This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 06/07/12 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS XY LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS'S VIEWS ON 
LIBERIA 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE TIM ANDREWS. REASON 1.5 (B) and 
(D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: During two recent conversations with 
Ambassador Jeter, the last on May 24, ECOWAS ExeSec 
Chambas outlined the game-plan for Liberia developed 
at the May 17 Heads of State meeting in Yamoussoukro. 
Presidents Obasanjo and Wade were appointed to broker 
political reconciliation and a GOL-LURD cease-fire 
while an ECOWAS technical group would visit Liberia to 
assess the security situation in order to advise Wade 
and Obasanjo. Chambas realized a cease-fire would be 
difficult; the LURD would demand political 
compensation for its quiescence while the GOL would 
resist any step insinuating legitimacy or territorial 
control for the rebel group. Chambas worried that 
mediation would be hampered by Obasanjo's domestic 
electoral distractions and Wade's inexperience on 
Liberia. Chambas also wondered how to coax Guinea to 
play a constructive role. Chambas blamed Taylor's near 
total expropriation of Liberia's political space as 
the reason for a recrudescent LURD. In the end, Taylor 
must loosen his stranglehold on the political process 
for progress to be achieved.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During a May 24 late evening meeting, ECOWAS 
ExeSec Chambas told Ambassador Jeter, joined by 
PolCouns, that he had just concluded a two-hour 
meeting, mostly devoted to Liberia, with President 
Obasanjo. While relaxed and at times joking, Chambas 
acknowledged the difficult terrain ahead and 
understood the road to ending the fighting in Liberia 
was twisting and all uphill. 
 
 
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YAMOUSSOUKRO DID NOT MEET GOL EXPECTATIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Describing the dynamics at Yamoussoukro, 
Chambas said the proposed resolution drafted by the 
ECOWAS Ministerial Mediation and Security Council was 
more favorable to the GOL then the final communique 
issued by the Heads of State. The differences in the 
documents also reflected the divergent tenors of the 
meetings. While the foreign ministers were attracted 
to the legal argument against the LURD for attacking 
the elected, nominally democratic GOL, the political 
heads showed diminished sympathy for the GOL position. 
Thus, while the final communique shared key provisions 
contained in the Ministers' draft, e.g. immediate 
cease-fire, dispatch of a military assessment team and 
political dialogue, the political leaders omitted the 
strong condemnation of the LURD and the specific 
reference to ECOMOG intervention in the absence of a 
cease-fire. 
 
 
¶4. (C) COMMENT: While not saying so explicitly, 
Chambas implied that Liberian ForMin Captan, subbing 
for President Taylor at Yamoussoukro, emerged from the 
Heads of State meeting disappointed. The small but 
symbolic diplomatic victory in his grasp at the 
Ministerial had vanished.  Instead of winning an 
explicit castigation of the LURD as well as a 
statement that ECOMOG might intervene on behalf of the 
GOL, the final communique labeled both the LURD and 
GOL "belligerents," thus making no moral 
differentiation between the two sides. President 
Wade's public statement immediately after the meeting 
that ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was not 
contemplated also irked Taylor. In the final analysis, 
what the GOL achieved at Yamoussoukro was a 
frustrating diplomatic stalemate. President Taylor's 
refusal to accept the GON invitation to come to Abuja 
after Yamoussoukro probably likely was a by-product of 
that frustration. END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶5. (C) The communique's nuances and its parsing 
notwithstanding, obtaining the actual cease-fire would 
be complicated, Chambas predicted. The LURD must be 
convinced to stop but the group's accession would not 
be without costs. Chambas's wondered, not if demands 
would be made, but what LURD's demands might be. 
Conversely, the GOL promised to be dogged in its 
position that the LURD, being an insurgent adversary 
of an elected government, did not have the standing to 
make political demands on the GOL. Shortening the 
distance between these positions would require 
sustained diplomatic effort by ECOWAS, he offered. 
Nigeria was key, as no other ECOWAS state could 
approximate Nigeria's potential clout over the 
Liberian actors. 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
---- 
OBASANJO -- POLITICS AT HOME TRUMPS A STATESMAN ROLE 
ABROAD 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
----- 
 
 
¶6. (C) However, given the demands of the Nigerian 
electoral season, the ExeSec was unsure whether 
Obasanjo could devote adequate time to this cause. 
Chambas thought Obasanjo should call the LURD leaders 
to Abuja to open a dialogue with them; however, 
Chambas had not conveyed the idea to Obasanjo because 
he did not want to overtax the Nigerian leader's 
schedule. Because of this caution, neither Obasanjo 
nor Chambas personally have met any of the declared 
LURD leaders. After discussing Obasanjo's ambitious 
travel schedule for the summer, Chambas worried that 
Obasanjo might not have the time to take advantage of 
whatever positive momentum generated by the 
Yamoussoukro meting. As the clock ticked toward the 
PDP national convention slated for October and the 
subsequent presidential campaign, Obasanjo's 
concentration on Liberia would only further diminish. 
Chambas speculated that Obasanjo should appoint a 
Special Envoy but could not think of current player in 
Obasanjo's foreign policy team with the requisite 
stature and experience with Liberia to do the job 
well. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Chambas discounted the rumor that Nigeria was 
supplying arms to the GOL, stating he saw no signs of 
such closeness between Obasanjo and Taylor. He also 
contended that establishing a "son of ECOMOG" for 
Liberia was highly unlikely. The leaders did not show 
stomach for this at the Summit. Moreover, domestic 
considerations in the two most likely troop 
contributing states precluded deployment. Electoral 
considerations would discourage Obasanjo and President 
Kufuor has his hands full with ethno-political trouble 
in Northern Ghana. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
WADE -- HIS MIND AND HEART MAY BE ELSEWHERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) Chambas confided that the Senegalese President 
Wade might not be very effective because neither Wade 
nor his senior foreign policy advisors knew much about 
Liberia. Despite his selection as ECOWAS Chairman, 
Wade was more focused on Madagascar's presidential 
tug-of-war than the political and security challenges 
facing the Mano River Union's two Anglophone members. 
Chambas mentioned that Wade was tasked with generating 
diplomatic and, if needed, material support within the 
international community for ECOWAS efforts on Liberia. 
Chambas hoped the selection of senior UN official 
Ibrahim Fall, also Senegalese, to head the UN's new 
West Africa office located in Dakar would help 
reorient Wade, particularly in helping Wade reach out 
to the international community for assistance on 
Liberia. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
GUINEA -- VIOLATOR AS WELL AS VICTIM? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Given that the LURD used Guinea as its primary 
base, Chambas stated that ECOWAS needed to develop a 
strategy that considered Guinea's role and interests. 
Chambas mentioned the ECOWAS communique endorsed the 
Rabat process but said the gesture was essentially pro 
forma. While admitting no detailed knowledge of what 
happened in Rabat, Chambas did not show great 
confidence in that process. He recognized Conte had 
serious security concerns due to Liberia's prior 
aggression and that Conte's continued mistrust of and 
deep animus for Taylor caused Conte to view the LURD 
with benign indifference, at minimum. However, he 
stated that ECOWAS needed to develop a strategy that 
would respond to Conte's apprehension about Taylor's 
hegemonic appetite but also pressure Conte to suppress 
the LURD. Chambas fretted that although Conte 
currently may have the upper hand on Taylor, the 
Guinean was engaged in a risky gambit. Guinea has 
significant domestic problems -- allowing a rag-tag 
rebel force to inhabit portions of territory where 
your government's control is thin could hand Conte 
problems in the long run. 
 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: In addition to seeing the LURD 
contemned by ECOWAS Heads of State, a secondary GOL 
objective at Yamoussoukro probably was to shift more 
diplomatic pressure on Guinea to cease hosting the 
LURD. However, because of perceptions that Taylor's 
megalomania is both father and mother to most problems 
within Liberia and between the two countries, the GOL 
did not register much success tarring Guinea as the 
sponsor of instability.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
TAYLOR -- HE HAS THE WHOLE MESS IN HIS HANDS! 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Despite the multiple aspects of this recent 
Liberian crisis, its gestation lies in Taylor's 
malevolent governance and his stiff opposition to the 
development of a meaningful political opposition. 
Chambas asserted that his efforts are based on the 
assumption that Taylor is not incorrigible and can be 
ultimately be turned in the right direction. However, 
the Liberian's intransigence is testing that premise. 
In the end, the ExeSec maintained Taylor must loosen 
his grip and allow the opposition to operate freely. 
The GOL must enter a dialogue aimed at creating the 
conditions for fair elections. Chambas asserted that a 
cease-fire without the GOL making concessions on the 
political side would be untenable. The GOL would have 
no incentive to change its ways after obtaining the 
cease-fire. While the LURD presence was unfortunate 
and should not be encouraged, it has put pressure on 
Taylor that did not previously exist, he maintained. 
The challenge is for ECOWAS to use that pressure in a 
manner that is not misinterpreted as condoning the 
LURD yet in a way that gets Taylor to accept 
nonviolent political opposition at home. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) Himself formerly a rebel leader, who stalked 
an unpopular Head of State, Taylor is now being 
pursued by late President Doe's former associates. 
This predicament smacks of karma. However, belief in 
reciprocal justice alone will not solve this problem. 
Diplomacy is needed. Save for not having opened a 
formal line of communication with the LURD, Chambas 
has a good grasp of the motivations, limitations and 
interests of the players. (We have encouraged him to 
develop that contact with the LURD. The longer they 
are left unattended, the more recalcitrant they will 
be when talks finally come.) ECOWAS has dispatched the 
five-man technical team to Liberia, and their report 
will help advise Presidents Wade and Obasanjo, Chambas 
and the Ministerial Mediation and Security Council, 
which will continue to play a role in ECOWAS efforts. 
The Yamoussoukro communique provides a skeletal 
framework for moving forward. ECOWAS must use that 
framework to develop a strategy that puts the right 
pressures on the LURD, the GOL and the political 
opposition as well as offers them the right 
incentives. While Chambas has not fleshed out the 
details, his statements indicate that this will 
require some type of linkage of a cease-fire to 
political reform, particularly of the electoral 
process. 
ANDREWS