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2002HANOI02345 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4590

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                  ------------------EDC100  270928Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7647
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 002345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/12 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL ECON SOCI PHUM VM DPOL HUMANR
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE 
 
¶1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02345  01 OF 04  270928Z 
REASON: 1.5 (D) 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY.  THE EXPANSION OF PERSONAL FREEDOMS 
AND DIMINISHMENT OF CPV AND STATE CONTROL OVER 
INDIVIDUAL LIVES HAVE BEEN WELCOME TRENDS OVER THE PAST 
TWO DECADES.  NEW INITIATIVES TO DEVELOP RULE OF LAW 
ARE ALSO HOPEFUL SIGNS OF CHANGE AS WELL AS ESSENTIAL 
COMPONENTS OF VIETNAM'S CONTINUED INTEGRATION INTO THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ECONOMY.  STRENGTHENED, MORE 
GENUINE LEGAL SYSTEMS WILL EVENTUALLY CHALLENGE THE 
CPV'S EFFECTIVE ABILITY TO RETAIN FINAL SAY ON ALL 
MAJOR POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES, HOWEVER.  THE CURRENT 
GENERATION OF LEADERSHIP IS PROBABLY TOO BUSY 
SUSTAINING THE NEEDED MOMENTUM OF ECONOMIC GROWTH TO 
COPE WITH THIS DILEMMA.  MORE RESULTS-ORIENTED AND/OR 
WESTERN-EDUCATED OFFICIALS FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW 
MAY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT -- OR POSSIBLY EVEN INSIST ON -- 
A MORE PASSIVE CPV ROLE.  LESS PROGRESSIVE LOCAL 
OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS CONSERVATIVE AND FRUSTRATED 
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE MILITARY, MAY CONTINUE TO BE DRAGS 
ON ANY EVENTUAL POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION, HOWEVER. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
THE GOOD NEWS 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND SOCIETY 
IN VIETNAM HAS UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT -- AND MOSTLY 
WELCOME -- CHANGE OVER THE SIXTEEN YEARS SINCE THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV) AND GOVERNMENT OF 
VIETNAM (GVN) INSTITUTED THE "DOI MOI" POLICY OF 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02345  01 OF 04  270928Z 
RENOVATION (MORE LITERALLY, "NEW CHANGE").  THE OVERALL 
THRUST HAS BEEN TO REDUCE THE MICRO-MANAGEMENT BY THE 
STATE NOT ONLY IN ECONOMIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE BUT 
ALSO IN THE PERSONAL LIVES OF ITS CITIZENS. 
 
¶4.  (U)  VIETNAMESE NOW HAVE DRAMATICALLY MORE PERSONAL 
FREEDOMS THAN THEY DID TWO DECADES AGO.  THEY CAN 
TRAVEL ESSENTIALLY WITHOUT RESTRICTION DOMESTICALLY, 
AND GO OVERSEAS WITH CONSIDERABLE EASE -- AS LONG AS 
THEY CAN GET A FOREIGN VISA AND HAVE ACCESS TO 
SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES (THEIR OWN OR THEIR VIET 
KIEU RELATIVES).  FARMERS LARGELY DECIDE ON THEIR OWN 
WHAT CROPS TO GROW AS WELL AS HOW, WHERE, AND FOR HOW 
MUCH TO SELL THEM.  NEW ENTRANTS INTO THE JOB MARKET 
MOSTLY FIND THEIR OWN JOBS, INCREASINGLY IN NON-STATE 
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT.  (ACCORDING TO WORLD BANK ESTIMATES, 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL HAVE TO CREATE MORE OR LESS ALL 
OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2 MILLION NEW JOBS NEEDED ANNUALLY 
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS.)   MOST -- IF NOT VIRTUALLY 
ALL -- RURAL CITIZENS LIVE IN THEIR OWN HOMES, WHICH 
THEY BUILD AND/OR EXPAND AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE.  A 
SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF URBAN RESIDENTS INCREASINGLY 
DO THE SAME.  MORE CHURCHES AND TEMPLES ARE AVAILABLE 
FOR ROUTINE USE BY THE FAITHFUL -- ALBEIT UNDER THE 
SUPERVISION OF GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORGANS -- AND THE NUMBERS OF RELIGIOUS WORKERS ARE 
STEADILY INCREASINGLY AGAIN AS RELIGIOUS SEMINARIES 
HAVE BEEN RE-OPENED AND EXPANDED. 
 
¶5.  (C)  THE INTRUSIONS INTO INDIVIDUAL LIVES BY PUBLIC 
SECURITY FORCES HAVE DIMINISHED, ALTHOUGH THE GVN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02345  01 OF 04  270928Z 
RETAINS THE CAPABILITY OF MONITORING MAIL, TELEPHONES, 
AND E-MAIL, AS WELL AS WATCHING VISITORS FOR THOSE 
CITIZENS WHOSE LOYALTY IS IN DOUBT OR ARE BELIEVED TO 
BE ENGAGED IN SUSPICIOUS OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. 
VISIBLE SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS HAS DECLINED.  THE 
PENALTIES OR HARASSMENT OF VIETNAMESE CITIZENS WHO 
BEFRIEND FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATS, SEEM TO BE 
MORE RARELY INVOKED.  DISCUSSIONS, EVEN ON POLITICAL 
ISSUES, AT HANOI'S UBIQUITOUS BEER HALLS ARE MORE AND 
MORE FREE-WHEELING, ALTHOUGH ALMOST INEVITABLY STOPPING 
SHORT OF ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE CPV OR CALLING FOR 
MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY. 
 
THE BAD NEWS 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  CPV LEADERS CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ZERO 
TOLERANCE OF POLITICAL PLURALISM OR ANY INTENTION TO 
LOOSEN THEIR GRIP ON THE MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL POWER. 
THE CPV'S POLITBURO, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE, REMAIN THE NEXUS OF ALL IMPORTANT DECISION- 
MAKING.  IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 11ST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
INAUGURAL SESSION IN JULY AND AUGUST 2002, FOR EXAMPLE, 
POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS ARE BELIEVED 
TO HAVE HAMMERED OUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT LINE-UP THAT 
WAS THEN DULY RATIFIED BY THE NA DELEGATES.  SIMILARLY, 
THE ELABORATE VETTING PROCESS FOR NA CANDIDATES FOR THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4591 
 
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                  ------------------EDC107  270929Z /38 
R 270931Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7648 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 HANOI 002345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
 
MAY 2002 ELECTIONS GAVE THE CPV AND ITS VIETNAM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02345  02 OF 04  270928Z 
FATHERLAND FRONT AN EXPLICIT VETO POWER.  THE NEW SLATE 
OF NA DELEGATES ACTUALLY INCREASED THE PERCENTAGE OF 
CPV MEMBERS IN THE NA, REVERSING WHAT HAD APPEARED TO 
BE A DIFFERENT TREND IN THE ELECTIONS FIVE YEARS AGO 
AND FOILING THE NA'S OWN ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS. 
 
¶7.  (C)  CPV PLENUM DOCUMENTS OVER THE PAST MANY MONTHS 
HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO IMPROVE "GRASSROOTS 
DEMOCRACY," BUT THIS HAS NOT LED TO AN EXPLOSION OF 
EMPOWERMENT OR PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING AT THE 
LOCAL LEVEL.  INSTEAD, THE PUSH APPEARS TO BE ON 
REINVIGORATING AND STRENGTHENING CPV LEADERSHIP DOWN TO 
THE LOWEST LEVELS IN ORDER TO COMMUNICATE THE CPV'S 
WILL DOWNWARD -- NOT TO ENSURE THAT OPINIONS AND 
POPULAR WISHES ARE CHANNELED UPWARD.  THE CPV IS ALSO 
POISED -- OR AT LEAST IT SAYS IT IS -- TO IMPLEMENT 
MORE SYSTEMATIC ROTATION OF CPV AND GVN OFFICIALS AMONG 
PROVINCES AS WELL AS BETWEEN PROVINCES AND THE CENTER 
IN ORDER TO UPROOT ENDEMIC CORRUPTION AND TO LESSEN 
LOCAL FIEFDOMS THAT SOMETIMES THREATEN EFFECTIVE 
CENTRAL CPV LEADERSHIP.  IT IS ALSO ENGAGING IN A NEW 
PUSH TO RE-EMPHASIZE IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE 
NATION'S ALREADY NONE-TOO-STRONG EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, 
WHERE STUDENTS ARE FALLING FURTHER AND FURTHER BEHIND 
IN ENGLISH AND COMPUTER SKILLS -- AMONG OTHER ESSENTIAL 
TOPICS -- COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. 
 
¶8.  (C)  THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINS AT BEST IN ITS 
INFANCY, ALTHOUGH PROGRAMS FUNDED BY THE USG, UNDP, AND 
OTHER DONORS HAVE BEGUN TO PAY OFF IN TERMS OF CAPACITY 
BUILDING WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE JUDICIARY, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02345  02 OF 04  270928Z 
AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.  DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES THAT ALL DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE PRESUMED 
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY, HOWEVER, AS MANY AS 95 
PCT OF ALL CASES RESULT IN CONVICTION.  THIS IS 
UNLIKELY EITHER TO BE A COINCIDENCE OR A TRIBUTE TO 
EFFECTIVE PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES.  JUDGES IN VIETNAM 
WERE NOT EVEN REQUIRED TO HAVE A BACHELOR'S DEGREE 
UNTIL 1999.  NO LEGAL TRAINING WAS OFFERED IN THIS 
COUNTRY BETWEEN 1954 AND 1976. THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
DID NOT EVEN EXIST BETWEEN 1960 AND 1984.  CPV CELLS 
CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AS AT ALL 
OTHER MINISTRIES, AS WELL AS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY; THE 
COMMON PERCEPTION IS THAT THESE CELLS HAVE THE FINAL 
SAY ON ANY REMOTELY SENSITIVE CASE. 
 
RULE BY PARTY VS. RULE BY LAW 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  ARGUABLY, IT IS THE CPV-BLESSED TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AIMED AT CREATING OR IMPROVING RULE 
OF LAW -- OR AT LEAST WHAT MANY DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISTS 
DISMISSIVELY LABEL "RULE BY LAW" -- THAT MAY LEAD TO 
POLITICAL COLLISIONS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.  THE CPV 
WILL FACE TOUGH CHOICES ABOUT ITS OWN FUTURE ROLE.  THE 
CONCEPTS OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, PRIMACY OF 
LEGAL PRECEDENCE, EQUAL APPLICATION OF LAW AND 
REGULATION, AND NATIONAL TREATMENT FLY IN THE FACE OF 
TIME-HONORED CPV TRADITIONS OF SECRECY, PATERNALISTIC 
GOVERNANCE, AND FAVORITISM FOR STATE ENTITIES.  MANY 
VIETNAMESE OPENLY ASSUME THAT SENIOR CPV LEADERS ARE 
VIRTUALLY IMMUNE FROM LEGAL PROSECUTION, APART FROM THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02345  02 OF 04  270928Z 
OCCASIONAL SCAPEGOATS (MOST RECENTLY IN THE NAM CAM 
CORRUPTION CASE THAT LED TO THE OUSTER -- BUT NOT 
PROSECUTION SO FAR -- OF ONE VICE MINISTER OF PUBLIC 
SECURITY AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE VOICE OF 
VIETNAM RADIO).   FOR RULE OF LAW TO WORK, THE CPV 
CANNOT RETAIN THE FINAL SAY, EVEN ON A PICK-AND-CHOOSE 
BASIS.  TRUE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD UNDERMINE THE 
CPV'S CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED ROLE AS THE LEADING 
FORCE OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY. 
 
¶10.  (C)  FOR VIETNAM TO BECOME AND REMAIN TRULY 
COMPETITIVE IN THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET- 
BASED ECONOMY AND TO ATTRACT NEEDED FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
CAPITAL, HOWEVER, THE GVN HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED 
WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM AND BUILDING 
OF RULE OF LAW.  IT CANNOT HOPE TO IMPLEMENT THE US- 
VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITHOUT DOING SO, NOR 
CAN IT DREAM OF WTO ACCESSION OTHERWISE.  IT CANNOT 
SUSTAIN THE JOB CREATION MOMENTUM NEEDED TO EMPLOY ITS 
YOUNG AND GROWING POPULATION WITHOUT THE LEGAL 
GUARANTEES AND SAFEGUARDS THAT ENABLE PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE TO FLOURISH.  IT IS TRUE THAT VIETNAM'S 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY HAVE NOT FARED AT ALL BADLY OVER 
THE PAST DECADE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENUINE LEGAL 
SYSTEM.  BUT THE "EASY" REFORMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE. 
THE COMPETITION FOR MARKETS AND INVESTMENT 
INTERNATIONALLY OVER THE NEXT DECADE WILL BE MUCH 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4593 
 
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                  ------------------EDC116  270929Z /38 
R 270931Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7649 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 HANOI 002345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
TOUGHER THAN ANYTHING VIETNAM HAS YET EXPERIENCED, AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02345  03 OF 04  270929Z 
MUST BE RULES-BASED. 
 
¶11.  (C)  SIMILARLY, AS PERSONAL FREEDOMS HAVE EXPANDED 
AND AS THE YOUNGER GENERATION KNOWS MORE ABOUT FREER 
SOCIETIES BEYOND THESE BORDERS AND KNOWS LESS ABOUT 
VIETNAM'S OWN RIGID PAST, THESE TRENDS HAVE BECOME 
IRREVERSIBLE.  WITHOUT A MANDATE OF CPV MEMBERSHIP TO 
MOVE UPWARD IN A STATE-CONTROLLED SYSTEM, FEWER YOUNG 
PEOPLE HAVE THE TIME AND INCLINATION TO DEVOTE TO CPV 
MEMBERSHIP, WITH ITS ENDLESS MEETINGS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
CAMPAIGNS.  ONE SAVING GRACE FOR THE CPV IS THAT FEW 
PEOPLE SEEM ACTIVELY TO MIND CPV POLITICAL DOMINANCE, 
AND MANY APPEAR TO ACCEPT WITHOUT QUESTION THE 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A ONE-PARTY STATE. 
 
HOLD YOUR BREATH 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  NONG DUC MANH'S TENURE AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
CHAIRMAN, CHARACTERIZED BY EFFORTS TO ENLARGE NA 
INFLUENCE AND OPEN UP ITS DELIBERATIONS, LED MANY 
OBSERVERS TO ASSUME HE WOULD CONTINUE THESE TRENDS AS 
CPV GENERAL SECRETARY.  HOWEVER, CPV PLENUMS BEFORE THE 
DECEMBER 2001 NA CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES AND BEFORE THE JULY 2002 NA VOTES ON THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT LINE-UP PROVIDED QUITE EXPLICIT 
"RECOMMENDATIONS" ON WHAT THE NA SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT 
DO, AND REINFORCED THAT NA DECISION-MAKING SHOULD BE 
NEATLY UNDER THE CPV LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE.  SO FAR, 
NOTHING IN MANH'S TRACK RECORD AS GENERAL SECRETARY 
SUGGESTS AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL REFORM, APART FROM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02345  03 OF 04  270929Z 
THE SEEMINGLY BACKWARD STEPS OF THE "GRASSROOTS 
DEMOCRACY" AND RENEWED IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS. 
 
¶13.  (C)  THE CURRENT CONSENSUS-DRIVEN POLITBURO IS 
UNLIKELY TO AGREE ON MUCH BEYOND THE PRIMACY OF 
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, NEED FOR 
DOMESTIC SOCIAL ORDER (AKA "STABILITY"), AND PROTECTION 
OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND "SOLIDARITY."  TINKERING 
WITH THE CPV'S LEADING ROLE, BLESSING NEW POLITICAL 
PARTIES, OR EVEN ENFORCING ALL OF THE RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE CONSTITUTION ARE 
UNLIKELY TO BE ON THE RADAR SCOPE OF THE POLIBURO. 
CREATING ENOUGH JOBS AND ENSURING THAT URBAN AND RURAL 
INCOMES CONTINUE TO RISE WILL KEEP THE CPV LEADERSHIP 
PREOCCUPIED FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS. 
 
¶14.  (C)  BUT IN FIVE OR TEN YEARS, AS MORE RESULTS- 
ORIENTED AND/OR WESTERN-EDUCATED OFFICIALS COME TO THE 
FORE IN ALL THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES AND NA, AND AS THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUES TO GROW, THE NEED FOR A 
SHARPER SEPARATION BETWEEN THE CPV AND THE GVN AS WELL 
AS FOR HEIGHTENED RESPECT FOR RULE OF/BY LAW IN LIEU OF 
CPV DOMINATION WILL BE CLEARER.  BARRING MAJOR DOMESTIC 
UNREST OR FOREIGN INVASIONS, THE NEXT GENERATION MAY BE 
READY TO ACQUIESCE IN MORE OF A BACKSEAT ROLE FOR THE 
CPV.  MORE THAN THIS, THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS 
MAY INSIST ON SUCH A CHANGE.  EVEN SO, SUCH CHANGES ARE 
LIKELY TO BE TOP-DOWN RATHER THAN IN REACTION TO A 
CLAMOR FROM THE "MASSES," WHO ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN 
WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT VOICE IN THEIR OWN GOVERNANCE FOR 
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.  LESS EDUCATED LOCAL GVN AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02345  03 OF 04  270929Z 
CPV OFFICIALS LIKELY WILL EXERT A SIGNIFICANT DRAG ON 
THIS TRANSFORMATION, HOWEVER.  HOLDING OUR FIGURATIVE 
BREATH FOR A FREER SOCIETY AND LESSENED CPV ROLE HERE 
MAKES SOME SENSE; WAITING FOR A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC 
VIETNAM TO EMERGE STILL DOES NOT. 
 
¶15.  (C)  THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND SENIOR MND 
LEADERSHIP IN PARTICULAR REMAINS A MINOR WILDCARD. 
MND'S ROLE IN VIETNAM'S POLITICAL LIFE APPEARS TO HAVE 
DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE DOI MOI PERIOD; SOME 
OBSERVERS WOULD ARGUE THAT THE MILITARY HAS INDEED BEEN 
MARGINALIZED DESPITE ITS SIZE AS WELL AS ITS NUMEROUS 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS.  IF IT FAILS TO FIND A BETTER 
NICHE, MND COULD PLAY A SPOILER ROLE IN ANY EVENTUAL 
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND REFORM, OR AT LEAST BLOCK 
THE EMERGENCE OF ANY NEW CONSENSUS ON STATE/SOCIETY 
RELATIONS. 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4594 
 
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      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00 
        /020W 
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R 270931Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7650 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 HANOI 002345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02345  04 OF 04  270929Z 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02345  04 OF 04  270929Z 
 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL