This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  IS THE STATE OF EMERGENCY NECESSARY? 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1007 
 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 0695 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 0540 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 0968 
     ¶E. (E) KATHMANDU 740 
     ¶F. (F) KATHMANDU 731 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) When Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba decided to 
dissolve Parliament, he cited MPs' refusal to extend the 
state of national emergency as a primary reason (Ref A). 
Legal experts and others, however, hold different opinions on 
the continued need of the state of emergency, as Parliament 
passed legislation granting the security forces many of the 
emergency powers to fight the Maoists--minus restrictions on 
civil liberties.   End summary. 
 
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SAFETY AND SECURITY UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY 
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¶2.  (SBU)  The state of national emergency, first declared by 
King Gyanendra November 26 after Maoist insurgents 
unilaterally broke a four-month cease-fire, has been in 
continuous operation in Nepal (minus a 24-hour lapse in 
mid-May following the dissolution of Parliament) for nearly 
seven months.  The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has undoubtedly 
made gains against Maoist insurgents since November, and its 
deployment has boosted casualty statistics steadily upward. 
Residents of Kathmandu generally feel that security in the 
city--after a precipitous dip from December-April--has 
improved markedly.  Businessmen report a decline in extortion 
attempts, and the incidence of urban bomb-blasts, a staple of 
the December and April general strikes, has dropped off 
sharply. More and more people are out on the streets at 
night, and businesses are open later.  Other major cities 
also report a lessening of tension.  Not far from the 
Kathmandu Valley, however, the situation can be vastly 
different, where some communities outside heavily fortified 
district headquarters are largely left to fend for themselves 
against marauding Maoists, especially at night.  Many police 
posts in more remote areas have been abandoned, as the police 
consolidate their positions in more populated areas, often 
side by side with Army positions.  Curfews are selectively 
applied on a district-by-district basis.  At least two people 
have been shot and killed in the troubled district of Dang in 
southwestern Nepal for violating the curfew there. 
Kathmandu, on the other hand, has no official curfew, 
although most residents, shopkeepers and businesses observe, 
by tacit consent, an unofficial curfew of 9:00 p.m., 
although, as mentioned above, this appears to be being 
relaxed.  Members of Kathmandu's business elite--many of whom 
faced threats and extortion before the emergency--generally 
approve of the clampdown,  although some grumble that curfews 
 and ubiquitous check-points cut into the tourism and 
entertainment industries' profits.  The state of emergency 
has the full backing of Kathmandu's business leaders, as 
exemplified by the heads of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industries. 
 
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DO YOU NEED AN ORDINANCE WHEN YOU HAVE AN ACT? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  After ratifying the state of emergency in 
February, thereby ensuring its continuation until May 25, 
Parliament passed the Terrorist and Destructive Activities 
Act April 4, that codified into law many of the emergency 
provisions contained in the royal ordinance (Ref B).  The Act 
was intended to allow the Government to continue the fight 
against the insurgents without continued imposition of the 
state of emergency and to fulfill commitments under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373 to take steps to combat 
terrorism (Ref C).  Both the Act and the ordinance maintain 
the same definitions of "terrorist" and "terrorist 
activities," grant sweeping powers to members of the security 
forces, including the Army, to arrest without charge and/or 
hold in preventive detention suspected terrorists,  and 
reserve the same penalties for commission of terrorist acts. 
(Note:  While both the Act and the emergency ordinance allow 
the military to detain people, neither explicitly permits the 
army to hold detainees for extended periods.  Instead, the 
military is supposed to turn over detainees to civilian 
authorities within 24 hours, according to the Ministry of Law 
and Justice.  We have learned, however, that in many cases 
the military sidesteps this requirement either by ignoring it 
completely or by obtaining notification from the relevant 
civilian authority--often the Chief District Officer--that 
the jails are full, which, unfortunately, they often are. 
End note.) 
 
¶4.  (U) The Act does, however, differ from the ordinance in 
some procedural aspects, according to Dili Raj Ghimire, Under 
Secretary at the Ministry of Law and Justice.  For example, 
 
SIPDIS 
the Act stipulates that suspects should be arrested only if 
there is "reasonable grounds" for suspicion of guilt, 
although the law does not define "reasonable grounds."  The 
Act allows members of the security forces to "search any 
house, shop, warehouse, transport vehicle or any other place 
belonging to any person whomsoever at any time" or "any 
person or goods that the person is carrying with him" as long 
as "notice"--not necessarily a warrant--is given (whether 
before, during or after the search is not stipulated). 
Suspects arrested under the Act must be produced before the 
court within 60 days (although they can be held in preventive 
detention for 90 days, as long as the place of detention has 
the basic amenities of light, water, sufficient air, etc.). 
The ordinance, on the other hand, places no limit upon the 
time before a suspect's first court appearance, and allows 
the period of preventive detention to be extended for an 
additional 90 days.  For the most part, provisions of the Act 
provide greater safeguards for the rights of the accused, 
Ghimire emphasized.  Perhaps the most significant difference 
between the Act and ordinance is that the Act, according to 
Law Secretary Udaya Nepali Shrestha, does not abridge basic 
civil liberties, such as freedom of press and freedom of 
assembly, and the right to pursue judicial remedy.  Sindhu 
Nath Pyakurel, Chairman of the Nepal Bar Association, echoed 
the Secretary's interpretation, adding his view that 
imposition of a state of emergency is not necessary to 
enforce the provisions of the Act. 
 
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THE PM DOES 
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¶5.  (C)  At some point, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba 
seems to have shared the view that the emergency ordinance 
had been made largely redundant by passage of the Act.  Upon 
his May 15 return from his headline-grabbing visits to the 
U.S. and UK, he was quoted by local reporters as asserting 
the emergency--due to expire a mere ten days later--"isn't 
necessary to combat terrorism."  Within a week, however, and 
after extensive discussions with the security chiefs (and, 
some believe, the Palace), Deuba reversed his public position 
radically, and was pushing, against the apparent opposition 
of most MPs in his party, for a six-month extension of the 
emergency.  Deuba subsequently asked the King to dissolve 
Parliament and call fresh elections (Ref A).  Although Deuba 
confided to the Ambassador that his primary motive in moving 
against Parliament was to avert a no-confidence motion (Ref 
A), the PM's May 24 public address to the nation focused on 
extension of the emergency--and the danger that would befall 
the nation in its absence--as his most important reason.  He 
told the public he wanted to extend the emergency to "keep 
morale high and continue the successes achieved by the 
security forces against the terrorists and continue the 
campaign against terrorism."  Continuing the emergency was 
important "for the protection of democratic system and the 
strengtheninng of national security to defeat the 
terrorists."  The ruling party's failure to support 
extension, on the other hand, "boosted up the morale of the 
terrorists"; those opposed to extension "were working for the 
fulfillment of the terrorists' wishes." 
 
¶6.  (C)  In spite of the importance the PM publicly claimed 
to attach to extension of the emergency, he has never 
discussed in detail the perceived deficiencies of the Act in 
prosecuting the insurgency.  One former member of the PM's 
Cabinet, while acknowledging the PM's legitimate fear of a 
no-confidence motion, commented that the PM should have been 
more willing to give the Act "a chance" to determine its 
effectiveness in countering the insurgency before insisting 
on the emergency.  Deuba's about-face, his former colleague 
observed, puts him in the paradoxical position of arguing on 
the one hand that conditions in the country are so dangerous 
that extension of the state of emergency is necessary while 
positing on the other that conditions in the country are safe 
enough to hold national elections.  Other observers have 
criticized the PM for calling national elections at the same 
time that the Government opted to postpone local body 
elections--due to have been held in May--for security reasons. 
 
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THE ARMY'S ARGUMENT 
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¶7.  (C) Given the compressed sequence of consultations 
following Deuba's return to Nepal in May, some observers have 
speculated that the military influenced the PM to insist on 
the emergency.  (Comment:  Another scenario is that the PM, 
convinced that his political rivals would persist in trying 
to unseat him, chose extension of the state of emergency--an 
issue on which he was certain of support from the Army and 
the Palace--as a pretext to stage a showdown.  End comment.) 
Maj. Gen. Rukmungud Katuwal told the Ambassador that RNA 
leadership had asked for extension, after exchanging frank 
views with Deuba on the security situation.  Many other 
members of the military leadership have told us they favor 
extension of the state of emergency for a variety of reasons. 
 Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Pyar Jung Thapa told the 
Ambassador he favors retaining the emergency because it is 
useful in partly controlling the press and politicians and 
because he believes the Act weakens security forces' ability 
to perform search and seizure.  He said he would support 
greater flexibility in the state of emergency, making it 
applicable selectively on a district-by-district basis. 
According to Col. Deepak Gurung, head of the RNA's Office of 
Public Affairs, imposition of the emergency makes the Army's 
task easier by prohibiting meetings of more than four 
persons, eliminating the possibility of strikes, allowing 
extended periods of detention and permitting searches without 
warrants.  (As noted in Para 4 above, the Act grants 
extensive powers of search to security forces.)  A civilian 
Ministry of Defense spokesman, speaking off the record, 
agreed that the Act and the emergency contain nearly 
identical provisions, and speculated that the RNA wants 
continuation of the emergency as a way of suppressing 
unfavorable coverage in the press.  Law Under Secretary 
Ghimire commented that, absent the emergency, the security 
forces "would have a lot of trouble" from people pressing 
cases in court against illegal detention, false arrest, etc. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C)  While the Prime Minister moved to dissolve 
Parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence, he has gone on 
record as citing the need for an extended state of emergency 
as his principal motivation.  This emphasis has resulted, not 
surprisingly, in heightened scrutiny of the emergency's 
protracted restictions on civil rights.  The simultaneous 
suspension of civil rights and dissolution of 
Parliament--complicated by the uncertain prospect of 
elections occurring on schedule--put Nepal's already fragile 
democratic institutions under significant strain. 
MALINOWSKI