This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME FOR FODAG 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PTER AORC ASEC PHUM NP
SUBJECT: Maoist Insurgency Exacts Heavy Toll on Food 
Security in Rural Nepal 
 
REF: A) Kathmandu 1477, B) KATHMANDU 1105, 
 
     C) KATHMANDU 871 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Nepal's Maoist insurgency poses a serious 
threat to food security in many areas of Nepal, according 
to UN officials and other experts.  The effects of Maoist 
raids on private food stores and food aid, military 
efforts to restrict Maoist food supplies, and disruptions 
in agriculture could lead to a major humanitarian crisis 
if not reversed, they say.  Insurgents have stolen 
hundreds of metric tons of supplies provided by the World 
Food Program (WFP) for areas of greatest food scarcity. 
In response, WFP suspended programs in some areas and 
attached conditions to their resumption, including 
compensation and security guarantees.  Nepal's armed 
forces have restricted the transport of foodstuffs to 
Maoist-controlled areas -- a strategy the WFP has 
criticized -- and offered to provide security for UN food 
shipments.  The food security problem will likely worsen 
unless the insurgency can be brought under control soon. 
End Summary. 
 
Crisis Looms Due to Crop Disruptions 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The ongoing violent Maoist insurgency has 
disrupted agriculture throughout Nepal, endangering food 
security for many rural communities, according to the 
World Food Program (WFP) Country Director for Nepal, Doug 
Coutts.  WFP believes that the indicators of an impending 
food crisis are already evident.  Coutts points out that 
"people die not because of a lack of food but because of 
diseases they develop when they are weakened by inadequate 
food."  TB rates in the mountains have increased, 
indicating that a problem has developed, Coutts concludes. 
He and other observers argue that a major humanitarian 
crisis will be unavoidable unless current trends are 
reversed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Both looting by Maoists and government 
restrictions on food transport to Maoist areas have 
compromised food security, but disruptions in traditional 
agricultural practices have had by far the most 
devastating affect, Coutts explained.  His assessment was 
echoed by a human rights activist who traveled recently to 
the heavily Maoist-affected districts of Rukum and Rolpa. 
She noted that local villagers had stopped raising goats 
and planting vegetables because these increasingly were 
being confiscated by Maoist cadres.  Many young men and 
women had abandoned their villages either to join the 
Maoists' ranks or to escape being dragooned or otherwise 
victimized by the militants.  An official from the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) confirmed that in many 
areas most able-bodied people had left their farms, and 
the land is unattended.  As a result, less food was being 
grown and crop yields were depressed. 
 
¶4. (U) Because the conflict has restricted income- 
generation activities in rural districts, the WFP assesses 
that farmers have become increasingly dependent on their 
own crops.  A FAO official sees this combination of 
increased dependence on farming along with a reduction in 
yields as potentially creating a very serious problem. 
(Note:  Many of the worst affected groups, particularly in 
the western hills and mountains, live in areas where food 
deficits are chronic.  Traditionally these populations 
have been unable to live on what is produced locally, 
depending on food purchased with income from seasonal 
labor performed elsewhere in Nepal or in India.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶5. (U) The WFP has heard reports that scarcity has led to 
the displacement of some individuals, but so far it has 
not obtained first-hand information on the numbers and 
current locations of these migrants.  A study sponsored by 
USAID/Nepal found that large cities such as Nepalganj and 
Kathmandu along with district headquarters in conflict- 
affected areas have absorbed a large number of displaced 
persons.  The study also found evidence suggesting that 
traditional seasonal migration patterns have changed as a 
result of the conflict.  A large number of individuals, 
mainly male youths from conflict-affected districts in the 
Mid- and Far Western regions, have crossed into India in 
recent months to escape the depredations of both the 
Maoists and security forces.  Officials in the Terai 
report a marked increase in demand for Nepalese identity 
cards by aspiring emigrant workers to India.  Moreover, 
the traditional return of working men to their villages of 
origin at the beginning of the rainy season (the season 
for planting paddy) has not been observed this year. 
 
Maoists Loot Food 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The WFP's unofficial records show that Maoist 
insurgents have looted about 427 metric tons of program 
food in the last year (Ref B).  This constitutes three 
percent of the WFP's total annual food aid through the 
Rural Community Infrastructure Works Program, better known 
as "Food for Work."  Maoists have either robbed storage 
facilities or seized the rations while they were en route 
to project locations.  The goods most commonly looted are 
dry food grains, as these are the most useful for mobile 
fighters.  WFP also reports that of late cargo trucks 
carrying food for the "Food for Work" program have been 
unable to travel into several districts because of fear of 
Maoist attacks. 
 
¶7. (U) Varying amounts of food have been stolen also from 
community stores and private homes.  These food raids have 
hit hardest in Western Nepal, where malnutrition and 
limited food availability are most acute.  The Maoists 
have been roundly criticized for stealing food.  In 
particular, the domestic human rights community has 
chastised them for stealing food from WFP aid supplies and 
individual rural citizens. 
 
WFP Responds by Suspending Programs, Demanding Assurances 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶8. (U) The WFP has responded to the Maoists' raids by 
suspending its programs in five districts (Ref B). 
Reinstatement of the programs is contingent on a set of 
preconditions, which are the WFP's way of trying to 
enforce some "basic ground rules" for the projects.  WFP 
says it intended the preconditions to push local 
authorities to take the threats seriously and to 
investigate them, as well as to correct weaknesses in the 
management of the food supply, which is often unmarked and 
unguarded. 
 
¶9. (U) One of the WFP's demands is that some of the food 
be recovered or that compensation be offered as a 
demonstration of commitment.  In Jajarkot and Mugu 
districts (in the western hills), the WFP has insisted 
that before programs can resume in October, the Maoists 
and District Development Committees (DDCs) must ensure a 
safe working environment, transportation, and storage. 
DDCs in Kailali and Bardiya districts (in the western 
Terai) have been required to provide a written guarantee 
for the future safety of the food and compensation for the 
food that was stolen.  The criteria for reinstatement of 
the program in Dailekh district is that the Maoists 
provide labor of a value equal to the quantity looted, 
albeit according to the Maoists' own valuation. 
 
WFP's Strategy Enjoys Some Success 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The WFP's strategy has met with some success. 
When the first looting incident occurred, in Dailekh, the 
Maoists wrote a receipt for the food they took.  Later 
they apologized and proposed that they provide work to the 
equivalent value of the seven tons looted.  They completed 
the work and gave assurances to the WFP that food supplies 
in the district would be safe.  The program then resumed. 
In Jajarkot and Bardiya, the Maoists have made similar 
commitments.  And in all districts except Mugu, the DDC 
has expressed a willingness to provide some compensation 
and to take steps to ensure the safety of food stocks. 
Under current conditions, the WFP hopes to resume programs 
in Mugu and Jagarkot in October. 
 
Military Bans Food Deliveries to Maoist Areas 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The military has responded to the Maoists' 
actions by attempting to limit the amount of food going 
into the most heavily Maoist-affected districts.  One 
ranking army official stated that the tactic was to "try 
to starve out the terrorists."  Restrictions on the 
transportation of dry food goods have been imposed in at 
least four districts.  This "ban" affects Salyan, Rolpa, 
Rukum, and Pyuthan districts in the Mid-West.  Many food 
suppliers have reportedly stopped deliveries as a result. 
 
Army's Controversial Tactics 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The WFP opposes the army's strategy on the 
principle that food should not be used as a currency of 
coercion and that food supplies should not be restricted 
under any circumstances.  They consider the military 
strategy doubly problematic in that it not only starves 
the insurgents and but also aggravates the suffering of 
rural non-combatants.  Some observers have criticized the 
restriction of food imports because it appears to increase 
the pressure put on local people by the Maoists.  One 
ranking military officer says that a measure of the ban's 
success is a reported increase in thefts of food from farm 
families.  There is anecdotal evidence that dwindling 
supplies of food have hampered Maoist combat operations 
and encouraged the desertion or surrender of Maoist 
soldiers.  Some personnel have indicated that the 
depopulation of Maoist-controlled areas, as civilians 
migrate to Government-controlled district centers, would 
be viewed as a positive outcome for the GON's counter- 
insurgency strategy. 
 
¶13. (U) The WFP also claims that the military's ban has 
impeded its ability to transport supplies for its school 
feeding program and provide "wages" of rice for some Food 
for Work laborers.  However, WFP officials admit they 
cannot say how large or how serious an impact the 
military's actions have made. 
 
Military Offers to Guard Food Aid 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) The military has expressed a willingness to 
provide protection for WFP food aid.  For practical 
reasons, however, this protection would be limited to 
areas near an army post, and could not be provided in 
remote areas in which the army is already spread thin. 
Unfortunately, the WFP says, protection is needed the most 
in those remote areas.  The WFP maintains, moreover, that 
the kind of support that the army can provide would not be 
appropriate; while military protection for food supplies 
can be beneficial, it could also make the stores more of a 
target for the Maoists.  As an alternative, WFP works with 
local governments to establish responsible food management 
practices that avoid security problems. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (U) The Maoist insurgency has taken a harsh toll on 
food security in rural districts and has led to a marked 
decrease in the rural food supply.  The problem is 
compounded by drought in many areas of western Nepal (Ref 
A).  As UN officials here have pointed out, while the 
immediate effects of this decrease are difficult to 
measure, a large-scale humanitarian crisis could result in 
the months to come. Unless the Maoist conflict is ended 
quickly, however, Nepal's food security problems for rural 
residents can be expected to worsen, with severe 
humanitarian consequences.  End Comment. 
 
BOGGS