This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2012 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IZ IS JO
SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFER TALWAR'S MEETING WITH FM MUASHER 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Foreign Minister Muasher met with the DCM, Poloff, and 
SFRC Staffer Puneet Talwar on August 13.  Most of the 
discussion revolved around the MEPP and Iraq.  FM Muasher 
applauded the U.S. commitment to a three-year time-frame for 
a Palestinian state, but urged that the U.S. come up with a 
plan of action on how to achieve it.  Muasher appeared to 
expect a U.S. action against Iraq, and while emphasizing the 
uncertainities and risks for Jordan, said "this is not 1990," 
and pointed out the importance of the U.S. relationship for 
Jordanians.  End Summary. 
 
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MEPP: WE NEED A ROAD MAP 
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¶2. (C) The President's June 24 speech changed the landscape, 
according to Muasher, and the GOJ viewed the 3-year 
time-frame in the speech positively.  The GOJ's diplomatic 
efforts now are focused on pressing for a plan of action to 
reach that goalpost.   Muasher said the Jordanians were 
reassured during the King's visit by the President's 
reiteration of the U.S. commitment to the three-year 
time-frame beginning on June 24.  The Jordanians in 
Washington had also stressed that the U.S. needed to develop 
a workplan that would tell the Palestinians exactly what lay 
ahead, otherwise average Palestinians would not be engaged. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  Muasher had some general comments on what the road 
map should include.  First, the three-year time-frame needs 
to be solid.  Muasher pushed the idea of an international 
monitoring group to ensure progress continued.  Second, 
Muasher said the settlement needed to be comprehensive and 
include solutions for Syria and Lebanon.  The Syria/Lebanon 
tracks did not have to begin at the same time or move at the 
same pace as the Palestinian track.  Muasher understood the 
importance of dealing with the Palestinian issue first, but 
"by the end of the three years, there needs to be Syrian and 
Lebanese solutions as well". 
 
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SAUDIS IN FOREFRONT 
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¶4. (C) Muasher stressed the importance of Saudi engagement. 
"This time they are following up, they are pressing people, 
convincing the Syrians to cooperate...they are playing a much 
more active role than the Egyptians."  When asked about the 
Egyptians, Muasher said confidentially that "in the end, they 
go along with the Jordanian and Saudi ideas, but they have no 
ideas of their own, they have no clear idea on how to move 
forward." 
 
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ARAFAT: GIVE THE PEOPLE A REAL CHOICE 
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¶5. (C) When asked about Arafat, Muasher expressed his 
frustration with the Palestinian leader.  "We are all 
frustrated with Arafat...he has not accepted change or the 
need to evolve."  Although Muasher agreed in principle to the 
need for reform of the Palestinian leadership, he thought the 
U.S. approach was a bit heavy-handed.  Muasher encouraged the 
U.S. to reinforce the three-year timeline with a road map and 
present it in clear terms for the Palestinians--what will it 
be, a state in three years or Arafat?  Given the choice--with 
a clearly defined path to a Palestinian state--Muasher 
believed the Palestinians would choose a state.  But without 
such a road map, people would be reluctant to speak or act 
against Arafat, lest they be branded traitors.   If there is 
only a promise of additional negotiations for a state, then 
the Palestinian people have nothing to gain from removing 
Arafat.  Although Muasher thought it was imperative for the 
Palestinians to do more on security issues, he was very 
encouraged by financial reform. 
 
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GOJ-ISRAEL TIES 
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¶6. (C) When asked about the Jordanian-Israeli bilateral 
relationship, Muasher said that there had been little 
movement in the relationship or useful diplomatic contact 
with the Israeli government in recent months.  The Jordanians 
still talk to Ben Eliezer, but the relationship with Peres 
has weakened.  Muasher opined that the Labor party was in 
complete disarray.  "Ben Eliezer will tell you things at 
variance with Sharon, and Peres will tell you things at 
variance with his own party."  Muasher said improvement in 
the relationship had to be reciprocal.  "If we returned our 
Ambassador to Tel Aviv without any Israeli action, then 
people would see the normalization steps as further 
capitulation to Israel without anything in return.  But if we 
sent back our Ambassador, and the Israelis did something in 
kind, that would mean something." 
 
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IRAQ: RESIGNATION AND CONCERN 
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¶7. (C) While Muasher confirmed the GOJ public stance that 
Jordan "will not invade Iraq" (i.e., take a direct role in 
the attack), he stressed that the Jordan of 2002 was not the 
Jordan of 1990.  "We have a strong strategic relationship 
with the U.S. that we will not jeopardize."  At the same 
time, Muasher said the GOJ cannot afford to take a public 
stance against Iraq.  "I don't think the U.S. will ask us 
things that we cannot deliver; on the other hand, we don't 
want to put the U.S. in a difficult position."  Muasher 
underscored the negative economic consequences for Jordan of 
an attack and reiterated the GOJ expectation that the U.S. 
will help Jordan in the short term.  Muasher said the length 
of any offensive would be critical.  "Bombing civilians for 
two weeks will be much different than if the campaign went on 
for six months.  This is not 1990...people are not concerned 
about Saddam, but the Iraqi people." 
 
¶8. (U) Mr. Talwar did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message bbefore departing Jordan. 
Gnehm