This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/EX, HR/OE-MTRACY 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER 
USDOC FOR 2037 DIEMOND 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
PASS USTR - ROSA WHITAKER 
TREASURY FOR ED BARBER AND C WILKINSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2012 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ZI
SUBJECT: STEALTH DEVALUATION: "THROUGH THE BACKDOOR" 
 
REF: HARARE 01728 
 
Classified By: Labor Officer KRBel for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Despite President Mugabe's vigorous 
insistence that "devaluation is dead" (see reftel), the GOZ 
has tacitly conceded -- within a matter of days -- that 
devaluation is in fact very much alive.  On July 25, Finance 
Minister Simba Makoni (who was obliquely castigated by Mugabe 
in the same speech as a "saboteur" and "enemy of the 
government" for advocating devaluation of the Zim dollar, see 
reftel) announced new pricing structures for both tobacco and 
duty calculated on imported luxury goods.  While the official 
exchange rate continues to be pegged to the US dollar at 
55:1, the newly-announced "viability price" for tobacco 
mandates payment to tobacco growers of Zim $317 per kilo of 
tobacco, which is a de facto devaluation to 158.5:1. 
Additionally, for customs/duty purposes, the valuation of 
luxury import goods will be calculated at 300:1.  These new 
calculations join the existing exchange differentials which 
benefit gold producers, exporters, and the tourism industry, 
among others.  In actuality, all imports -- with the 
exception of fuel and energy -- are the beneficiaries of 
targeted devaluation.  While he is adamantly refusing to 
devalue the Zim dollar across the board, Mugabe has allowed 
the creation of a patchwork monetary policy where the 
exception is rapidly becoming the rule.  End summary. 
 
Gold 
---- 
 
¶2. (U) Gold mining was one of the first sectors to benefit 
from a differential price structure.  By law, all Zimbabwean 
gold must be sold to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), 
which sells the gold to the world market based on US dollar 
prices.  Initially, the RBZ paid the producers in Zim 
dollars, until the rising discrepancy beginning in mid-2000 
between the official exchange rate and the parallel market 
rate rendered this unworkable.  Gold producers complained 
about their inability to import necessary equipment, such as 
machinery, spare parts, and explosives, based on 
profitability calculated at the official exchange rate.  In 
response, the GOZ initiated the "support price structure" for 
the industry, which pays the producers on an 80/20 split. 
Eighty percent of the purchase price is paid out in Zim 
dollars based on a premium determined by the RBS (e.g., the 
US dollar price for gold), which works out to approximately 
126:1.  The other 20% is paid out in forex, resulting in a 
"blend rate" of about 170:1. 
 
Exports 
------- 
 
¶3. (U) Industries which produce for export, and therefore 
generate forex, were the next beneficiaries of differential 
price structures.  Exporters are allowed to maintain Foreign 
Currency Accounts (FCAs), which pay out 40% of an exporter's 
income at the official 55:1 rate, but allow the exporters to 
retain 60% of their income in forex -- provided that they 
spend that forex within the next sixty days.  This ostensibly 
provides a pool of forex for export companies to fund their 
necessary inputs, capital improvements, equipment costs, and 
other capital expenses which require forex payments.   If a 
company does not spend its forex within sixty days, the 
remaining funds are subject to "forced conversion" and the 
exporter receives the equivalent in Zim dollars changed at 
the official 55:1 rate.  In essence, for the first 40% of an 
exporter's earnings as well as any of the 60% of forex funds 
not turned around within the mandated time, at the current 
parallel rate of 690:1, the RBZ -- and thus the GOZ -- keeps 
Zim $635 for each US $1 earned. 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations / Embassies 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign 
embassies are also beneficiaries of special treatment.  NGOs 
and foreign embassies are allowed to bring in forex which is 
not subject to forced conversion IF they are 100 percent 
funded from outside Zimbabwe.  If the NGOs, particularly, are 
partly funded from local sources, they are subject to the 
same regulations, including the 60/40 split, described above 
for exporters. 
Export Processing Zone Enterprises 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Export processing zone (EPZ) enterprises, which are 
specially-designated companies that export at least 80% of 
their product, are able to retain 100% of any forex they earn 
without the sixty-day time limit.  This category almost 
exclusively comprises new companies which have existing 
markets in foreign countries; of the one hundred or so 
companies which qualified for this status, very few were 
existing companies which earned reclassification. 
Essentially, these companies are able to retain their forex 
until they want to use it. 
 
Zimbabweans / Foreigners with Outside Resources 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (C) Zimbabweans who legitimately have access to outside 
sources of forex, such as those with relatives working in 
Britain, are not yet subject to any forced conversion to Zim 
dollars (although such has been advocated in some circles, 
see reftel).  Additionally, foreign investors with capital -- 
e.g., those investing in money markets -- are free to keep 
their forex or exchange it on the parallel market, for the 
moment.  If parallel market sources such as bureaux de change 
are shut down or become more heavily regulated, this will 
limit to some degree the freedom of these individuals to 
benefit from the true value of their resources, although 
predictably we would expect a black market to emerge and 
handle much of this volume. 
 
Tourism 
------- 
 
¶7. (U) Tourist operators have long had a multi-tier pricing 
structure, which (while not technically a devaluation) 
certainly qualifies as a differential price structure.  The 
first three tiers separate prices according to whether 
visitors are international, regional, or domestic.  In 
contrast to international visitors, who must pay a higher 
rate -- in forex hard currency or via forex-based credit 
cards -- Zimbabwean residents pay a nominal rate in Zim 
dollars.  For instance, the official price for a double room 
at the Miekles hotel in Harare is US $ 140 in hard cash for 
an international visitor (which translates to Zim $ 96,600 at 
the parallel rate), while a Zimbabwean resident pays Zim 
$17,000 (or US $24.64 at the parallel rate).  Similar pricing 
structures pertain at other local establishments, including 
Victoria Falls and various game reserves. 
 
¶8. (C) Further, there is a fourth tier, unofficially termed 
the "Tourism Exchange Rate," which qualifies as outright 
devaluation.  This is the rate at which tour operators who 
get paid in international funds remit payments to hotel 
operators who are paid in Zim dollars.  This rate, while not 
officially sanctioned by the GOZ, has been in operation for 
approximately the past ten months.  To determine the Tourism 
Exchange Rate, a prominent local economist contacts four 
parallel market forex dealers and ascertains the rate of the 
last deal of each, averages those four rates, and calculates 
60% of the average.  The tour operators then use this rate to 
remit payments to the hotel operators.  This economist has 
been determining the Tourism Exchange Rate on a weekly basis 
for application to transactions completed during the 
following week, with the most recent value computed at 438:1. 
 
Tobacco 
------- 
 
¶9. (U) At the beginning of the current tobacco sales season 
the GOZ announced that although buyers would be paying in US 
dollars, the growers would be paid in Zim dollars to avoid 
the type of forex-based speculation which reigned last year 
and provided a windfall for buyers.  This resulted in several 
days of protest at the tobacco auction houses, during which 
many growers refused to consummate sales wherein they 
received inadequate payment in Zim dollars despite reasonable 
prices offered in US dollars.  Makoni subsequently announced 
an 80% "price support" for tobacco growers, which resulted in 
the farmers being paid at the "blend rate" of Zim $99 per 
kilo.  Since the buyers paid for their purchases in US 
dollars, this meant that the GOZ retained anywhere from Zim 
$777.30 per kilo (for tobacco selling at a low of US $1.27 
per kilo) to Zim $1957.20 per kilo (for tobacco selling at a 
high of US $2.98 per kilo). After the announcement of the new 
"viability price," the farmers are being paid at an exchange 
rate of 158.5:1, with retroactive effect for all sales made 
this season.  Using an average price of US $2.00 per kilo, 
GOZ has now agreed to pay the growers Zim $317.00 per kilo. 
The interesting point here, of course, is that the GOZ still 
retains the difference between the growers' payout and the 
buyers' remittance in forex. 
 
¶10. (U) It remains unclear whether this support price will 
provide enough incentive to save Zimbabwe's tobacco market, 
which has traditionally depended on the output of large-scale 
commercial growers.  The general estimate is that it costs 
between Zim $200-$300 to produce one kilo of flue-cured 
tobacco.  While the more efficient farmers, a category which 
tends to include the larger scale growers, will undoubtedly 
make a profit, the profit margin is minimal compared to that 
they would have made had the government not retained the 
difference resulting from the imbalanced exchange rate.  At 
this point, based on both the low profitability of this 
year's crop and the uncertainty as to whether any large-scale 
growers will be allowed to stay on their land past the August 
10th deadline, most estimates of next year's crop point to a 
50% reduction from this year's crop -- which itself is about 
a 25% reduction the previous year's crop.  There are already 
some intimations that the big buyers are looking farther 
afield for next year's buying season.  If the tobacco crop 
fails to bring the buyers next year, as happened after the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence days, it will take a 
minimum of ten years for the industry to woo them back, when 
and if it recovers a sound footing. 
 
 
Luxury Goods 
------------ 
 
¶11. (U) The last category of products subject to a 
devaluation is "luxury goods," which is defined as any import 
which does not "feed into production and essential services." 
 This group of non-essential goods includes passenger 
vehicles, oil fats, beverages, tobacco and manufactured 
goods.  Since the luxury products are now valued at an 
exchange rate of 300:1 rather than 55:1, the duty on these 
goods can potentially rise in the range of 500%.  Makoni 
stated that he expected to raise up to Zim $11.5 billion 
through this "enhanced customs revenue" in order to support 
the recently approved Zim $52 billion supplemental budget. 
 
Economic Predictions 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) At least one prominent local economist, who has 
excellent Zanu-PF connections, theorizes that the current GOZ 
position on devaluation will be maintained for the next few 
months.  However, he anticipates a minimal devaluation by 
September/October to the 180:1 range.  According to his 
calculations, the population has already suffered the major 
shock related to devaluation since many products have moved 
from the formal marketplace to the parallel market, which is 
providing goods at the 700:1 range.  If the GOZ devalued the 
Zim dollar enough to reach a blend rate of about 300:1, the 
general cost of inputs would drop, and since there would be 
less incentive for sellers to use the parallel market, goods 
would again be found in the formal sector.  Since most goods 
are already the subject of targeted (if unofficial) 
devaluations, only energy and fuel costs would be radically 
affected by a general devaluation.  Even though the energy 
and fuel costs would rise under a general devaluation, their 
inflationary increase would be balanced by the deflationary 
effect on most other goods, and the net effect would not be 
inflationary. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶13. (C) Comment: The GOZ has created a de facto patchwork 
devaluation based on its announcement of a "viability price" 
for tobacco, along with its implementation of the 300:1 
valuation for luxury goods.  As one local economist observed, 
when any president says "never" to devaluation, that is the 
moment to expect it imminently -- although in the case of 
Zimbabwe, through a stealth devaluation, or devaluation 
"through the back door," allowing the GOZ to preserve 
deniability and save face. In some circles, there is 
certainty that change must come within the next six months 
based on several factors.  The first factor is growing 
hunger, which is demonstrably affecting more people and their 
families; and as one recent letter to the editor stated, "A 
hungry man is an angry man."  The other factor is increasing 
divisions within the Zanu-PF politburo, where consensus is 
emerging on the need to take rational steps to address the 
economic debacle, although nobody -- aside from Makoni -- yet 
seems willing to move from words to action.  End comment. 
WHITEHEAD