, the King should emphasize that his 
intervention is a temporary measure, necessitated by the 
critical security situation confronting the country, and 
announce a date for elections as soon as possible, preferably 
within one year. 
 
¶12.  (C)  In previous conversations with the Ambassador, the 
King has emphasized his commitment to democracy (Refs A and 
B).  We have no reason to believe he is dissembling. Although 
public suspicions about his possible role in his late 
brother's death have substantially subsided, we believe that 
the King remains sensitive to this early popular mistrust and 
will work hard to avoid re-igniting it.  He is perceived to 
be above partisan politics, and may thus be the only national 
figure capable of uniting the fractious mainstream parties to 
develop a strategy to address the root causes of the 
insurgency and, perhaps ultimately, a strategy for possible 
future negotiations with the Maoists. 
 
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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS 
------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C)  Embassy requests Department clearance by COB 
September 11 on the talking points below in the event that 
the subject of royal intervention is raised in the 
Ambassador's September 12 meetings with the Prime Minister 
and the King. 
 
Begin suggested talking points: 
 
--The security climate raises significant doubt that free and 
fair elections can be safely held according to the stipulated 
schedule. 
 
--Any action taken by the King to intervene should be done in 
strict accord with the Constitution. 
--We suggest seeking advice from the Supreme Court before 
taking such action. 
 
--The King should emphasize the temporary nature of the 
intervention, perhaps by appending a future date for national 
elections. 
 
--Multi-partisan consensus on royal intervention will be 
crucial to the success of this action. 
 
End text of suggested talking points. 
 
MALINOWSKI