This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC 
FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-05-12 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR PREL CE
SUBJECT:  Breaking down possible cohabitation scenarios 
 
Refs:   (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 050127Z Aug 02 
 
-       (B) Colombo 1422 
-       (C) Colombo 1403, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Colombo is aswirl in reports that the 
tense cohabitation relationship between President 
Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is coming 
to a head.  At this point, three possible scenarios seem 
to be emerging, all of them equally plausible.  The 
first scenario is that both sides muddle through and 
desist from aggravating the situation.  The second has 
Kumaratunga suspending Parliament and calling elections 
later this year.  The third has the PM calling snap 
elections in order to bolster his position.  This 
volatile situation is not positive news for the peace 
process, which is at a sensitive stage.  The best 
posture for the U.S. is to continue to urge the parties 
to exercise restraint.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Inching toward Confrontation 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Colombo is abuzz with reports that the tense 
cohabitation relationship between President Kumaratunga 
and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is coming to a head. 
Newspapers over the last several days have been full of 
reports that the two sides are planning to take this or 
that action in order to corner the other side.  August 5 
news stories, for example, report that members of the 
United National Front (UNF) government met August 4 and 
discussed the possibility of a snap election (see Ref A 
and Para 4 for more on this report). 
 
¶3.  (C) The UNF meeting came in response to a widely 
publicized letter dated July 29 from Kumaratunga to the 
PM in which she claimed that his ministers were working 
to undermine her position.  In the letter, which was 
extremely harsh in tone, she also reiterated that she 
had the legal right to fire ministers (see Ref C).  This 
letter followed an earlier exchange of letters dated 
July 19 between the two in which Wickremesinghe rejected 
Kumraratunga's demand that he fire Commerce Minister 
Ravi Karunanayake.  (Note:  Joined by a handful of other 
ministers, Karunanayake, a fierce opponent of the 
president, has repeatedly goaded Kumaratunga over a 
number of issues.  In her July 19 letter, Kumaratunga 
had alleged that Karunanayake had publicly accused her 
of bringing a handbag equipped with a bomb to cabinet 
meetings.  The PM denied that Karunanayake had made this 
specific accusation.  End Note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Outlining Possible Scenarios 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) As tensions spike up, three possible scenarios 
seem to be emerging, all equally plausible.  These 
scenarios are: 
 
-- Muddling Through:  In this scenario, both sides 
decide to desist from taking steps that exacerbate the 
situation.  Desmond Fernando, a well-known local lawyer, 
told us that he thought that this scenario was a real 
possibility.  He noted that there was a tradition in Sri 
Lankan politics of tensions spiking up very quickly, as 
emotions get out of hand over small issues.  Tempers 
soon calm down, he added, and the people involved get 
back to more-or-less regular business.  Along the lines 
Fernando mentioned, there have been some tentative 
signals that there may be a willingness by some members 
of both camps to cool off temperatures, perhaps by 
agreeing to some sort of formal or informal compromise 
solution.  In an August 5 meeting with the Ambassador, 
for example, Nimal S. De Silva, a senior People's 
Alliance (PA) MP, said Kumaratunga was willing to back 
down if the UNF stopped verbally attacking her in 
cabinet meetings and stopped harassing PA party members. 
Milinda Moragoda, a senior UNF minister, has also told 
the Ambassador that he was advising other party members 
to seek a compromise solution, perhaps one that was 
written down and then signed by both parties.  Another 
aspect that makes this scenario a real possibility is 
that the two other likely scenarios involve the calling 
of elections.  Elections are something most MPs do not 
want to happen, as campaigns are very expensive and 
elections have already been held each of the past two 
years. 
 
-- Kumaratunga Suspends Parliament:  Under this 
scenario, President Kumaratunga suddenly fires the Prime 
Minister, suspends Parliament for three months (the 
constitutional limit), and calls for new elections late 
this year.  (Note:  Per her constitutional right, the 
president could call for new elections at any point one 
year after the December 2001 election.)  Neither the 
president nor her supporters have publicly indicated 
that this scenario is in the cards.  That said, leaks to 
the press -- apparently from PA sources -- have 
indicated that the president and her advisers are 
seriously mulling over this possibility.  One newspaper 
on August 4, for example, published a memo purportedly 
prepared by one of the president's advisers that set out 
this scenario as something that was under active 
consideration.  (Note:  PA MP De Silva told the 
Aambassador that Kumaratunga, in fact, did not plan to 
suspend Parliament.)  In another indication of a 
possible PA inclination toward confrontation, the 
radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party has of 
late urged the president to sack the government. 
Several PA senior MPs, including Anura Bandaranaike, the 
president's brother, have been reportedly developing 
close ties with the JVP.  Some observers wonder whether 
the JVP's hard-line stance on cohabitation has the 
blessing of these PA MPs. 
 
-- UNF calls a Snap Election:  As noted above, reports 
are rolling in that the UNF may be considering calling 
snap polls in order to bolster its position.  (Note: 
The PM has the right to call new elections if he obtains 
the support of a majority of MP's sitting in Parliament. 
Elections would take place from six weeks to two months 
after being called.)  According to one report, the UNF 
would call a snap election if the president did not 
agree to a series of demands.  These demands would 
reportedly include that she agree to give up her right 
to call elections one year after the last election and 
that she agree to allow crossover voting in Parliament. 
(Note:  The UNF has been discussing pursuing both of 
these proposals via a constitutional amendment for 
several months now -- see Ref C.)  The PM and ministers 
such as Milinda Moragoda are believed to be reluctant to 
call snap elections, which they believe would only serve 
to divert attention from the peace process.  There is a 
hard-line group in the UNF, however, which is believed 
to be pressing for a confrontation.  This group believes 
the UNF would bolster its position in Parliament via an 
election, leaving it better positioned vis-a-vis the 
president, and possibly with the support of enough MPs 
to try to impeach her for corruption and abuse of power. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Not Positive News for the Peace Process 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The ongoing volatility in Sri Lankan politics is 
not positive news for the peace process.  The process is 
entering an especially sensitive stage, with both the 
GSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
preparing for possible face-to-face talks (see Ref B). 
The continuance of instability in Colombo would almost 
certainly make the LTTE reluctant to deal with a 
government that may not be able to carry through on its 
promises.  Tamil politicians, for example, have often 
(and accurately) claimed that past governments have gone 
back on agreements reached with Tamils -- and they are 
allergic to any possibility that this might happen 
again.  Compounding the situation is the fact that a 
suspension of Parliament or the calling of an election 
would lead to serious disruptions in which politicians 
would not be able to give their full attention to the 
peace process. 
 
¶6.  (C) Given this situation, continued volatility in 
Colombo could easily lead to a significant delay in 
talks (which now seem possible in September or October), 
as the GSL gets its act in order.  If Kumaratunga and 
her supporters -- who are generally more hard-line on 
the LTTE -- get the upper hand in elections or some 
other way, the peace process as it is now configured 
could also be sidetracked for some period.  At best, if 
the UNF did well in an election, the results might be 
seen as a vote of confidence in its peace initiative, 
allowing it to move forward toward talks.  All this 
said, there are many risks for the peace process 
inherent in the currently fluid situation that make it 
important that tensions abate soon. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Comment and Recommendations for U.S. Policy 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) At this point, it is difficult to guess which of 
the three scenarios reviewed above will eventuate. 
Tensions between the two sides appear so intense that it 
is possible that either side may make a sudden lunge at 
the other.  Any such action would, in turn, provoke a 
negative response in kind.  That said, the situation may 
not be as dire as it seems on the surface, i.e., as part 
and parcel of the country's political culture, there may 
be a lot of hot air being emitted along with the harsh 
broadsides. 
 
¶8.  (C) We think the best posture for the U.S. is to 
continue to urge the parties to exercise restraint, 
steering them back toward a focus on the national 
interest in moving forward with the peace process.  It 
is important that the politicians not lose sight of the 
incontestable fact that the vast majority of Sri Lankans 
support the peace process and do not want this rare 
chance to slip away due to partisan infighting. 
Depending upon events, we may recommend that a senior 
official -- the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary or 
Assistant Secretary Rocca -- call one or both party 
leaders to convey a message of concern, but it is too 
early to take such an action now.  End Comment. 
 
¶9. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS