This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: PM: "NO ALTERNATIVE" BUT TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 995 
 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 996 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1005 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  In a May 23 meeting with Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba, Ambassador Malinowski and British Charge Andrew 
Mitchell emphasized that the dissolution of Parliament 
presents the PM with a rare opportunity to form a technocrat, 
reformist Cabinet that could re-institute good governance, 
eliminate corruption, and improve the security situation 
throughout the country.  The PM acknowledged those points, 
but seems more focused for now on regaining his party's good 
graces and on initiating party preparations for elections. 
The intra-party machinations of his political rival, former 
PM G.P. Koirala, left him no alternative but to ask the 
Cabinet to dissolve the Lower House.  He plans to address the 
nation on television the evening of May 24.  He does not 
intend to bring extension of the emergency before the 
National Assembly (the as-yet undissolved Upper House of 
Parliament) but will instead re-institute it through 
ordinance for another three months.  The Army has assured him 
it can provide adequate security for the elections to take 
place within six months.  While he does not doubt the King's 
commitment to democracy, he fears that some "people around 
him" may harbor anti-democratic sentiments.  End summary. 
 
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DISSOLUTION THE ONLY WAY 
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¶2.  (C)  On May 23 Ambassador Malinowski and British Charge 
Andrew Mitchell called on Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba 
to discuss implications of the May 22 decision to dissolve 
the Lower House of Parliament (Ref C). Deuba told the envoys 
the constant conniving of his political rival, ruling Nepali 
Congress Party President and former PM G.P. Koirala, had left 
him "no alternative" but to ask the Cabinet to recommend 
dissolution.  Koirala's allegations that the PM had not 
adequately consulted with the party before pursuing extension 
of the emergency were untrue; Deuba had met with party 
leaders twice and the security chiefs once before he 
introduced the extension proposal in the Parliamentary 
Secretariat.  None of the party chiefs contacted, including 
 
SIPDIS 
Koirala, had ever raised any objection to the extension, he 
complained. 
 
¶3.  (C) Even though Deuba acknowledged that he has a (slight) 
edge against Koirala among his party MPs, his long-time rival 
"could move against me at any time and sack me from the 
party."  (Note:  At the time of the meeting, Deuba had not 
yet been suspended from the Nepali Congress Party.  The 
suspension order gave him three days in which to clarify his 
decision to defy the party.  End note.)  "I have the votes in 
Parliament, but for how long?"  Koirala would never cease 
trying to lure away Deuba supporters in Parliament.  In fact, 
Koirala had intended to bring a no-confidence motion against 
him the very next day, Deuba learned.  Prolonged political 
in-fighting could demoralize the security forces and boost 
Maoist insurgents' efforts to destabilize the country.  Hence 
his pre-emptive strike in dissolving Parliament. 
 
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NEXT STEPS? 
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¶4.  (C)  Ambassador Malinowski noted the current situation, 
while regrettable, afforded Deuba a valuable opportunity to 
form a new, smaller Cabinet with well-regarded, talented 
technocrats and members of other parties to address the many 
pressing problems, such as the Maoist insurgency and rampant 
corruption, that Koirala's constant back-biting had 
distracted him from resolving.  The Ambassador reported 
raising the topic with Opposition Leader Madhav Nepal, along 
with British CDA Mitchell, earlier in the day (Ref B), and 
stressed the Opposition has "an open mind" about 
participating in a national government.   Deuba could address 
the nation publicly on his plans, emphasizing that he was 
putting politics aside during this time of national crisis 
and would concentrate on these priorities during the six 
months before the election.  He should appeal to the nation's 
voters to judge for themselves at election time whether or 
not he had fulfilled his pledge, the Ambassador urged. 
 
¶5.  (C) Deuba concurred with the Ambassador's suggestion, but 
noted that his first priority  is to restore unity in the 
Nepali Congress.  "I'm a party person," he explained, "and so 
I want a united party to go for the poll."  After sorting out 
the intra-party discord, he might explore the possibility of 
a national Cabinet that could include the Opposition. 
 
¶6.  (C) British Charge Andrew Mitchell took up the theme of 
Deuba seizing the chance to form a high-powered Cabinet that 
could effectively address national problems.  The dissolution 
could actually be a great opportunity for Deuba to announce a 
new Cabinet as a reforming government and demonstrate to 
people that democracy can work.  By appealing directly to 
people's interests, he could win their support for the 
upcoming elections.  He asked what the PM's strategy over the 
next few days would be. 
 
¶7.  (C) Deuba agreed with the sense of the British Charge's 
points, but returned again to his central preoccupation:  the 
threat from within his own party.  With the return of his 
mentor and party patriarch K.P. Bhattarai from abroad the 
following day, Deuba said he would be in a better position to 
address that challenge.  The Ambassador asked if he planned 
to put his case before the nation; Deuba said he would do so 
in a televised address May 24. 
 
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SECURITY 
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¶8.  (C) With Parliament dissolved, the Ambassador asked, what 
will happen to the emergency?  Deuba said he would not bring 
the motion before the National Assembly, the (as-yet) 
undissolved Upper House of Parliament.  (Comment:  He does 
not have sufficient support within the National Assembly to 
win a two-thirds vote.  King Gyanendra told the Ambassador 
later in the day that the Cabinet had just asked him to 
dissolve the Upper House.  The King said he would do so the 
next day--May 24.  End comment.)  Instead, he plans to allow 
the emergency to lapse and then have it re-introduced by 
ordinance.  According to the Constitution, the emergency 
could then last no more than three months.  Deuba said that 
he would not want a longer extension in any event--and might 
actually abridge its duration to two months--since it would 
interfere with campaigning for the November polls. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Ambassador asked if the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) 
leadership is confident that it could provide adequate 
security during the election period and if voter lists--some 
of which may have been damaged during attacks on local 
government offices--are intact.  The PM replied yes to both 
questions, noting that copies of voter lists have been 
maintained at the Election Commission in Kathmandu.  The 
elections could also be staggered, Deuba said, with voting 
taking place in certain districts on different days, but with 
the final count taking place on the same day.  There is 
already such a precedent.  He added that he was meeting with 
the Chief of Army Staff later in the evening. 
 
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THE PALACE 
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¶10.  (C)  The Ambassador advised the PM that he and the 
British Charge would be meeting King Gyanendra later in the 
evening.  Deuba predicted that the King would assure them of 
his staunch support of Constitutional democracy.  Deuba asked 
that the two envoys "suggest  to the King that he should 
cooperate with democracy."  The PM said he isn't worried that 
the King himself harbors any anti-democratic ambitions, but 
rather that some "people around him" are "not in favor" of 
democracy.  The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. could only 
provide assistance to Nepal if democracy remains intact. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (C)  Chronic political infighting, in our view, has been 
the main impediment to Deuba's ability to demonstrate his 
effectiveness as a leader.  His critics, however, both within 
his own party and in the Opposition, have long alleged that 
he is unable to assert forcefully enough the power of the 
civilian government.  His insistence on continuing the 
emergency, presumably at the behest of either or both the RNA 
and the Palace, against the opposition of his own party will 
only reinforce that perception in some quarters.  While the 
Prime Minister agreed with the Ambassador and the British 
Charge's suggestions about the possible opportunities the 
current crisis presents, his main attention was obviously 
focused on saving his position within the party--and thus his 
chances for a Nepali Congress nomination in the impending 
elections.  The party's decision just one hour later to 
suspend him (Ref C)--with the ever-imminent threat of 
ultimate expulsion--prove just how short-sighted his 
preoccupation was.  As a self-proclaimed "party person," 
Deuba risks being soon cut adrift from that political 
mooring.  The PM's slight edge in support among his party's 
MPs is unlikely to survive his probable expulsion in a 
society where virtually every association--from trade unions 
to human rights groups to university clubs--has a partisan 
affiliation.  We have seen no evidence of anti-democratic 
elements at work in the Palace, as Deuba speculated, but will 
monitor the situation closely. 
MALINOWSKI