This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 001850 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 06/14/12 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A RETURN TO REGIONAL ELECTORAL POLITICS 
 
 
REF: A) ABUJA 852 B) ABUJA 1068 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE TIM ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A current snapshot of presidential 
electioneering shows two contesting strategies, one devised 
by the President's camp, the other by his strongest 
opposition. The President appears content to steamroll the 
PDP nomination through tightening his grip on the party 
apparatus. To win the general election, his team will 
exploit the powers of incumbency, cut as many "mutual 
support pacts" with other incumbents as possible, and 
attempt to keep the opposition fragmented. On the other side 
of the battlements, the most serious opposition strategy 
hearkens to the regionally-centered electoral calculus of 
the past. Powerbrokers are huddling to recreate the 
Northwest-Southeast axis that formed the winning 
presidential ticket in every election save 1993 and 1999. 
However, selecting a ticket palatable to most key opposition 
players will be difficult. Another possible twist is whether 
the presidential candidate will be from the Southeast 
(Igbo), with the running mate from the Northwest. Both 
inherently cynical and overtly power-driven, these 
strategies discount the average voter and eschew substantive 
issues. In doing so, they throttle genuine democratization 
and may exacerbate disillusionment among large segments of 
public. End Summary. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
A HISTORIC CHANCE BEING SPENT 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) The 1999 election was as much a referendum against 
continued military rule as it was a vote for Obasanjo. 
Handed the blank canvas of this negative mandate, Obasanjo 
came to office with high hopes on the public's part that he 
could paint a picture of a more democratic, productive 
Nigeria. However, he has failed to develop a positive 
mandate, and his supporters increasingly cast the next 
elections in negative terms also: Don't let the bad guys 
come back. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Reftel A mentioned that Obasanjo needed to devote 
more attention to taking care of domestic policy imperatives 
and mending political fences. This meant fewer journeys 
abroad and more consultations at home. He apparently did not 
read our cable. In June alone, he will take four 
international trips, some of them with multiple 
destinations. We have not heard reports of him saying 
"sorry" to any of the political figures on whose toes he has 
stepped during the past three years. His popularity 
continues to flag. Recently a group of National Assembly 
members from Obasanjo's PDP wrote party chairmen Ogbeh 
threatening to bolt from the party if Obasanjo won the party 
nomination. Ogbeh has reportedly told the President that 15 
of the 21 PDP governors would prefer a different 
Presidential nominee (This would be a blow to Obasanjo's 
strategy. It also may be a reason that the Presidency 
appears to be rethinking the utility of the deal Obasanjo 
cut with the Governors to hold local government elections in 
August.). 
 
 
¶4. (C) Obasanjo has even managed to fall out with Senate 
President Anyim, previously considered one of the most loyal 
tools in the presidential shed. Anyim has tacitly supported 
the recent impeachment motion against Obasanjo in the 
Senate. While the motion will likely exhaust itself, the 
estrangement of Anyim demonstrates Obasanjo has not lose his 
penchant for turning friends into enemies. 
 
 
¶5. (C) People acknowledge that he works hard but they 
question his sincerity, priorities and effectiveness. For 
many people, he gives the impression of a man feverishly 
running in place when he is not running in a circle. Because 
he is guilty of angering the high and disenchanting the 
humble, he does not have much goodwill. For an incumbent 
whose administration has not lived up to expectation, this 
is a severe vulnerability. If he had retained sufficient 
goodwill, it would be easy for people to excuse him by 
reasoning that the job is very tough or that Obasanjo was 
doing his best but has been ill served by his advisors. 
Right now, most people see the federal government as an 
extension of Obasanjo's personality and view its failures as 
reflecting his own shortcomings. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Outwardly, President Obasanjo seems oblivious to the 
political discontent around him. Part of the reason may be 
that his haughty character disallows much consideration of 
what lesser humans think of him. Another reason is that, in 
his political calculations, public opinion may not matter 
all that much. An American political consultant would advise 
Obasanjo that he needed to go out and win the people's minds 
if not hearts. Yet, Obasanjo does not seem primed to reach 
out and touch. The time is quickly dwindling for such a move 
to be effective. Soon, the intended audience would view any 
such overture as a last minute attempt to curry favor after 
over three years of indifference. 
 
 
¶7. (C) To his critics, Obasanjo has behaved like an autocrat 
wearing democratic garments.  What can be gleaned of his 
campaign strategy at this stage tends to confirm the 
characterization. The first rung of the game plan apparently 
is to suppress serious internal challenge to Obasanjo's 
renomination.  This was the rationale behind the April 
pilgrimage to Obasanjo's farm in Ota by PDP stalwarts to 
"beg" the President to seek another term. That procession 
was engineered by Works Minister Tony Anenih, Nigeria's 
archetypal backroom politician. According to most observers, 
Anenih has not seen a deal he could not cut nor run across a 
principle he would not disavow if the price were right. 
Anenih, now second in command of the reelection campaign 
behind absentee Finance Minister Adamu Ciroma, is not above 
brandishing threats as well. According to one Northern 
governor, Anenih told PDP governors that they could expect 
plums from the Presidency for their personal consumption if 
they came out in support of Obasanjo. However, if they 
failed, they could expect much harsher tidings. In an ironic 
twist, the amoral Minister threatened state executives with 
being called before the anti-corruption panel. 
 
 
¶8. (C) To help entice governors and other elected officials 
to support Obasanjo, the team wants to cut informal mutual 
support agreements with as many incumbents as possible. This 
tack seems to transcend party lines as the Obasanjo team has 
apparently wooed a few AD governors and maybe one or two APP 
state executives. Through these arrangements, the team hopes 
to use the interests of state and local candidates to 
campaign energetically on their own behalf at the grassroots 
level to Obasanjo's advantage. Thus far, this is the closest 
Obasanjo's strategy comes to reaching out to the electorate, 
but it is essentially by proxy. While indirect rule was the 
political system in colonial Nigeria, Obasanjo might just 
add the term "indirect campaigning" to the national lexicon. 
 
 
¶9. (C) The third leg of his strategy is to fragment the 
opposition. Knowing that the toughest opposition is lodged 
in the North, Anenih has tried to coax a few older Northern 
politicians into the Obasanjo camp. The Obasanjo team has 
also tried to thwart Igbo solidarity. Senior-level Igbos in 
the Administration have tried to drive a wedge through Igbo 
land by discouraging talk of an Igbo presidency in 2003. 
Additionally, the President's team has welcomed the likes of 
the odious Senator Arthur Nzeribe who left the APP for the 
PDP. The rich and essentially selfish Nzeribe will back any 
government in power, as long as the price is right. He has 
publicly backed Obasanjo and will likely use his resources 
to pull other Igbos toward Obasanjo. Last, Obasanjo critics 
contend the Presidency, having lost the fight to restrict 
this electoral cycle to the PDP, AD and APP, will now 
pressure the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) to register 5-10 new political parties. According to 
this theory, his team wants numerous opposition parties to 
prevent the President's foes from assembling under one roof. 
The President's supporters reportedly paid some senior UNDP 
and APP figures to scuttle the two parties' planned merger. 
 
 
------------------ 
A COUNTER STRATEGY 
------------------ 
 
 
¶10. (C) Obasanjo's failure to develop an electoral 
constituency and to present a compelling vision for the 
future has both afflicted and helped his opponents. Because 
his cupboard is relatively bare, they have little need to 
fill theirs. Obasanjo's inability has made it easy for his 
detractors to sally backward and find their solutions in the 
politics of the past. His enemies have embraced the tried 
and tested strategy of forging an alliance of two of the 
three politically strategic regions, namely the North and 
the Southeast.  Here, the North serves as a proxy for the 
Northwest, traditionally the politically potent part of the 
region. 
 
 
¶11. Aside: Because of the importance affluence, status and 
age play in Nigerian politics, most of the key players are 
rich older men relatively conservative in outlook. 
Unsurprisingly, many would find succor in the politics of 
old rather than in diving into the uncertainly of a more 
egalitarian set-up. In a different way, Obasanjo also is 
guilty of superimposing the past on the present. Instead of 
being the consensus-building democrat people craved, 
Obasanjo has copied too liberally from how he ruled during 
the late seventies. What was appropriate then is passe now. 
Hailed as an enlightened military ruler years ago, he now is 
criticized by many as a quasi-autocrat with only superficial 
democratic attributes. End Aside. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
ENEMIES TO THE NORTH OF HIM 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) The North is where opposition runs deepest. Northern 
elites feel shortchanged under Obasanjo and fear their 
influence in national politics may be irretrievably lost 
should Obasanjo win another four years. Strategy-minded 
Northerners point out that the combination of Obasanjo- 
Atiku, representing the Southwest and the Northeast, 
respectively, is the antithesis of the regional axis that 
controlled national politics previously. In that Obasanjo 
has registered a lackluster performance and has allegedly 
betrayed their support by ignoring their interests, these 
Northerners see no reason not to revive the old political 
combine. Theirs is essentially a two-step strategy. 
 
 
¶13. (C) First, they seek to coalesce Northern opinion. The 
vehicle for this endeavor is the Arewa Consultative Forum. 
The ACF is not yet united, however, as the rejection by many 
of Sokoto Governor Bafarawa's April speech to the ACF shows. 
But most Northerners do not reject Bafarawa's sharply anti- 
Obasanjo sentiment. The few Northerners who believe that the 
President should be re-elected (usually saying he is the 
least-bad person for the job) are coming under increasing 
pressure to keep their views to themselves.  After tepidly 
endorsing Obasanjo earlier this year, Kaduna governor Ahmed 
Makarfi has been under heavy pressure to recant. Once seen 
as almost a shoe-in for reelection, Makarfi now faces strong 
opposition that has the support of key ACF leaders.  A 
senior Northern politician claimed Makarfi and VP Atiku 
Abubakar were essentially run out of Kafanchan, in southern 
Kaduna State, during a recent campaign swing and that they 
were politely ignored by most people in Makarfi, the 
governor's home LGA. We cannot confirm this assertion. 
 
 
¶14. (C) The second element of this plan is to reach out to 
the Southeast and as an alternative, the South-South. (The 
ethnic and political heterogeneity of the South-South makes 
that region a less cohesive bloc and thus a much less 
attractive partner.) Former Commonwealth Secretary General 
Emeka Anyaoku recently told us a delegation of northerners, 
including Sokoto's Bafarawa, visited him last year. They 
proposed a Northwest-Southeast alliance with him as the 
Presidential candidate. The gentlemanly Anyaoku declined the 
offer, saying that he had no appetite for the hurly-burly of 
Nigerian politics. However, there are more ambitious Igbo 
politicians waiting to chomp on that hook, most notably 
Shehu Shagari's Vice President, Alex Ekwueme. Ekwueme was to 
have succeeded Shagari in 1987, but his dream died when 
Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon seized power. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
ENEMIES TO THE SOUTHEAST OF HIM 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶15. (C) The call for an Igbo president has matured from a 
relative murmur to a loud clamor. The lead social-cultural 
organization Ohaneze Ndigbo and other pan-Igbo groups have 
met. While the groups have not issued official statements, 
most leading members of the organizations have publicly 
endorsed the call. Miscalculations by President Obasanjo and 
Igbos in his administration unwittingly have fed the fire. 
Early on, Transportation Minister Maduekwe had his eyes on 
the governor's seat in Abia State. Other Igbos in the 
Presidency wanted to undermine the growing popularity of 
Abia Governor Kalu to prevent his draw at home from 
eclipsing theirs. To combat this attack, which he felt had 
the Obasanjo seal of approval, Kalu sounded the clarion for 
an Igbo president. It was a masterstroke. By appealing to 
the yearning of the Igbo, who feel they have not be fully 
integrated into the political arena since the civil war, 
Kalu made himself the unofficial spokesperson for the entire 
tribe. This increased his popularity and made his detractors 
seem to be ethnic traitors. An attack on Kalu was perceived 
as an attack against the Igbo in general. Others began to 
pick up the call for the presidency to come to the 
Southeast. Now it has a life of its own, right at the heart 
of political discussion in the Southeast. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
WILL THE OPPOSITION TWAIN MEET? 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶16. (C) While aversion to Obasanjo is strong in both the 
Northwest (and indeed most of the vast and populous former 
Northern Region) and Southeast, striking a deal will be 
difficult and will require many more late night negotiating 
sessions. The Igbos know they will have to deal with the 
North. However, they do not want to be the junior partner 
once again. The Igbos want the lead this time. 
 
 
¶16. (C) The wisest and most experienced Northern elders 
(those no longer engaged in seeking political office) 
believe that the North must not try to re-assume the 
Presidency in 2003. They believe the best hope of sustaining 
Northern influence until 2007 lies in supporting an older, 
not too energetic Igbo (like Ekwueme) for President, with a 
younger Northerner as VP-cum-power behind the throne). They 
believe (probably correctly) that the Igbo will give 80-90% 
of their votes nationwide to a co-ethnic. Fearing that 
Obasanjo's supporters will try to rig elections, they view 
the enormous internal Igbo diaspora as a natural army of 
poll-watchers that will be able to keep the rigging to a 
minimum. Ambitious Northerners who want the keys to Aso 
Villa for themselves, however, ask why the old formula 
(Shagari/Ekwueme (civil rule) and Babangida/Aikhomu 
(military rule)) cannot serve as a tonic for the body 
politic today. This debate will continue among Northern 
actors for some time to come, but the trendline clearly 
favors an Igbo lead. 
 
 
¶17. (C) To bolster their position in talks with the North, 
Igbo leaders are trying to line up the South-South's 
support.  However, getting the fractious South-South 
politicians to agree on anything is difficult. Given 
historical animosities that date back to the transatlantic 
slave trade, getting South-South politicians to agree to 
support an Igbo leader for national office is a Herculean 
task.  The South-South has, during Nigeria's post-colonial 
history, more often aligned with the North, specifically in 
order to advance the one interest upon which its diverse 
peoples seemingly can agree -- resisting domination by the 
more numerous and far more cohesive Igbo.  For its part, the 
North, in order to retain leverage, is also discussing a 
South-South Presidency. Again, the possible candidates are 
older, relatively non-controversial figures. Septuagenarian 
Christian Onoh's name is one that surfaces occasionally. 
 
 
¶18. (C) The predominantly Lagos-based Nigerian media harp on 
Northern domination of national politics.  But Northerners 
have a different perspective.  While conceding that generals 
and politicians from the North have disproportionately held 
the top job since independence, they argue that the North 
has tried since 1993 to engender greater balance.  The North 
voted heavily for Abiola in 1993, they point out: Abiola 
even won his Kano-based opponent's LGA. The North lined up 
behind Obasanjo in 1999; even those opposed to Obasanjo and 
the PDP backed a candidate from the Southwest, Olu Falae. In 
return for their support of Obasanjo, they continue, their 
interests have been ignored.  This was the essence of 
Bafarawa's screed. Many Northerners fear an Igbo Southerner, 
once in office, would treat them as shabbily as has the 
incumbent Yoruba Southerner. For the Igbo to achieve their 
symbol of complete political rehabilitation, they will have 
to allay those Northern fears. For historical reasons, the 
time is not yet ripe for rapprochement between the Southwest 
and the Southeast. So, without the North, an Igbo Presidency 
will remain nothing more than a fond dream. 
 
 
¶19. (C) A close Babangida associate told us recently that 
Former Head of State Babangida is trying to broker a 
solution. The proposed arrangement would reverse the 
regional division of the ticket in 2007 but without the same 
individuals on the ticket. IBB reportedly has Ekweume in 
mind as President and Umaru Shinkafi as the preferred number 
two. IBB reportedly has decided, for now, not to run.  Given 
their age and long experience in supporting roles, IBB 
likely believes both Ekweume and Shinkafi will be pliable 
"team players" and will not seek second terms. This tack 
would preserve a "vacancy at Aso Rock" for 2007, by which 
time, his supporters believe, the controversy surrounding 
IBB will have abated. An Ekwueme/Shinkafi ticket would also 
end most of the (limited) elite support for former Head of 
State Buhari's candidacy. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
WHERE HAVE ALL THE ISSUES GONE? 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶20. (C) All recent discussions with politicians invariably 
center on the presidential campaign. Remarks of politicians 
in both camps, while fecund with regard to power politics, 
tend to be sterile when it comes to substantive issues such 
as poverty alleviation and economic reform, not to mention 
foreign policy. Most politicians' forays into substance are 
brief and concentrate on the allegedly poor job that the 
opponent will do or is doing. Daily newspapers and weekly 
magazines are replete with reporting on the presidential 
politicking. Yet, the dribble of ink devoted to actual 
issues is minimal when compared to pool devoted to the 
machinations of the political class. 
 
 
¶21. (C) Upon observing the tenor and tactics of the 
presidential campaign so far, further democratization will 
require the gradual transformation of Nigeria's political 
culture in two basic ways. First, the Nigerian political 
system remains a very closed shop -- a person needs a lot of 
money or personal connections to enter it. The elitism that 
governs the current system must be eroded so that more 
people from various walks of life can enhance the mix. 
Second, political affiliations need to be based more on 
issues and less on ethnic and regional considerations. 
Realistically, this will take time and progress will be 
gradual. However, it was hoped that the 2003 elections would 
be another link in this concatenation of strengthening 
Nigerian democracy. Sadly, this is not happening. 
 
 
¶22. (C) The President's bare-knuckle strategy, personified 
by the unprincipled Anenih, and the opposition's regional 
axis approach, personified by the Machiavellian Babangida, 
have placed the process of genuine democratization in 
"spiritual deepfreeze." While neither side is devoid of 
issue content, efforts to delineate substantive differences 
are pro forma. The two camps operate on a different plane. 
Basically, the President's campaign is using the party 
machinery and the tools of office to create a nationwide 
network of incumbents that will help each other get 
reelected, with the connivance of hand-picked electoral 
officials. On the other hand, the opposition is promoting 
ethnic populism by appealing to the base instincts of two 
(Igbo and Hausa/Fulani) of Nigeria's three main ethnic 
groups. Thus, despite increasingly frenetic electioneering, 
somehow the idea of crafting an appeal to entire Nigerian 
electorate has been lost in shuffle. Because of this, many 
people sense that, though the politicians are energetically 
fighting each other, neither side is really fighting for the 
interests of the average Nigerian or the country as a whole. 
 
 
ANDREWS