This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 07/30/12 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MOPS TP CM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A/S KANSTEINER MEETING WITH 
BATAGARAWA 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  During a July 24 meeting with 
Minister of State For Defense (Army) Lawal Batagarawa, 
A/S Kansteiner raised the inquiry into the 2001 Benue 
state massacre, the recent legislative hold on WASP 
funding, the Army's response to violence in Plateau 
State that has claimed a soldier and police officer, 
and prospects for violence in the upcoming elections. 
Batagarawa requested USG help to defuse potential 
trouble in Bakassi, assistance on debt relief and more 
police training.  In attendance at the meeting were 
Ambassador Jeter, Kansteiner Senior Special Advisor 
Jim Dunlop, Political Counselor, Pol/Mil officer and 
DATT (notetaker).   End summary. 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
BENUE INQUIRY -- NEED FOR PROGRESS 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2.  (C) A/S Kansteiner met Minister of State for 
Defense (Army) Lawal Batagarawa at the Ambassador's 
residence on the evening of 24 July, after his arrival 
from Libreville. A/S Kansteiner informed Batagarawa of 
Senator Feingold's decision to place a legislative 
hold on the proposed $2m program for post-Operation 
Focus Relief (OFR) sustainment for the five US-trained 
Nigerian peacekeeping battalions.  The legislative 
action was prompted by the apparent lack of progress 
in the inquiry into the army massacre of civilians in 
Benue State last October.  Kansteiner added that the 
Commission seemed dilatory and its proceedings 
appeared to be open-ended.  He asked when the 
proceedings would close. The Ambassador raised 
concerns about the credibility of the Commission, 
noting he was troubled by the delay in the Commission 
actually going to the troubled areas to gather 
evidence from local sources and people who could not 
travel to Abuja.  He also cited the Commission's lack 
of prosecutorial power as a concern. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Batagarawa responded that the lack of funding 
delayed the initial start of the inquiry (Funding also 
affected the start of a separate military 
investigation on the events.)  The shift of the 
Commission from Abuja to the locus of the violence was 
also impeded by lack of money.  He agreed that the 
Commission needed to visit the affected areas to give 
the numbers of poor people who cannot to travel to 
Abuja a chance to be heard and provide evidence. 
Additionally, travel by the Commission would give its 
members an opportunity to see first hand the sites of 
violence. Constitutionally the Commission could not 
have prosecutorial powers Batagarawa noted, but its 
findings would be referred to the appropriate 
authorities, including the Justice Ministry.  The 
facts gathered could be used as evidence at trial. 
Batagarawa stated that the internal army inquiry would 
take place but would never be made public; however, he 
offered to privately brief the Embassy and/or Senator 
Feingold on its findings. A/S Kansteiner noted that 
the in-house investigation and briefing of USG 
officials would be helpful. Batagarawa volunteered to 
travel to the U.S. in August to meet Senator Feingold 
to discuss the status of the investigation. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
NIGERIAN CONCERNS-BAKASSI IS NUMBER ONE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (S) Minister Batagarawa expressed deep concern 
about the Bakassi peninsula.  The GON expected a 
decision by the ICJ any time after September and 
thought it would go against Nigeria. He pointed out 
the difficult position the GON would be in 
politically, particularly in the run-up to elections. 
The GON needed a way out.  "We don't want to go to 
war.  It would be bad for us, undermining our 
credibility as a peacekeeper in the region."  He 
agreed with Ambassador Jeter's assessment that it 
would also destabilize the region.  The GON wanted to 
negotiate a political solution in advance of the 
decision, but Cameroon appeared disinterested. 
President Obasanjo had made three separate attempts to 
talk with Cameroon's Biya, but the latter rebuffed 
Obasanjo each time.  The Minister added that the GON 
requested French President Chirac's assistance as an 
intermediary.  Chirac was unhelpful, stating there was 
nothing he could do since he had little influence on 
Biya. 
¶5.  (S) A/S Kansteiner replied that dialogue with 
Cameroon was crucial, and needed to occur before the 
ICJ decision.  Afterwards, he said, the winner of the 
judgment would not have any incentive to talk.  The 
A/S offered U.S. assistance in conveying messages to 
the Cameroonians, but assessed our influence as much 
less than that of the French. The Ambassador noted 
that much of this problem was personality driven, as 
Biya purposefully isolated himself and was intractable 
and stubborn.  (Note: This assertion was based on the 
French Ambassador's and the GOF's assessment of Biya.) 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
OTHER POSSIBLE MILITARY VIOLENCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The Minister stated he had no information 
outside of press accounts about the reported killing 
of Sierra Leonean civilians by Nigerian peacekeepers 
in Freetown.  Regarding the continuing violence in 
Plateau State and threats by military officers to 
avenge the killings of a soldier there, the Minister 
assured A/S Kansteiner that there would be no heavy- 
handed response.  Both A/S Kansteiner and the 
Ambassador emphasized that an overzealous, 
unrestrained response by the military would 
essentially seal the fate of USG military cooperation 
with Nigeria.  The Minister explained the situation 
had escalated beyond the police's ability to control, 
requiring the military to restore order.  In fact, the 
Minister stated that the publicized military threat 
had been taken out of context by a journalist covering 
a meeting designed to help restore calm to the area. 
The journalist had been thrown out of the meeting and 
retaliated by writing a negative story.  The Minister 
noted that curbing the growth of armed banditry in the 
area necessitated highly visible military maneuvers 
and expressed concern about how such movements would 
be exploited by an often irresponsible media. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment: Security forces report groups of 
violent bandits roving in Plateau and neighboring 
states all the way to the Chadian border. There was a 
recent firefight between army units and criminals in 
northern Plateau State during which several bandits 
were allegedly killed. However, the recent spike in 
violence in Plateau cannot all be attributed to 
criminality. Most of the recent violence has been 
communal or election-related. End Comment. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
ELECTIONS "ARE HEATING UP" 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to A/S Kansteiner's question about 
the election season, the Minister stated that things 
were hot even though the season had not entered full 
swing.  Regarding electoral violence, he said he was 
most concerned about the Southeast, where the spirit 
of compromise is almost nonexistent and there is no 
strong traditional social hierarchy to control the 
parties.  Batagarawa also expressed concerned about 
parts of the Southwest and South-South (citing the 
Chevron facility seizure) as well as Plateau State in 
the Middle Belt. He added that he was much less 
concerned with the rest of the Middle Belt or the 
North. The Ambassador noted holding local government 
elections on August 10 was logistically impossible, 
and that November-December was a more realistic time- 
frame.  The Ambassador also predicted that significant 
violence could be expected for the gubernatorial 
elections.  The Minister concurred with both 
assessments. (Comment: Batagarawa was very concerned 
about electoral violence because he knows all too well 
that the army will be summoned to stem outbreaks 
because the police have proven incapable. End Comment) 
 
 
---------------------- 
Debt Relief Once Again 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶9.  (U) The Minister asked about debt relief for 
Nigeria, noting its importance to the economy. A/S 
Kansteiner replied there was very little chance for 
debt relief now; its eventuality would depend on the 
GON reaching agreement with the IMF and sustaining 
economic reform. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
More Help With Police Reform 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) The Minister requested increased USG 
assistance in building an effective police force.  His 
concern was that police ineffectiveness to contain 
communal violence forced the military to intervene in 
domestic security issues, increasing the potential for 
the army to be accused of the excessive use of force. 
He observed the police system currently allowed 
officers with almost no training to rise to a high 
rank, and that there was no vetting. This meant "bad 
men" could enter the force with the expectation of 
reaching its senior levels. Police ineffectiveness was 
a systemic problem in need of a "MPRI"-style approach 
to establish a training base and schools. He thought 
the one full-time American slated to work in the 
police headquarters as an advisor would be inadequate. 
 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the full time 
position was created solely to work on developing a 
police training curriculum, to replace the 
approximately sixty year old program currently being 
used.  He highlighted the problems we had to overcome 
to start this program, citing police resistance to the 
USG advisor having an office in police headquarters 
and to the location of a national information database 
at the headquarters. Batagarawa surmised the police 
were afraid the USG would use the advisor and the 
database "to spy" on them. The Ambassador noted that 
establishing a viable curriculum to train the force 
was a critical first step to reforming the police. 
 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Kansteiner mentioned the Department had 
earmarked an additional five million dollars for 
police reform for Nigeria and stressed this was an 
important indication of our commitment to help with 
Nigerian police reform, given our usual policy 
reluctance toward providing police reform assistance. 
He added that we anticipate the money being available 
in four or five months; down the road a new survey of 
the overall police system and an action plan for its 
improvement might be considered. 
 
 
------------- 
Ronco Support 
------------- 
 
 
¶13.  (U) The Ambassador raised the issue of assistance 
to the Ronco team working the clean-up of the Ikeja 
ammunition transfer depot explosion. The Minister had 
received Ronco's letter enumerating support 
requirements; he stated the requests would be met 
completely. He also accepted the Ambassador's 
invitation to visit the site, noting they could also 
visit the Oshodi resettlement center.  (Note: The trip 
is now planned for August 2.) 
 
 
-------------------- 
Sao Tome Patrol Boat 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶14. (C) A/S Kansteiner told Batagarawa that, while in 
Libreville, he was informed Sao Tome's lone patrol 
boat reportedly had been hijacked to Nigeria by 
"pirates."  The Assistant Secretary asked the Minster 
about the existence of a defense cooperation agreement 
between Nigeria and Sao Tome and whether Nigerian 
troops were stationed there.  The Minister was not 
aware of the stolen patrol boat.  He added that it was 
unlikely Nigerian troops were already stationed in Sao 
Tome because he thought the cooperation agreement had 
not been formally concluded. He qualified his 
statement, however, noting his knowledge may not be 
current but that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
the lead on this issue and could provide an accurate 
update. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶15.  (S) The Minister of State for the Army is our 
closest and most effective interlocutor at the 
Ministry of Defense.  He has become the main GON 
interlocutor on the Benue inquiry. Regarding Benue, we 
underscored the seriousness of a credible 
investigation and we believe Batagarawa fully 
understands our position. In addition to our pressing 
him on Benue, the Army Minister has two other very 
serious potential concerns that may fall into his and 
the army's lap -- security for elections and Bakassi. 
On these and numerous other issues, we believe 
Batagarawa has the ear of the President. They probably 
discussed how to broach the sensitive issue of Bakassi 
with us. Batagarawa knew A/S Kansteiner would meet 
President Obasanjo. Batagarawa's discussion on the 
Bakassi was likely a primer for the subsequent 
Obasanjo-Kansteiner meeting (Septel.) Obasanjo might 
have wanted an indication of our position before 
deciding whether to raise it with the Assistant 
Secretary. 
 
SIPDIS 
JETER