This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012 
TAGS: PREL ETTC EPET IZ JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S IRAQ JITTERS 
 
REF: (A) AMMAN JO 3705 (B) AMMAN 1782 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) Repeated public statements by Jordanian FM Muasher and 
PM Abul Ragheb since July 10 denying that Jordan will be used 
as a "launching pad" for U.S. military operations against 
Iraq shed light on GOJ sensitivity to its vulnerabilities 
vis-a-vis Baghdad.  Similarly, on July 13, the GOJ issued a 
clear statement distancing itself from former Crown Prince 
Hassan's participation at a gathering of Iraqi Oppositionists 
in London this past weekend.  There may also have been a 
political angle to the Jordanians' reluctance to put a stop 
to oil smuggling through the Port of Aqaba, at least to the 
extent that it was politically easier to begin than to end 
the smuggling.  With concern about the stalled MEPP as a 
backdrop, the GOJ appears to be recalibrating its familiar 
policy of placating the Iraqis and demonstrating to the 
Jordanian street a degree of independence from domestically 
unpopular U.S. policies.  To calm the immediate uproar, we 
recommend that the Department find an appropriate opportunity 
to say that we have not asked Jordan to take part in any new 
cooperative military activities beyond our routine 
military-to-military relationship.  End Summary. 
 
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Jordan's Vulnerabilities 
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¶2. (C) As senior GOJ officials from the King down routinely 
stress to visitors, the government is extremely nervous about 
the potential domestic repercussions of any visible U.S. 
preparations for a military confrontation with Iraq, or of 
perceived Jordanian participation/collaboration in such 
preparations.  The reasons for this concern are familiar: 
 
     Oil: Through its oil/barter arrangements, Jordan obtains 
all of its oil from Iraq at below world market prices.  A cut 
off of Iraqi oil before, during or after U.S. military action 
could have potentially devastating consequences for Jordan's 
economy. 
 
     MEPP: Without much difficulty, the Iraqis could step up 
the drumbeat of radical pronouncements on the MEPP, with 
disruptive consequences for Jordan.  At its most extreme, 
this could turn into a campaign to destabilize Jordan by 
labeling the GOJ a lackey of the U.S. in the "suppression" of 
the Palestinian Intifada -- a hot button issue for most of 
the Jordanian population.  As long as average Jordanians view 
the GOJ as weak on support for the Palestinians, the 
government will see itself as vulnerable to pressure from 
Iraq (and other radical states). 
 
¶3. (C) Periodically, events (or the Iraqis themselves) remind 
the Jordanians that Iraq has the power to do a great deal of 
mischief if it chooses.  The vulnerabilities noted above are 
realities that the GOJ keeps in mind as it seeks to protect 
its national interests in the region's political rapids. 
Indirectly, they also help explain the GOJ's recent public 
statements and other policy stances. 
 
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Leaks Generate Frequent Jordanian Denials 
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¶4. (U) Over the past week, senior Jordanian officials have 
gone out of their way to  refute the proposition -- sourced 
by the press to U.S. officials -- that Jordan will be used as 
a U.S. "launching pad" for future military operations against 
Iraq.  In interviews with local, regional, and international 
media (including the NYTimes on July 10), and most recently 
at the conclusion of the Arab League Follow-Up Committee 
meeting in Cairo on July 12, FM Muasher "categorically denied 
any plans between Jordan and the United States in this 
regard."  PM Ali Abul Ragheb, in a July 11 Press Conference 
(given prominent coverage in the local pro-government media), 
echoed and amplified the message: "Jordan does not allow and 
will not allow in the future its territory and airspace to be 
used to interfere in the affairs of any other Arab country, 
particularly fraternal Iraq." 
 
¶5. (U) Both the FM and PM in their public statements have 
also contended that there are "no U.S. troops on Jordanian 
soil," and the local press reported that FM Muasher told the 
Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan that he could "visit any military 
base at any time to personally verify the veracity of the 
Jordanian statements."  A tour is being arranged for Azraq 
AFB. 
 
¶6. (S) The Ambassador, in meetings July 10 and 11, told both 
Muasher and Abul Ragheb that their statements denying any 
U.S.troop presence in Jordan were neither factually correct 
(given our long-standing training and exercise program) nor 
sustainable.  Muasher's response was that this problem began 
because "someone in the Pentagon had leaked materials on 
preparations for an assault on Iraq.  Look, this puts us in a 
very difficult position.  I'm being called by the New York 
Times and others on this. We have no choice but to say what 
we are saying." 
 
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Prince Hassan's London Appearance Adds to the Story 
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¶7. (U) Taking a similar tack, the GOJ July 13 delivered a 
clear public message that former Crown Prince Hassan's 
participation at the London gathering of Iraqi Oppositionists 
was "a personal act  . .  and does not represent official 
policy."  Minister of State for Political Affairs, Mohammed 
Adwan, in a statement carried by the official Petra News 
Agency, and given prominent above-the-fold coverage in the 
July 14 local press, stated "We were surprised at the 
participation, which neither the leadership nor the 
government had any prior knowledge of, and which does not 
conform to the principled Jordanian stand on brotherly Iraq." 
 
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Humanitarian Flights and Oil Smuggling 
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¶8. (S) The barrage of public statements by senior GOJ 
officials this past week are not the only evidence of the 
wary "neighborliness" the GOJ seeks to maintain with Iraq. 
This policy often has an overtly economic or commercial 
component.   Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) has continued its 
humanitarian flights from Amman to Baghdad at about 4-5 per 
week. This represents a small downward trend in flight 
frequency since the Embassy demarched the GOJ in mid-June 
that RJ's Baghdad flights threatened to become a regular 
commercial transaction and needed to be scaled back.  (The 
DCM raised this issue again with the FM's office on July 15 
and pressed for further and faster reductions.) 
 
¶9. (C) Similarly, after almost a month's hiatus, there was a 
renewed attempt to smuggle illegal Iraqi oil from the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba (ref a) at the beginning of July. 
While this case appears to have been stopped successfully, it 
suggests the allurements to fudging policy (and the truth) 
that Iraq offers Jordanian officials.  We can only assume 
that some Jordanians, whether officials or private citizens, 
have benefited from the smuggling that has taken place.  The 
scheme inevitably created a political dynamic, however, and 
it was no doubt easier to start the exercise than to stop it. 
 
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Comment and Recommendation 
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¶10. (S) The actions and statements outlined above bear 
careful watching, but we know from contacts with the King and 
other senior officials that they do not represent any 
fundamental change in Jordanian policy.  They would love to 
see Saddam go, but in the meantime they must live next to 
him.  They are the latest developments in the long-continued 
balancing act that Jordan must carry out to protect its 
interests.  The perceived deadlock in the MEPP (current 
diplomatic activities notwithstanding), the disappointment, 
frustration and anger many Jordanians feel regarding the 
plight of the Palestinians in the face of Israeli 
reoccupation, and the continued economic difficulties Jordan 
faces as a result of the Intifada and the global economic 
slowdown heighten the GOJ's perception that on issues 
relating to Iraq, it has to tread very carefully.  We will 
see a similar pattern whenever U.S.-Iraq confrontation 
intensifies. 
 
¶11. (S) Embassy Recommendation: To deal with the immediate 
irritant on Iraq -- the stories reportedly tying Jordan to 
U.S. military preparations against Saddam Hussein -- we 
recommend that the Department find an opportunity to say that 
we have not approached the Jordanians with requests for 
military cooperation beyond our routine military-to-military 
contacts. 
Gnehm