Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 02ROME3639, BOSSI ON ITALIAN POLITICS, DEVOLUTION, IMMIGRATION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #02ROME3639.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ROME3639 2002-07-23 16:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2012 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB IT EUN ITPGOV EUN ITPGOV EUN ITALIAN POLITICS


SUBJECT: BOSSI ON ITALIAN POLITICS, DEVOLUTION, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE EU 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM THOMAS COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  03639  01 OF 03  231626Z 
 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: NORTHERN LEAGUE LEADER (AND MINISTER FOR 
REFORM AND DEVOLUTION) BOSSI MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR JULY 17 
FOR A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF ISSUES, INCLUDING DOMESTIC 
POLITICS, DEVOLUTION, IMMIGRATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE EU. 
RELAXED AND STRAIGHTFORWARD, BOSSI EXPLAINED NEXT STEPS IN 
THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS, THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE BOSSI-FINI 
IMMIGRATION LAW, AND HIS ECONOMIC CONCERNS REGARDING EU 
ENLARGEMENT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) THE AMBASSADOR MET JULY 17 WITH UMBERTO BOSSI, LEADER 
OF THE LEGA NORD (LN), A LEADER OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 
COALITION AND MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO FOR REFORM AND 
DEVOLUTION.  A/DCM AND ECON COUNSELOR WERE ALSO PRESENT. 
 
ITALIAN POLITICS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) BOSSI EXPECTS THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT TO SERVE ITS 
FULL FIVE-YEAR TERM.  IN HIS VIEW, THE REALIGNMENT OF SEVERAL 
FORMER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES INTO THE NEW ""CHRISTIAN 
DEMOCRATIC CENTER"" WAS NOT A REAL THREAT.  WHILE THIS GROUP 
(WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNING COALITION) WAS INTERESTED 
IN RETURNING TO POLITICAL POWER, THEY DID NOT HAVE THE 
STRENGTH TO STRIKE OUT ON THEIR OWN. 
 
4.  (C) BOSSI RECALLED THAT THIS GOVERNMENT HAD INHERITED A 
COUNTRY WITH AN UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH FISCAL DEFICIT, 37 BILLION 
LIRE (USD 18 MILLION) OVER THE ANTICIPATED LEVEL, WHICH 
SOMEWHAT SLOWED THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO MAKE 
NECESSARY CHANGES.  HOWEVER, MINISTER TREMONTI WAS A CREATIVE 
MAN, AND HAD MOVED AHEAD WITH REFORMS NONETHELESS. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  03639  01 OF 03  231626Z 
 
5.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT THE LABOR SITUATION, 
NOTING THAT THE GOI HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THREE OF 
THE FOUR MAJOR LABOR UNIONS.  WHAT WERE PROSPECTS FOR AN 
ACCORD WITH THE CGIL?  BOSSI RESPONDED THAT HE SAW LITTLE 
PROSPECT OF AN ACCORD UNTIL CGIL LEADER COFFERATI RETIRED IN 
LATE SUMMER.  COFFERATI'S SUCCESSOR SEEMED A MORE MODERATE 
INTERLOCUTOR, AND WAS MORE LIKELY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT. 
 
6.  (C) BOSSI EXPLAINED THAT MOST ITALIAN UNIONS HAVE FEW 
WORKERS AND MANY RETIREES.  ONLY ONE NORTHERN UNION CONSISTS 
OF ONLY WORKERS.  UNIONS, HE DECLARED, WERE INTERESTED IN 
PROTECTING PENSIONS, NOT CREATING JOBS.   TWENTY TO THIRTY 
YEARS AGO, THE GOI HAD GIVEN UNIONS THE SOLE CONTRACT FOR 
HANDLING PAPERWORK FOR WORKER AND PENSION BENEFITS. EVEN 
THOUGH THE GOI HAD SPENT $2 BILLION RESTRUCTURING THE 
GOVERNMENT'S INPS SOCIAL BENEFITS SYSTEM, ONLY UNIONS COULD 
PROCESS THIS PAPERWORK -- FOR A FEE PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT 
FOR EACH DOCUMENT.  THE UNIONS EARN AT LEAST $750 MILLION 
ANNUALLY FOR THIS SERVICE. 
 
7.  (C) ""AS A RESULT, UNIONS ARE RICHER THAN POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN ITALY,"" BOSSI EXPLAINED.  ""TAKE COFFERATI AND 
(CENTER-LEFT DS LEADER) FASSINO FOR EXAMPLE.  THE CGIL'S 
COFFERATI HAS MONEY TO PAY FOR BUSES TO TRANSPORT UNION 
MEMBERS FOR MASS DEMONSTRATIONS.  THE DS'S FASSINO DOES NOT 
HAVE MONEY FOR THIS.""   FURTHERMORE, BOSSI CONTINUED, THE 
UNIONS WANT TO SET UP AND RUN PENSION FUNDS.  BY DOING SO, 
THE UNIONS WOULD BECOME FINANCIERS AND MANAGERS OF PENSION 
FUNDS -- EVEN STRONGER FINANCIALLY AND POLITICALLY. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  03639  01 OF 03  231626Z 
8. (C) COFFERATI WILL ENTER POLITICS AT THE END OF THE 
SUMMER, WHEN HE RETIRES FROM THE CGIL, EXPLAINED BOSSI. 
BOSSI EXPECTED COFFERATI TO RECONSTITUTE THE COMMUNIST POLE 
IN ITALY, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE REFOUNDED COMMUNISTS (RC). 
(COMMENT:  MAYBE.  WE WOULD CERTAINLY AGREE THAT HE WOULD 
ATTRACT THOSE ON ITALY'S LEFT, BUT WE THINK HE WOULD RATHER 
BE AN ALLY WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT (DS) THAN WITH THE RC. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
DEVOLUTION AND FEDERALISM 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) BOSSI DETAILED THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS IN ITALY.  HE 
NOTED THAT THE PROCESS HAD BEGUN UNDER THE (1998-2000 
CENTER-LEFT) D'ALEMA GOVERNMENT, WHICH TOOK THE FIRST STEP BY 
MODIFYING TITLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION (THE PART OF THE 
ITALIAN CONSTITUTION THAT SETS OUT CENTRAL AND REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES). ""IT WAS DONE TO KEEP US (THE 
LEGA) FROM JOINING BERLUSCONI,"" HE EXPLAINED.  (NOTE: BOTH 
ITALY'S CENTER-LEFT AND CENTER-RIGHT HAVE, IN THE PAST, 
SOUGHT TO GAIN THE LEGA'S ALLEGIANCE.  BOSSI SUGGESTED THAT 
THE TITLE V REFORM WAS A LAST-DITCH EFFORT BY THE CENTER-LEFT 
TO WOO HIS PARTY.  END NOTE.) THIS GAVE REGIONS SOMEWHAT MORE 
CONTROL OVER SCHOOLS, HEALTH CARE AND LOCAL POLICE (VIGILI 
URBANI), ALBEIT WITH CONSIDERABLE ONGOING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
OVERSIGHT  IT WAS ONLY A SMALL STEP TOWARD DEVOLUTION, 
HOWEVER.   THE NEXT STEP -- IN 2003 -- WILL BE TO CHANGE THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4581 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  03639  02 OF 03  231627Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AGRE-00  AID-00   ACQ-00   CA-01    CEA-01 
      CIAE-00  COME-00  CTME-00  INL-00   DINT-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EXIM-01  E-00     FAAE-00 
      FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   INSE-00 
      ITC-01   LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    DCP-01   NSAE-00 
      NSCE-00  OCS-03   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00 
      ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00 
      USIE-00  VO-03    PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00 
      SAS-00     /018W 
                  ------------------CF2A6B  231627Z /38 
P 231625Z JUL 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5040 
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
AMCONSUL MILAN 
AMCONSUL NAPLES 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 003639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2012 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB IT EUN ITPGOV EUN ITPGOV EUN ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: BOSSI ON ITALIAN POLITICS, DEVOLUTION, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE EU 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT BY ADDING REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
REPRESENTATIVES TO THOSE FROM THE PARLIAMENT, PRESIDENT AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  03639  02 OF 03  231627Z 
JUDICIARY.  THE THIRD STEP WILL BE TO TURN THE ITALIAN SENATE 
INTO A FEDERALIST BODY.  ""THIS WILL BE A HISTORIC STEP IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLIC. WE WILL DO IT IN OUR 
LAST YEAR (2006), AS IT WILL REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS,"" HE 
ADDED.  THE CHAMBER WILL HANDLE ONLY THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE ITALIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.  THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
WILL HANDLE REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.  THE SENATE WILL 
HANDLE AREAS OF JOINT OR OVERLAPPING COMPETENCY.  THE RESULT 
WILL RESEMBLE THE FRENCH FEDERAL SYSTEM MORE THAN THE U.S. 
FEDERAL SYSTEM.  ""ITALY IS NOT MATURE ENOUGH FOR U.S.-STYLE, 
STRONG FEDERALISM,"" BOSSI EXPLAINED. 
 
10. (C) BOSSI CHARACTERIZED PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI AS 
""PRESIDENTIAL - ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE A PRESIDENTIAL 
SYSTEM.""  BERLUSCONI IS A DECISIVE DECISION-MAKER AND 
MANAGER, NOT A MAN OF COMPROMISE.  HE WAS VOTED INTO POWER AS 
THE GOVERNMENT LEADER.  ""THE BALLOT HAD BERLUSCONI'S PICTURE 
AND THE PARTY SYMBOL.""  IN ITALY, STRESSED BOSSI, THE IDEAS 
OF PRESIDENT AND FEDERALISM ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED IN THE 
PUBLIC MIND. 
 
11.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR AND BOSSI THEN COMPARED THE PROBLEMS 
OF ITALY'S SOUTH TO THOSE OF THE U.S. SOUTH MANY YEARS AGO -- 
ALSO AN AREA CHARACTERIZED BY AN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY AND 
HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT.  THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED HOW SOUTHERN 
LEADERS IN THE U.S. HAD OBTAINED INVESTMENT FUNDS AND 
PERSUADED MANUFACTURING FIRMS TO SET UP IN THE SOUTH.  BOSSI 
CONTRASTED THIS TO SOUTHERN ITALY'S EXPERIENCE.  ""WE IN ITALY 
BORROWED A LOT FROM KEYNES, WHO INSPIRED OUR CASSA PER IL 
MEZZOGIORNO (FUND FOR SOUTHERN ITALY).  BUT HERE THE IDEA WAS 
CHANGED FROM ONE OF CREATING BUSINESS TO A WELFARE STATE.""  A 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  03639  02 OF 03  231627Z 
U.S. STATE CAN MAKE LAWS AND UNDERTAKE PROGRAMS, AND IS 
RESPONSIBLE TO ITS CITIZENS FOR THE RESULTS.  IN ITALY, 
INSTEAD, HE EXPLAINED, ""THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MAKES THE LAWS 
AND PROVIDES THE MONEY, WHILE LOCAL POLITICIANS ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTHING.  ITALY SUFFERS FROM A LACK OF 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.  ITALY HAD THE LARGEST COMMUNIST 
PARTY IN THE WORLD, AND THE STATE PROVIDED MONEY FOR 
EVERYTHING.""  BOSSI DECLARED THAT BUSINESS NEEDED ""A STABLE 
CURRENCY AND GOOD ROADS -- NOT WELFARE HANDOUTS.""  THE 
ITALIAN SOUTH NEEDS REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS WITH REAL POWER AND 
RESPONSIBLE TO CITIZENS FOR THE RESULTS.  ""THE PROBLEMS OF 
THE SOUTH OF ITALY WILL NEVER BE RESOLVED UNTIL THE CITIZENS 
AND POLITICIANS OF THE SOUTH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN 
FATES,"" HE ARGUED. 
 
IMMIGRATION 
----------- 
 
12. (C) THE A/DCM ASKED ABOUT THE FINI-BOSSI IMMIGRATION LAW. 
 BOSSI REPLIED THAT HE HAD DRAFTED THE LAW EXACTLY ONE YEAR 
AGO. HIS BASIC CONCERN IN DOING SO, HE EXPLAINED, WAS 
NATIONAL SECURITY, A FEAR OF GROWING UNREST AMONG BOTH 
ITALIAN YOUTH AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS.  BOSSI FEARED THAT 
ITALY WOULD BE AT RISK IF ITS YOUNG PEOPLE COULD NOT OBTAIN 
PERMANENT JOBS, BUT ONLY TEMPORARY, FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS.  HE 
EXPLAINED: ""IF YOU HAVE THREE APPLICANTS FOR EACH JOB, THEN 
OK, THAT IS COMPETITION.  BUT IF YOU HAVE 100 APPLICANTS FOR 
EACH JOB, THEN YOU LEAVE ITALIANS -- PARTICULARLY YOUNG 
PEOPLE -- WITHOUT HOPE.  THIS IS AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS 
SITUATION.""  AT THE SAME TIME, HE ARGUED, ITALY FACES AN 
INFLUX OF JOBLESS, HOMELESS IMMIGRANTS, WHO CAN EASILY FALL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  03639  02 OF 03  231627Z 
INTO A CRIMINAL LIFESTYLE TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. 
 
13. (C) MANY HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF RISING 
IMMIGRATION COULD BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH AID TO THE THIRD 
WORLD.  BOSSI DISAGREED.  HE NOTED THAT HE STRONGLY OPPOSED 
THE TOBIN TAX (NOTE: THIS IS A PROPOSED TAX ON CROSS-BORDER 
CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS, INTENDED TO CUT DOWN ON CURRENCY 
SPECULATION AND PROVIDE DEVELOPMENT FUNDS. END NOTE). 
MOREOVER, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT MOST ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN 
THE THIRD WORLD USE 80 PERCENT OF THEIR FUNDING FOR THEIR OWN 
IN-HOUSE EXPENSES, DOING LITTLE TO FIGHT THIRD WORLD POVERTY. 
 
14. (C) BOSSI PREFERRED TO LINK SUPPLY AND DEMAND.  THE LAW 
CONDITIONS ENTRY OF IMMIGRANTS ON EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.  IN 
THIS WAY, ONLY IMMIGRANTS WITH THE MEANS TO SUPPORT 
THEMSELVES LEGALLY WILL ENTER ITALY.  THIS SHOULD, HE HOPED, 
IMPROVE JOB PROSPECTS FOR ITALIANS.  THIS WAS BY NO MEANS AN 
ANTI-FOREIGN OR RACIST PROVISION.  RATHER, IT WAS INTENDED TO 
SLOW THE ENTRY OF IMMIGRANTS TO A PACE THAT ITALY COULD 
ABSORB. ""WE KNOW THE WORLD IS CHANGING.  WE CAN ATTEMPT TO 
CONTROL ONLY THE SPEED OF THAT CHANGE.""  IT WAS IN NO ONE'S 
INTEREST TO SEE RELIGIOUS CONFLICT, A CLASH OF CULTURES, 
EXPLAINED BOSSI. 
 
EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE CONVENTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4582 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  03639  03 OF 03  231627Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AGRE-00  AID-00   ACQ-00   CA-01    CEA-01 
      CIAE-00  COME-00  CTME-00  DINT-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EXIM-01  E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00 
      VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   INSE-00  ITC-01 
      LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OCS-03 
      OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  VO-03 
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00 
        /017W 
                  ------------------CF2A7F  231627Z /38 
P 231625Z JUL 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5041 
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
AMCONSUL MILAN 
AMCONSUL NAPLES 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 003639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2012 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB ECON PINR ELAB IT EUN ITPGOV EUN ITPGOV EUN ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: BOSSI ON ITALIAN POLITICS, DEVOLUTION, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE EU 
 
15. (C) BOSSI WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE EU BECOME A ""LOOSE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  03639  03 OF 03  231627Z 
CONFEDERATION.""  HE IS CONVINCED THAT ""THE LEFT PLANS TO USE 
THE CONVENTION TO CREATE A SUPERSTATE, A UNITED STATES OF 
EUROPE, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THEY WILL ACHIEVE THIS.""   THE 
PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT, ADDING COUNTRIES, WILL PREVENT TIGHT 
CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOWER THE RISK FOR CONFLICT WITH THE U.S. 
THAT COULD RESULT FROM A MORE POWERFUL, CENTRALLY-GOVERNED EU. 
 
16. (C) ENLARGEMENT, EXPLAINED BOSSI, WILL CAUSE ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS FOR EXISTING MEMBERS AND NEW ENTRANTS.  THE EU 
STRUCTURAL FUNDS HAVE POURED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS INTO THE 
ITALIAN SOUTH, BOSSI NOTED, AND THIS WOULD END WITH EU 
ENLARGEMENT.  FEDERALISM WOULD BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT -- IT 
WAS ESSENTIAL TO MOVE DECISION-MAKING AND RESPONSIBILITY 
CLOSER TO CITIZENS. 
 
17. (C) THE INITIAL IDEA OF MANY IN THE EU, HE SAID, WAS THAT 
NEW MEMBERS WOULD PROVIDE LARGE NEW MARKETS.  IN BOSSI'S 
VIEW, HOWEVER, MAASTRICHT TARGETS WILL PROVE DIFFICULT AND 
EXPENSIVE TO MEET FOR THESE NEW ENTRANTS.  ""HOW WILL A 
COUNTRY SUCH AS POLAND LOWER ITS FISCAL DEFICIT TO THREE 
PERCENT OF GDP, LOWER ITS DEBT?"" HE ASKED.  NECESSARY 
ECONOMIC MEASURES TO MEET THESE TARGETS MAY BE SO DIFFICULT 
AND COSTLY THAT SOME CANDIDATES MAY CONSIDER EU MEMBERSHIP 
TOO EXPENSIVE.  BOSSI WAS IN FAVOR OF REVISING THE STABILITY 
PACT TARGETS.  HE STRESSED ""YOU CAN,T COMPETE WITH YOUR 
HANDS TIED BEHIND YOUR BACK.  THESE NEW COUNTRIES ARE FACING 
THAT PROBLEM.  MINISTER TREMONTI UNDERSTANDS THIS ENTIRE 
ISSUE VERY WELL."" 
 
18. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE CONVENTION WOULD 
CHANGE EU DECISIONMAKING. BOSSI THOUGHT NOT.  ""THE CURRENT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  03639  03 OF 03  231627Z 
SYSTEM GIVES EVEN SMALL COUNTRIES THE RIGHT TO VETO MEASURES 
AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS.  THIS VETO PREVENTS THE CREATION OF 
THE EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE THAT THE LEFT WANTS.""  NOTING THAT 
THE TRADITION OF NATION STATES IS VERY STRONG IN EUROPE, 
BOSSI SUGGESTED THAT MEMBER STATES NEEDED TO RETAIN A VETO IN 
EU DECISIONS. 
 
BOSSI'S VIEW OF PRESIDENT BUSH 
------------------------------ 
 
19. (C) BOSSI SEVERAL TIMES EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE U.S. 
FEDERAL SYSTEM AND, IN PARTICULAR, FOR PRESIDENT BUSH.  HE 
RECOUNTED THAT, IN 1999, THE GOVERNMENT HAD SENT HIM TO 
BELGRADE TO TALK TO MILOSOVIC, TO PERSUADE HIM TO NEGOTIATE. 
 ""MILOSOVIC WAS A VERY SMART MAN, BUT HE DIDN'T RECOGNIZE 
THAT THE WORLD HAD CHANGED.  HE NEVER ACCEPTED THE WESTPHALIA 
TREATY.  HE BELIEVED THAT EVERY KING HAD AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO 
RULE HIS COUNTRY AS HE WISHED.  I WENT, KNOWING THAT I'D LOSE 
VOTES IF I FAILED.  I KNEW I WAS BEING SET UP TO FAIL.  I 
HOPED, HOWEVER, TO BRING OUT AT LEAST ONE OF THE THREE 
AMERICAN SERVICEMEN THAT MILOSOVIC WAS HOLDING.  I FIGURED I 
COULD GET AT LEAST ONE.  THE IDEA WAS THAT I'D BRING HIM TO 
ITALY, AND GOV. BUSH WOULD TAKE HIM TO THE U.S. FROM THERE. 
BUT MILOSOVIC DID NOT MAKE A DEAL.  AND HE GAVE THE AMERICANS 
TO JESSE JACKSON.""  BOSSI, BASED ON HIS CONTACT WITH FUTURE 
PRESIDENT BUSH, BEGAN TO STUDY HIM. ""I FOUND MYSELF ATTRACTED 
BY A MAN WHO EATS MEXICAN BEANS INSTEAD OF CHINESE FRIED RICE 
LIKE CLINTON.  I ADMIRE HIS WIFE'S DEDICATION TO WORKING ON 
IMPORTANT SOCIAL ISSUES."" 
 
COMMENT: 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  03639  03 OF 03  231627Z 
-------- 
 
20. (C) BOSSI'S STATEMENTS ABOUT MOVING TO A PRESIDENTIAL, 
FEDERALIST SYSTEM WERE TIMELY.  IN RECENT DAYS, WE HAVE HEARD 
DIVERSE OPINIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL.  BOSSI CLEARLY FAVORED 
A STRONG PRESIDENTIAL FIGURE, BALANCED BY EQUALLY STONG 
REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.  HE PUT A POSITIVE SPIN ON 
HIS RECENTLY-ENACTED IMMIGRATION BILL.  THIS LEGISLATION, 
WHICH TIGHTENED IMMIGRATION RULES, WAS SUPPORTED BY MANY WHO 
RESENT FOREIGN COMPETITION FOR ITALIAN JOBS AND INFLUENCE ON 
ITALIAN CULTURE AND VALUES. 
 
21. (C) BOSSI WAS RELAXED AND STRAIGHTFORWARD DURING HIS 
DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR.  HE CAME ACROSS AS A 
PRAGMATIC BUT COMMITTED CONSERVATIVE LEADER IN A COUNTRY 
STILL LARGELY TO HIS LEFT.  HIS COMMENTS ON PRIME MINISTER 
BERLUSCONI, WHOM HE CLEARLY RESPECTS, INDICATED THAT BOSSI 
ACCEPTS HIS SECONDARY POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND 
BELIEVES HIS CONTRIBUTION IS VALUED.  HE REALIZES THAT HIS 
FOUR PERCENT OF THE VOTE DOES NOT MAKE HIM EQUAL PARTNERS IN 
THE COALITION, AND THAT HE CANNOT PUSH BERLUSCONI TOO FAR. 
BOSSI SEEMS COMFORTABLE IN HIS CURRENT ROLE, AND MORE MATURE 
AND REASONABLE THAN HIS OUTSPOKEN PUBLIC IMAGE WOULD SUGGEST. 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
> 
 2002ROME03639 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 

"