This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2007 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THREE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES--OLD WINE IN 
NEW BOTTLES 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: INEC registered three new political parties 
June 22, bringing the total of approved parties to six. 
However, this doubling of the number of parties does not 
represent liberalization of the political landscape. At least 
two of the three parties, the NDP and the UNPP, are tied to 
former Head of State Babangida.  The AGPA is more of a 
mystery. There is some indication of Babangida's involvement, 
as some believe the party is the former general's bridge to 
the Southeast. Still others think President Obasanjo's 
strategists registered the party to divide the Southeast in 
order to douse the prospect of a North-Southeast alliance 
against Obasanjo's presidential candidacy.  In any event, the 
new parties are laden with former military officers as well 
as civilians who had attained comfortable niches under 
various military regimes.  INEC did not register any of the 
less establishment-oriented parties that could have injected 
fresh blood into the electoral contests.  In the end, the 
decision to register only these parties will assure that 
closed shop, politics-as-usual will be the dominant force 
during the upcoming election season.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
completed the party registration exercise on June 22, by 
certifying three new parties: the All Progressives Grand 
Alliance (APGA), the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the 
United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP). Among the 24 parties 
that failed to make the cut were the NCP, led by veteran 
pro-democracy advocate Gani Fawehinmi and the PRP headed by 
progressive Northern political veteran, former Kaduna State 
Governor Balarabe Musa. 
 
 
¶3. (C) The registration of the NDP and UNPP is not surprising 
but the AGPA validation was unexpected. Both the UNPP and the 
NDP have been linked to Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) and power 
structures of both groups are peopled with his acolytes. The 
UNPP has several retired senior military officers and former 
military Vice-President under Babangida, Augustus Aikhomu, is 
the Chairman of the UNPP's Board of Trustees. Both the UNPP 
and NDP have significant numbers of South/South political 
personalities and some Southeasterners. The NDP seems to have 
more Northerners in the formal party hierarchy than the UNDP. 
 The AGPA appears to be heavily Igbo influenced but none of 
the Igbo major leaguers are formally involved.  It is not 
immediately clear who are the heavy hitters, if any, behind 
the APGA. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Discussions with UNPP and NDP members reveal strong 
attachment to IBB.  Former Senator Dangana Ndayako, a 
founding member of the PDP and now a charter member of the 
NDP, told Polcouns that he and most party organizers 
supported an IBB candidacy.  Two veteran reporters of the 
Nigerian political scene told the Ambassador that the 
euphoria in front of INEC headquarters when the approval of 
the three parties was publicly announced resembled a 
Babangida pep-rally.  Appearing in equal numbers with party 
banners were those calling for IBB to run in 2003.  UNPP and 
NDP party members spent as much time vocalizing their support 
for Babangida as celebrating their parties' successful 
registration. APGA members were much more restrained. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
The UNPP - A Party and One-Half 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ironically, by the time it was formally registered, 
the UNPP should have ceased to exist; it had previously 
merged with the APP to form the ANPP.  However, that merger 
was de facto not de jure.  With its successful registration, 
the UNPP is not only united with the APP in practice; it also 
retains its own distinct corporate existence as well.  Unless 
INEC abrogates the merger on the basis that the UNPP had no 
legal existence at the time of the merger, the UNPP will 
enjoy the political equivalent of having its cake and eating 
it too. While unique, this duality is also causing tension 
within the UNPP. Some UNPP members, who did not benefit from 
the merger, are claiming that the merger was a nullity and 
that, by their very actions, those UNPP members who favored 
the union have exited the party. 
 
 
 
 
 ¶6.  (C) Babangida allies who participated in the UNPP-APP 
merger into the ANPP are working to block former Head of 
State Buhari from capturing the ANPP nomination. Thus, in 
addition to influencing ANPP positions, the UNPP can still do 
its own thing as an independent party.  One member of the APP 
before the merger told Polcouns in early July that 
Babangida's influence in the party has risen due to the UNPP 
influx and that Babangida will be one of the major factors 
determining who gets the party's nomination. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
The AGPA- A Babangida Ploy, an Obasanjo Ruse, or Both? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
¶7. (U) Taken at face value, the AGPA represents Igbo 
agitation for an Igbo President in 2003.  In the end it 
probably will not be a major factor unless allied with 
another party.  A Southeastern-based party with a one-issue 
platform (the ethnic identity of the President) does not have 
sufficient gravitational pull to stand alone.  The situation 
changes if the party is allied with a Northern-oriented 
group, recreating the old North-Southeast axis. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Here is where intrigue knocks at the door.  Professor 
Ukandi Damachi, an intelligent, information peddler and 
consummate Babangida strap-hanger, recounted to Ambassador 
Jeter a July 5 meeting Damachi had with Babangida.  Damachi 
jokingly told the former Head of State that with the 
registration of the UNPP and the NDP, Babangida had fathered 
twins.  The former Head of State corrected Damachi, saying 
with a grin that he had "triplets," adding the APGA to the 
parties under his wing. However, an opposite spin on the 
APGA's pedigree was offered by Gani Fawehinmi.  Fawehinmi, a 
staunch Obasanjo critic who has repeatedly called for the 
President's resignation, believes the APGA is Obasanjo's 
artifice to divide the Southeast and the Igbo vote.  He 
claimed Obasanjo will try to bully and buy off APGA party 
officials so that the group will nominate him, thus 
undermining the solidarity of the call for an Igbo president. 
(Comment: Due to the convoluted nature of politics here, 
plausibly both Damachi and Fawehinmi are partially right. In 
that so much of what happens in determining the control of 
the party depends on who is the highest bidder, both the 
Obasanjo camp and Babangida may be trying to woo the AGPA for 
divergent reasons: IBB wants to build the North-Southeast 
Axis while Obasanjo seeks to prevent it. End Comment.). 
 
 
¶9. (C) During a July 17 call on the Ambassador, 
representatives from the APGA (5 members of the National 
Executive Committee, including one-time presidential 
candidate Sarah Djibril) claimed that AGPA was the only party 
with no ties to the military elite.  The APGA leadership 
disavowed that it was an Igbo dominated body, but with half 
of its leadership from the Southeast, that argument was not 
convincing.  We do note that the second-in-command hails from 
Niger State, Babangida's home.  This may be happenstance, but 
it gives rise to suspicions that IBB has access to APGA. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Losing Side of Party Registration 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (U) Ostensibly to advance the constitutional requirement 
that new parties reflect "federal character" (ethnic and 
regional diversity), INEC developed criteria to validate 
party registrations.  The requirements included having 
offices in 24 states, filing affidavits that no members 
belong to any other party, establishing a transparent process 
for the election of national representatives and holding 
party membership open to all Nigerians. 
 
 
¶11. (C) The goal of achieving "federal character" collided 
with the goal of opening the political space so that people 
with alternative ideas might compete in the electoral 
process. One disgruntled human rights activist caviled that 
someone who had creative ideas for improving his local 
community in Lagos was faced with a Hobson's choice.  Either 
that person would have to form a party and accumulate 
sufficient funds to "establish an office in Bauchi" and other 
far-flung places or, alternatively, join an existing 
political party.  While the latter option would save money, 
the person would still have to bribe existing party officials 
to win the party's nomination.  By committing that initial 
transgression, the person would be steadily infected by the 
politics of corruption.  An isolated individual is no match 
and will be engulfed by Nigeria's system of moneyed politics, 
the activist lamented. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Human rights activists not only bemoan the fact that 
the registration did not create more opportunities for 
political participation, many believe the registration 
process was retrogressive.  These Nigerians point to the fact 
that IBB is bankrolling the UNPP, the NDP and perhaps the 
AGPA while also having placed a firm down payment to buy 
influence in the ANPP. Meanwhile Obasanjo's team is trying to 
strengthen control of the PDP and perhaps the APGA. 
Additionally, while attempting to fortify their positions 
within the various parties they influence, both likely will 
spend money to weaken each other and cause dissent in the 
heart of the others' camp. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶13. (C) Many cynical Nigerians believe that INEC is not a 
free agent and the approval of the three parties was 
engineered by Obasanjo to fragment the strongest pockets of 
his opposition. For example, by registering the NDP he drives 
a wedge in the North and upper Middle Belt between the older 
Northern politicians in the ANPP and the younger ones in the 
NDP. Although the APP and UNPP have announced their merger 
creating the ANPP, a formal union has not yet taken place. 
Obasanjo's team will work hard to scuttle the union, in order 
to keep his opposition as divided as possible. As earlier 
stated, registering the AGPA may also be Obasanjo's way of 
keeping the Igbo's from gathering under one tent. 
 
 
¶14. (C) Under a more charitable analysis, INEC did a credible 
job registering the parties that satisfy the guidelines.  As 
one INEC official put it, "We know which parties are 
serious." However, pro-democracy activists counter that the 
electorate, not INEC should determine whether a party is 
"serious" or not. This criticism carries some merit.  While 
INEC may have been pursuing the laudable goal of "federal 
character", its decision may have paid inadequate attention 
to political openness.  For example, none of the 
"progressive" parties based in the Southwest or North were 
approved.  While these parties have no chance of taking the 
election, their campaigns would have likely been more 
issue-based than the campaigns of the larger parties. As 
such, they might have put modest "peer pressure" on the major 
parties not to reside totally in the arena of power politics, 
but give some, albeit limited, attention to key economic and 
social issues facing the average Nigerian. However, these 
parties also would have chipped into some of the votes 
Obasanjo would likely win. 
JETER