This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, 1.6X6 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS CM FR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO AND A/S 
KANSTEINER DISCUSS BAKASSI 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 2268 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASON 
1.6X5 AND 1.6X6. 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. During their July 25 meeting at Aso 
Rock Villa, President Obasanjo and Assistant Secretary 
Kansteiner discussed major regional conflicts and the 
potential crisis on Nigeria's southeastern border -- 
the Bakassi. This cable reports the discussion on 
Bakassi. Other topics are reported septel. 
 
 
¶2. (S) On Bakassi, President Obasanjo asked our help 
urging Cameroon toward a negotiated "political 
solution" rather than waiting for a winner-take-all 
ICJ judgment that might heighten tensions between the 
two countries. Joining President Obasanjo in the 
meeting were NSA Aliyu Mohammed, Minister of 
Cooperation and African Integration Bimbola Ogunkelu, 
the President's Chief of Staff and MFA Americas 
Officer Director Basil Ukpong. Ambassador Jeter, Lagos 
Consul General Hinson-Jones, A/S Senior Special 
Advisor Jim Dunlap and PolCouns (notetaker) 
accompanied A/S Kansteiner. End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Bakassi Is A Problem! 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) During most of this 90-minute meeting, Obasanjo 
was in relaxed good spirits.  But as discussions swung 
toward Bakassi, the President's look turned to one of 
deep concern and his speaking cadence became more 
deliberate, as if to underscore the gravity of the 
situation. 
 
 
¶4. (C) When he was military Head of State, Obasanjo 
recalled, the border friction with Cameroon was 
contained and had not assumed the ominous significance 
it has today. Twenty some years ago, he was able to 
manage difficulties and maintain good rapport with 
Cameroon's leader Ahidjo. Successor leaders in both 
countries, unfortunately, allowed the dispute to 
percolate. (Comment: Obasanjo offered his personal 
historical perspective to set the stage for his 
request to us. In attesting to his own "innocence," he 
also was casting blame at the military rulers who 
followed him.  Because someone got him into this mess, 
he feels he has the moral standing to ask someone else 
-- the United States and others -- to help him out of 
it.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶5. (S) Immediately after his 1999 election, Obasanjo 
made a goodwill visit to Yaounde. At that time Biya 
wanted to discuss Bakassi; however, believing the 
discussion inappropriate since he was not yet 
inaugurated, Obasanjo demurred, saying he lacked the 
authority to consult at that time. Once sworn in, he 
would eagerly talk Bakassi, Obasanjo told the 
Cameroonian. Obasanjo told Biya that he had come so 
soon after the election as a goodwill gesture but that 
he could not discuss such a weighty matter without 
formally being in office. That his temporary reticence 
came when the moody Biya was ready to talk might have 
permanently "turned Biya off" from talking to him, 
Obasanjo speculated. 
 
 
¶6. (S) Since taking office, Obasanjo tried several 
times to communicate but Biya has rebuffed him and his 
emissaries at every turn. Believing Cameroon might 
listen to the French, Obasanjo raised Bakassi with 
President Chirac, asking the Gallic leader to act as 
an intermediary. He recalled translating for Chirac a 
Yoruba adage " that you don't go to court against 
someone and come back as friends."  Obasanjo advised 
Chirac to take the "African way" by not labeling 
either party as completely right or absolutely wrong; 
instead, he counseled the French President to 
apportion both blame and credit to each side. This way 
neither side would lose face or gloat completely. 
Chirac initially accepted the assignment with 
enthusiasm; however, after talking to Biya, Chirac's 
enthusiasm waned. Biya, confident of his chances 
before the ICJ, had turned a stubborn and deaf ear to 
the French President. 
 
 
¶7. (S) Obasanjo and Chirac had their most recent 
discussion on Bakassi on the margin of the Kananaskis 
G-8 Summit.  During this meeting, Obasanjo stressed a 
court decision completely negating all Nigerian claims 
would be very "hard to swallow politically."  However, 
he explained, a "political solution" could be 
fashioned to make the negative impact more gradual and 
thus more palatable.  Even if Bakassi inhabitants had 
to change their nationality, a deliberate approach 
that protected their rights and did not generate 
upheaval or panic should be explored, Obasanjo told 
Chirac.  At the end of their talks, Obasanjo asked 
Chirac to intercede once more. Chirac responded that 
he would raise the matter with Kofi Annan and ask 
Annan to talk to Obasanjo. (Comment: Apparently, 
Obasanjo was unable to elicit from Chirac a firm 
commitment to talk to Biya; if Chirac had committed, 
Obasanjo probably would have told us. From Obasanjo's 
own rendition of his last encounter with the French 
leader, Chirac seemed less than keen on revisiting 
this matter with Biya. Attempting to pass the baton, 
Chirac appears to be pushing Kofi Annan into the spot 
Obasanjo wants Chirac to occupy. End Comment.) 
 
 
¶8. (S) In their conversation, Obasanjo told Annan that 
Nigeria had established a senior level implementation 
commission to plan how to handle the ICJ decision, 
whether negative or positive.  He stressed to Annan, 
however, that Nigeria and Cameroon should be working 
toward a peaceful political solution before the 
verdict. Annan endorsed the idea, according to 
Obasanjo. Obasanjo then asked Annan to discuss this 
approach with Chirac.  (Comment: Obasanjo has 
initiated a diplomatic round-robin that thus far has 
yielded only half of what he seeks. He talked to 
Chirac who shuffled him to Annan as the one to see. He 
conferred with Annan whom he asked to talk to Chirac. 
Seems the trio agree on a general approach, but 
Obasanjo does not appear to have successfully 
convinced either Chirac (again) or Annan (first time) 
to approach Biya directly.  End comment.) 
 
 
¶9. (S) Irrespective of the outcome of the ICJ verdict, 
Obasanjo told Kansteiner, both nations would have to 
cooperate to implement cardinal aspects of the verdict 
dealing with boundary demarcation and movement of 
people. Awkward as it might be, Nigeria was open to 
talk because it could not wish Cameroon away.  Try as 
he could, Biya "might be able to wish me away but he 
could not wish Nigeria away," Obasanjo quipped. 
Obasanjo added that while he wanted to work for a 
peaceful solution, the GON was receiving reports of 
increased harassment of Nigerian inhabitants in the 
Bakassi by Cameroonian authorities. These reports only 
increased the temperature and could be a source of 
provocation, the President implied. (Comment: Alluding 
to his domestic political woes, Obasanjo half-joked 
that before long Biya's wish to be rid of him might 
come true.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶10. (S) A/S Kansteiner responded the USG wanted 
Bakassi resolved peacefully; therefore, we would help 
where possible but our influence with Biya was less 
than that of France. Kansteiner mentioned new French 
Foreign Minister de Villepin, although only a few 
months on the job, had taken a keen interest in things 
African. Nigeria would likely find France's new top 
diplomat a helpful interlocutor. Kansteiner offered 
that we would be willing to raise Bakassi with de 
Villepin.  Perking up somewhat, Obasanjo interjected 
that working through the French Foreign Minister might 
be a good avenue to encourage France to re-engage 
Biya. 
 
 
¶11. (S) Immediately before the session with the 
President, A/S Kansteiner met NSA Aliyu Mohammed where 
Bakassi was also discussed.  Mohammed claimed Nigeria 
was prepared to forcibly settle Bakassi 20 years ago 
but President Shagari refused to go to war.  Since 
then, there had been numerous flare-ups regarding the 
peninsula.  With the advent of the Obasanjo 
Administration, Mohammed claimed the GON had done its 
utmost to talk to Biya.  However, the Cameroonian, 
smug in the belief that he has the stronger legal 
case, rebuffed every Nigerian overture.  Mohammed 
recalled going to London with a letter from President 
Obasanjo to hand to Biya, only to discover that Biya 
had scotched the rendezvous at the last minute, even 
though the two were staying at the same hotel.  After 
summarizing Obasanjo's efforts with Chirac and Annan, 
Mohammed stressed the GON wanted to be engaged in 
negotiations with Cameroon quickly in order to resolve 
the matter by November, the month the Nigerians 
project the ICJ will render its decision. 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶12. (S) Clearly, President Obasanjo and his foreign 
policy team are deeply concerned about Bakassi. 
Obasanjo did not explicitly state Nigeria would go to 
war if it lost the ICJ case and if Biya remains 
steadfastly intransigent. However, with the President 
twice stressing his hope for a "peaceful political 
solution," the implication is inescapable that a 
Nigerian military response is possible should Biya 
continue to refuse to engage. To a degree, some of 
these dire insinuations may be to stoke the USG, the 
French and others to intercede. Nevertheless, this is 
not simply a negotiating tactic. Nigerian concern is 
real that domestic pressures might compel a military 
response if Cameroon overplays its hand by refusing 
even the possibility of negotiations. 
 
 
¶13. (S) To lessen the possibility of military action, 
Biya and Obasanjo should talk. Herein, lies the rub. 
While Obasanjo might have gotten sympathetic hearings 
from Annan and Chirac, neither apparently committed to 
directly asking Biya to soften. Obasanjo is now asking 
the USG to approach Biya as well as to persuade the 
French to do so. Biya will be a very difficult sell. 
While we defer to the opinion of our colleagues in 
Yaounde regarding Biya's modes and moods, convincing 
him to negotiate will likely take a lot more than a 
subtle nudge. What advantage does he derive by 
removing from the game the ICJ trump card he currently 
holds in order for the Nigerians to have their desire 
for a reshuffled deck?  For negotiations to have a 
chance, it appears the parties would have to agree 
that the expected outcome of the ICJ opinion should be 
the "informal basis," the starting point for 
apportioning the relative rights, claims and duties of 
the two sides in a compromise arrangement on the 
Bakassi. 
 
 
¶14. (S) Ambassador Jeter has briefed French Ambassador 
Simon on the Obasanjo-Kansteiner discussion of 
Bakassi. Simon was grateful and agreed with the 
proposed approach of us engaging Foreign Minister de 
Villepin. Simon is a close friend of de Villepin and 
thinks the Foreign Minister will try to be helpful. 
Simon also believes Chirac has more influence with 
Biya than anyone else; nonetheless, Simon is uncertain 
that Biya will listen to anyone, including his 
respected mentor. 
JETER