This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR TUCKER ASKEU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: O9/O9/2O12 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IZ XF IS JO MEPP
SUBJECT: GOJ PUSHES BACK AT POPULAR DISSATISFACTION 
ON IRAQ AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 4719 B. AMMAN 5131 C. STATE 1693O4 
 
Classified By: CDA Gregory L. Berry for reasons 1.5 
(B) and (D) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) In recent weeks, the GOJ--through the King's 
public address on August 15 (see Ref A), the Prime 
Minister's speech to the Jordan press association on 
September 2, and Royal Court Chief Fayez Tarawneh's 
September 2 address to the Amman World Affairs Council 
(see Ref B)--has respondcd more aggressively to public 
criticism of the GOJ's stance on Iraq, the MEPP, and 
other domestic issues, including its decision to 
postpone elections.  In doing so, the King, PM, and 
other GOJ officials have put forth the idea of "Jordan 
First", underscoring that Jordanian interests are its 
primary concern and that GOJ policy on the issues, 
particularly Iraq, will reflect this.  By taking these 
issues to the public, the GOJ is also beginning to 
address popular frustration with an uneven record of 
government communication on core issues.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
IRAQ: PREPARING THE PUBLIC 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) In contrast to the GOJ's sometimes misleading 
public statements on Iraq in July, the King in his 
August 15 speech and PM in his September 2 interview 
placed the responsibility for resolving the current 
crisis on the Iraqi government.  PM Abul Ragheb 
emphasized that the GOJ will maintain a "balanced 
relationship between Iraq and the U.S." and 
underscored that both were "strategic partners of 
Jordan."  By placing the burden of responsibility on 
Saddam Hussein and emphasizing the strategic nature of 
its relationship with the U.S., the GOJ appears to be 
signaling to Jordanians that it will not jeopardize 
its relationship with the U.S. in the event of a 
conflict with Iraq.  However, recent discussions with 
embassy contacts indicate the government's message so 
far has had only a limited impact on the public. 
 
¶3. (S) Street opinion in Jordan, while harboring no 
fondness for Saddam Hussein, remains critical of 
perceived U.S. efforts to impose its will on the 
region.  Public frustration over Iraq is one facet of 
the popular consensus that the Arab world has no 
influence on U.S. actions in the region.  Recent high- 
level U.S. public diplomacy efforts on Iraq have not 
shaken the view of many here that the U.S. will use 
the U.N. as nothing more than a facade, and that 
consultations will be limited.  As for the U.S. case 
against Iraq, Jordanians persist in dismissing or 
downplaying the possibility that Iraq may be harboring 
CBW or WMD, despite Iraq's sordid and well-documented 
history of WMD use. 
 
¶4. (S) Politically sophisticated contacts worry about 
the economic and political ramifications for Jordan of 
any prolonged offensive against Iraq.  Most caution 
that public opinion will run heavily against the U.S., 
but those connected to the government believe the 
security services will be able to handle popular 
discontent on the streets, albeit with stretched 
resources.  To curb the "street", these contacts urge 
the U.S. to make sure that any move against Saddam is 
quick: "do not let the situation linger."  The 
reaction of the Iraqi people to any action will likely 
affect public opinion here.  If the Iraqi people were 
to welcome U.S. troops as liberators, "it will diffuse 
tensions." 
 
¶5. (S) The potential for U.S. military action against 
Iraq is inevitably linked to the Palestinian issue in 
the minds of Jordanians.  Criticism of U.S. policy on 
Iraq is often tied to the U.S.'s "one-sided" approach 
to the MEPP and the perceived reluctance to enforce a 
"just" solution on the Palestinian issue.  There is 
widespread speculation that Israel will use any action 
against Iraq to transfer Palestinians from the West 
Bank to Jordan while the International Community is 
focused elsewhere. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
DOMESTICALLY, NO APOLOGIES POR POSTPONING ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶6. (C) While the GOJ's evolving public policy on Iraq 
has yet to have much impact, the King's postponement 
of elections--as announced in his August 15 speech-- 
continues to generate broad criticism.  The PM 
addressed these critics in his September 2 remarks by 
warning that if elections were held now, they could 
"fall under external influence."  He defended the 
quick tempo of temporary laws that have been passed 
since the Parliament was dissolved last June, citing 
their necessity for the "country's development."  He 
also offered unusually strong criticism of the 
political role that professional associations have 
assumed and encouraged the associations to stick to 
addressing the concerns of their professions, not 
politics.  The PM also confronted criticism that the 
government is outlawing demonstrations, "We did not 
ban rallies and marches, but rather regulated them." 
 
¶7. (C) The message on elections is a hard sell to both 
sophisticated political observers and the street. 
Most contacts balk at the government's defense that 
regional instability is a reason to delay.  "The 
situation is more unstable now than when the 
government first delayed elections...and it is only 
growing worse!"  One Parliamentarian detailed, 
district by district, how the Islamists could only 
gain 20-25 seats under the current electoral system-- 
hardly a threat to the government.  (The government 
response in private is that a number of "swing" 
parliamentarians would ally themselves with the avowed 
Islamists on key issues including Iraq, creating 
management problems with the GOJ.  Many contacts argue 
that people need some forum for venting their growing 
frustrations--protesting in Parliament is better than 
protesting in the street.  Even some supporters of the 
government argue that a sitting Parliament with a 
strong opposition voice would strengthen the King's 
hand, both domestically and internationally. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SOMEONE NEEDS TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The government's reluctance to defend it's 
policies directly with the people--the King's mid- 
August public address is only the second time he has 
spoken to the nation on camera since the beginning of 
the Intifada--has been a long-standing theme with our 
contacts.  One Circassian contact opined in July that 
Jordan needs either a strong government with a Prime 
Minister who can communicate with the people, or a 
strong King with a natural feel for Jordanian 
constituencies, but right now "we have neither-" 
While it remains to be seen if the government's recent 
attempts at public diplomacy will affect public 
opinion, the government has at least recognized the 
need to defend its often unpopular policy decisions. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The GOJ's recent efforts to directly address 
the people is a welcome step.  While many Jordanians 
may not accept the government's reasoning, there is a 
pressing need to prepare the populace for potential 
disruptions in coming months.  The issue of Iraq will 
be particularly divisive here, as the public 
imagination will be focused on the plight of the Iraqi 
people, not their leader.  We can expect zigs and zags 
in the GOJ's language on Iraq as circumstances 
dictate, but the government seems to have settled on a 
broad outline for its public audience. 
BERRY