This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA; LONDON FOR REIDEL; NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2012 
TAGS: CE PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER LTTE
SUBJECT: MORAGODA ON MEETING LTTE IN OSLO: GUARDED OPTIMISM 
RETURNS 
 
REF: A. OSLO 1742 
     ¶B. OSLO 1846 
     ¶C. COLOMBO 1319 
 
Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills; reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
SUMMARY:  PEACE TALKS MOMENTUM 
 
¶1. (C) GSL Minister Moragoda appeared to have regained a bit 
of optimism following his Oslo meeting (reftels) with LTTE 
"theorist" Anton Balasingham.  Moragoda said that Balasingham 
seems serious about getting talks going, is very sensitive to 
US and Indian attitudes re the LTTE, and concerned about the 
LTTE's overall international image.  According to Moragoda, 
Balasingham has an understanding of GSL political 
difficulties and appears willing to try not to add to them 
unnecessarily.  The long-stagnant "peace process" looks to 
have regained its momentum. At the same time, Moragoda 
expressed concerns over Balasingham's health, the potentially 
complicating role of Muslim political leader Rauff Hakeem, 
and the Byzantine nature of Sri Lankan politics, most notably 
the very strained relationship between President Kumaratunga 
and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) Moragoda met the Ambassador and DCM on August 19 to 
provide a read-out on the "peace process" in the wake of the 
PM's visit to Washington and Moragoda's meetings with 
Balasingham in Europe.  Much of what Moragoda told us is 
contained in reftels and we won't repeat.  He did, however, 
relate a few noteworthy items. 
 
¶3. (C) Moragoda expressed a renewed sense of reserved 
optimism that the long-stagnant "peace process" seems to have 
picked up some steam and has begun moving in a positive 
direction.  Although Moragoda thought there was confusion 
within the LTTE on how exactly to proceed, he said 
Balasingham seems genuine in wanting to get the talks 
underway.  Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was not 
ready to discuss substance.  Moragoda responded by saying 
that the two sides would start "in the baby pool" and proceed 
later to greater depths.  For this reason, the first phase of 
the talks will deal with practical issues of development and 
commercial activity and will seek to establish the framework 
for subsequent formal peace negotiations. Both sides are 
under pressure to show the long-suffering population in the 
north and east some immediate results in the development 
area.  Moragoda pressed Balasingham re the Scandinavian 
monitors' reports of over fifty kidnappings/forcible 
recruitments since the ceasefire.  Balasingham, while not 
necessarily accepting that number as accurate, recognized 
that the LTTE has a problem with cadres leaving their units 
and going home; he implied that the "kidnappings" were the 
LTTE's bringing soldiers back to their units -- he tacitly 
admitted that "peace" has created a desertion problem for the 
LTTE.  Balasingham promised that the LTTE would look into the 
reported incidents. 
 
¶4. (C) Moragoda said GSL spokesman and fellow Minister G.L. 
Peiris had made a mistake by announcing publicly that Muslim 
politician Rauff Hakeem would form part of the GSL 
negotiating team.  Moragoda said the announcement was 
premature as the rest of the team has not yet been selected. 
Moragoda said that Balasingham did not seem too happy about 
Hakeem's being at the negotiations and questioned Hakeem's 
ability to deliver Sri Lanka's Muslims, especially in the 
East.  Moragoda acknowledged that he, too, shared those 
concerns and worried about what role Hakeem would play and 
how Hakeem could be handled. 
 
¶5. (C) Moragoda's greatest concern remained the complex, at 
times bizarre politics of the Sinhalese south.  He said 
hardliners within the PM's UNF coalition are determined to 
bring down President Kumaratunga.  These hardliners are not 
satisfied with getting a constitutional amendment passed that 
would restrict the President's ability to dissolve parliament 
-- they want Kumaratunga impeached and out of office. 
Moragoda said that he and the Prime Minister recognize that 
the UNF does not have the numbers to remove Kumaratunga, and 
at most they will be able to pass the constitutional 
amendment.  Kumaratunga, Moragoda said, will remain a force 
to be reckoned with for the next three years of her term. 
Given the very poor state of relations between the President 
and the Prime Minister, those three years are going to be 
rocky ones and could affect the peace negotiations. 
Fortunately, he said, Balasingham seems to appreciate the 
GSL's internal difficulties and vowed not to make life any 
more difficult than necessary for the GSL.  The announcement 
of peace talks for September reflects the LTTE's attempt to 
help the PM.  In fact, Balasingham apparently agreed to the 
September announcement without first going to Sri Lanka to 
consult LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran. 
 
¶6. (C) Moragoda expressed serious concern over the state of 
Balasingham's health and whether he would be able to see the 
process through. Moragoda said Balasingham is the LTTE's eyes 
and ears on the world.  Balasingham understands the 
importance of the LTTE's cleaning up its international image 
and has a healthy respect for the positions of India and 
especially the U.S.  Balasingham would be hard to replace. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT:  The negotiations are going to be tough and 
Sri Lanka will undoubtedly experience some tense moments in 
the months ahead, particularly if the politics of the 
Sinhalese South do not stabilize.  In addition, no one knows 
what exactly is going on within the LTTE and whether 
Balasingham's more moderate stance can carry the day.  There 
are no guarantees. That said, the overall state of affairs in 
Sri Lanka has experienced a dramatic turn for the better over 
the past few months.  Sri Lanka is a very different country 
today than it was eight months ago.  If the GSL can keep the 
LTTE focused on practical issues of development, money, and 
patronage, even without a final political settlement in the 
near future, it would be difficult (though not impossible) 
for the bad old days to return. 
Wills