This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002999 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA, PRM AND DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2012 
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT: UNRWA'S UXO REMOVAL EFFORTS IN JENIN CAMP STYMIED 
BY LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND EXPLOSIVES 
 
REF: JERUSALEM 1271 
 
Classified By: DCM Greg Berry, per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
(U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Tel Aviv and 
ConGen Jerusalem. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and Comment:  UNRWA's efforts to remove 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) from Jenin refugee camp remain 
severely hindered by the UN agency's inability to procure the 
necessary equipment and explosives.  UNRWA requested Israeli 
authorization to use the equipment and explosives verbally in 
mid-April and in writing on April 23.  UNRWA has not yet 
received any response from the IDF.  However, Israeli 
authorities on June 5 agreed to UNRWA's long-standing request 
to hold technical meetings on UXO removal during the week of 
June 10.  Resolution of the equipment issue is crucial. 
Without the proper equipment and explosives, UNRWA can only 
defuse the UXO and either leave it in place or bury it in an 
undisclosed location.  Both options leave the possibility 
that refugees or UNRWA staff could be injured, or Palestinian 
fighters could find and retrieve the UXO.  Neither 
possibility advances U.S. or Israeli interests, and both 
leave UNRWA open to charges of "complicity" in terrorism. 
End Summary and Comment. 
 
¶2.  (C) In June 4 and 5 telcons, UNRWA West Bank field 
director Richard Cook briefed regional refcoord on UNRWA's 
continuing, unsuccessful efforts to procure the equipment 
necessary to remove unexploded ordnance (UXO) from Jenin 
refugee camp.  Cook reported that the situation had changed 
little since mid-April, when the IDF pulled out of Jenin camp 
and UNRWA first requested Israeli assistance.  Although a 
Norwegian demining team had conducted the first UXO removal 
in late April (ref), and UNRWA currently has a four-person 
demining team (one French UNMAS employee, and a 
Swedish-funded team comprised of two British nationals with 
extensive IED experience and a Swedish medic), their efforts 
are severely hampered by the lack of equipment.  As UNRWA had 
explained previously, UXO cannot be disposed of properly 
without explosives.  Citing security concerns, Israeli 
authorities have not granted UNRWA permission to procure the 
explosives. 
 
¶3.  (C) Cook said that, without the explosives and related 
equipment, UNRWA can move only slowly -- and at great risk -- 
to remove the UXO.  The demining team is having a 
particularly difficult time with improvised explosive devices 
(IED's) and unidentified manufactured devices.  Without the 
explosives, the team can only defuse them and then either 
leave them in place or bury them.  As Cook noted, neither 
option is attractive.  Leaving the UXO in place, with no 
means to control pedestrian flow over the destroyed center of 
the camp, leaves refugees and UNRWA employees in danger of 
injury.  (UNRWA officials told refcoord and visiting 
congressional staffers on May 30 that two refugees had been 
killed and dozens wounded by UXO.  While visiting Jenin camp, 
USG officials observed that there were no barriers around the 
destroyed camp center and no means of preventing refugees 
from traversing the mounds of rubble.  UNRWA officials noted 
that the PA's ability to secure and police the camp had been 
severely reduced by the IDF operations in Jenin.)  Defusing 
and burying the UXO -- albeit in an undisclosed location -- 
leaves open the possibility that Palestinian fighters could 
find and use it.  It also leaves UNRWA open to charges of 
"complicity" in terrorism.  Nevertheless, Cook said, UNRWA 
has no choice but to move ahead without the equipment.  It 
cannot start rubble removal and reconstruction efforts until 
the UXO is identified and defused. 
 
¶4.  (C) Cook detailed UNRWA's unsuccessful efforts to secure 
Israeli permission to obtain the necessary explosives and 
equipment.  Immediately following the Israeli withdrawal from 
Jenin, UNRWA first approached the IDF with a verbal request 
to provide the equipment and explosives required for UXO 
removal.  The IDF informed UNRWA that it would engage in 
discussions with UNRWA only if UNRWA agreed to provide the 
Israeli government with a complete record (including 
photographs) of all UXO found in the camp.  UNRWA responded 
that it would only turn over the record to the Israeli 
government after all UXO recovery operations had been 
completed.  Cook said UNRWA did not want to put its UXO 
disposal team (the Norwegian team) in any danger, as 
cooperation with the IDF during the UXO removal process 
would, in the eyes of Jenin camp residents, compromise 
UNRWA's neutrality.  UNRWA followed this verbal approach with 
an April 23 written request to the IDF, to which it has not 
received a response. 
 
¶5.  (C) UNRWA then approached an Israeli private company, 
Goldtec, hoping to contract its services to remove the UXO. 
Goldtec told UNRWA it can supply the equipment, but needs IDF 
authorization to use explosives within Jenin refugee camp. 
According to Cook, Goldtec has not received any response to 
its initial inquiries with Israeli government authorities. 
¶6.  (C) Cook emphasized to refcoord that UNRWA is trying to 
be reasonable, and would like to engage the Israelis in 
discussions over its specific security concerns.  For 
example, UNRWA would be willing to store the explosives 
outside Jenin refugee camp, under IDF control, and transport 
them to and from the camp at the beginning and end of each 
workday.  Cook reported that the IDF had agreed on June 5 to 
UNRWA's long-standing request to hold technical meetings on 
UXO removal during the week of June 10.  He is hopeful that 
the meeting will produce results, but asked that the U.S. 
raise UXO with Israeli authorities if the meeting is not 
productive. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Equipment still required by UNRWA includes: 
 
-     1 x-ray inspector and processor 
-     1 recoilless disrupter and dearmer 
-     1 fiberoptic endoscope/boroscope kit 
-     10 boxes of x-ray film 
-     75 kg high explosives 
-     400 electric detonators 
-     400 m detonating cord 
-     200 electrically initiated cartridges for the dearmer 
-     20 m explosive cutting tape or charge linear cutting 
(CLC) 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment: Continuation of the status quo -- slow, 
dangerous UXO defusing operations without proper disposal -- 
serves neither U.S. nor Israeli interests.  It also leaves 
UNRWA unfairly and unnecessarily vulnerable to charges of 
"complicity" in terrorism.  End comment. 
Gnehm