This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001640 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
MANILA FOR USAID DCHA/OFDA 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2012 
TAGS: PTER PGOV MCAP NP
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAOIST INSURGENCY:  JULY-AUGUST 2002 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1174 
 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1315 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1373 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 1408 
     ¶E. (E) KATHMANDU 1532 
     ¶F. (F) KATHMANDU 1619 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) This message highligts significant events in the 
Maoist insurgency since July.  On August 21 the Royal Nepal 
Army (RNA) attacked a Maoist training camp in Rolpa, 
reportedly killing 30 insurgents.  Maoists continue to attack 
civilians and rural infrastructure, but staged no large-scale 
attacks on RNA or police during the period.  Pledging to 
disrupt national elections in November, the insurgents have 
begun a campaign of threats and intimidation in some areas. 
The Government of India continues its cooperation in cracking 
down on Maoists believed to be operating in its territory. 
Interpol issued an international alert on several wanted 
Maoists.  On August 19 a member of the Maoists' Joint 
Revolutionary Council surrendered to the National Human 
Rights Commission.  End summary. 
 
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RNA OFFENSIVE IN ROLPA 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Acting on intelligence in the largest offensive 
engagement since an attack on a Maoist training camp in 
Salyan on June 12 (Ref A), on August 21 the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA) attacked a Maoist base in Thawang, Rolpa--the heartland 
of the insurgency--with two company-sized units 
(approximately 300 soldiers).  According to initial reports, 
the RNA suffered one soldier killed in action and three 
wounded.  At least 30 Maoists were reported killed, and five 
Enfield 303 rifles and large quantities of rice were 
recovered from the site.  From July 1 to August 22, 2002, the 
Ministry of Defense reports a total of 193 Maoists killed by 
security forces. 
 
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MAOIST ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Although the Maoists have not staged any large-scale 
attacks on the security forces since May, the insurgents' 
campaign against civilian targets continues.  Most observers 
expect the level of violence to increase as September 16--the 
date of a Maoist-proclaimed general strike--approaches (Ref 
C).  Maoists reportedly have killed at least 18 civilians 
during the period, including three teachers, one newspaper 
editor, and 10 mainstream party activists.  On July 10 a 
horde of several hundred Maoists attacked a village in 
southwestern Nepal, killing two men suspected of being 
informants and beating other villagers with iron rods. On 
August 1 Maoists abducted three Nepali civilians, including 
an employee of the British Gurkha Welfare organization and a 
radio announcer, from a bus in Rolpa.  Other passengers were 
beaten and robbed.  To date, the kidnapping victims' 
whereabouts remain unknown.  On August 12 in southern Nepal 
insurgents killed former Maoist Tek Bahadur Thapa Magar, who 
had surrendered to the authorities.  On August 16, a band of 
Maoists in western Nepal hacked to death Manohar Pratap 
Malla, the son of a former minister during the Panchayat 
regime.  On August 20 Maoists killed Nawaraj Sharma, editor 
of a local newspaper in the mid-west district of Kalikot. 
 
 
¶4.  (U) The insurgents continue violent activities within the 
capital, albeit with more limited effect.  On July 5 Maoists 
set off a bomb at the Prime Minister's Nepali Congress party 
office (Ref B), injuring ten, and at a private business 
college--owned by the Press Secretary for the Royal 
Palace--August 8, injuring six (Ref E).  The insurgents have 
also kept up their attacks on local infrastructure, destoying 
the only Sanskrit school in eastern Nepal's Taplejung 
District with a socket bomb August 12.  They disrupted 
transportation between the remote northern districts of Humla 
and Mugu with the destruction of a suspension bridge.  On 
August 15 Maoists blew up the only power station in the 
capital of far northwestern Darchula District, leaving nearly 
1500 families with no electricity and crippling the local 
economy. 
 
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ANTI-ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  The Chief District Officers (CDO) of Pyuthan and 
Gorkha Districts in Nepal's mid-western hill region report 
Maoists have begun propagating anti-election slogans in local 
villages, spreading terror among the residents.  The CDO in 
Nawalaparasi District in southern Nepal reports similar 
activities in the northern hilly belt of his jurisdiction. 
The level of actual intimidation is undoubtedly much higher. 
In the Kathmandu Valley, for example, one resident of 
Lalitpur District told emboff that Maoists had visited every 
household in his electoral ward to warn residents not to vote 
in the November 13 national elections. 
 
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INDIAN COOPERATION 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Critical to the Government of Nepal's (GON) 
relative success in countering the Maoists has been 
increasing and long-needed support from India, which shares 
1600 km of border with Nepal (Ref D).  The Indian government 
has banned the All Indian-Nepali Unity Society, an 
organization affiliated with Nepali Maoists, and in July 
cooperated in the arrest and extradition of nine Maoists 
wanted in Nepal.  On July 10 the Indian Charge told the 
Nepal-India Friendship Association that his government will 
deploy members of India's Special Service Bureau to patrol 
the border in an effort to control Maoist and other 
cross-border criminal activities. On August 10 the Nepali 
press reported Indian schools in some districts along the 
Nepali border had been instructed not to register Nepali 
students who lack GON-issued identification.  The Indians 
also staged a raid on a Maoist-occupied apartment in 
Darjeeling. 
 
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INTERPOL COOPERATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  At the request of the GON, Interpol issued an 
all-points bulletin against eight Maoists, including top 
leaders Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai and head of the 
Maoist student group Debendra Parajuli.  (The Nepali press 
noted the Interpol website had inadvertently transposed 
Bhattarai's and Prachanda's pictures.)  Also on the list: 
Agni Sapkota, one of the insurgents' negotiators who met with 
GON representatives three times during the 2001 ceasefire. 
Nepali police said they have asked Interpol to add other 
names to the list, including that of the Maoists' putative 
military commander, Ram Bahadur Thapa (a.k.a. "Badal"). 
 
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NOTABLE SURRENDER 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Mukti Pradhan, on the GON's most-wanted list as a 
member of the Maoists' Joint Revolutionary Council, 
surrendered to the National Human Rights Commission on August 
19 (Ref F).  Pradhan's surrender is the first by a suspect on 
the most-wanted list.  The GON had offered a USD 45,000 
reward for information leading to his arrest.  In all, the 
GON reports that nearly 16,000 former Maoists have 
surrendered.  (Note:  It seems likely that a good number of 
those who surrendered were not armed militants but rather 
former members of "people's governments" in areas previously 
under Maoist control.  End note.)  About 5400 suspected 
Maoists are reported to be in GON custody. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (C) The general perception within the GON and among many 
observers is that the Maoists, who have staged no major 
action against the security forces since May, are on the 
defensive.  Cooperation from neighboring India has been 
particularly significant in helping the clampdown and in 
ratcheting up the pressure on the insurgents' leadership. 
Most observers expect the Maoists' small-scale attacks 
against civilian targets, including bombings and possible 
assassination attempts against senior government offials, to 
increase in tempo as the dates of the September 16 general 
strike and the November 13 national elections near.  The 
Rolpa operation indicates the RNA's evolving ability to use 
intelligence successfully and to seize the offensive from the 
Maoists. 
MALINOWSKI