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Viewing cable 02HANOI1384, VIETNAM: EFFECTING CHANGE WITH THE BTA AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02HANOI1384 2002-05-30 10:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

301026Z May 02


 2002HANOI01384 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ9247

PAGE 01        HANOI  01384  01 OF 02  301039Z 
ACTION SS-00    

INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   ANHR-00  TEDE-00  JUSE-00  STR-00   SAS-00   
        /000W
                  ------------------B59E14  301039Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6623
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DEPSEC ARMITAGE 
STATE PASS USTR FOR HUNTSMAN/IVES/BRYAN 
STATE PASS USAID FOR BALLANTYNE 
JUSTICE FOR AAG VIET DINH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/12 
TAGS: ECON ECIN ETRD EAID PREL KJUS VM BTA
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: EFFECTING CHANGE WITH THE BTA AND 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - THE CASE OF THE JUSTICE MINISTRY 
 
 
1.  CLASSIFIED BY ECON/C CLAIRE PIERANGELO, REASONS 1.5 (D) 
 
2. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: DURING RECENT MEETINGS AND 
CONVERSATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, U.S. TECHNICAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01384  01 OF 02  301039Z 
ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS, AND OTHER LEGAL AND ECONOMIC EXPERTS, 
WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WE SEE 
UNDERWAY THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY CREDITED TO THE NEED TO 
FULFILL COMMITMENTS UNDER THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
(BTA) AND WHICH ARE BEING MADE POSSIBLE WITH THE HELP USG 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.  THESE CHANGES ARE BUILDING 
ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN VIETNAM'S OVERALL ECONOMIC 
REFORM EFFORTS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MISSION'S AND 
WASHINGTON AGENCIES' WORK IS BEGINNING TO PAY OFF, 
SOMETIMES IN OBVIOUS WAYS BUT ALSO IN MORE SUBTLE WAYS. 
THIS CABLE FOCUSES ON THE LEGAL REFORM EFFORT AND THE 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IN PARTICULAR, HOW THE BTA HAS BECOME 
A TOOL FOR THE MOJ TO EFFECT CHANGE WITHIN THE MINISTRY AS 
WELL AS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. MINISTER OF JUSTICE NGUYEN 
DINH LOC IS TRAVELING TO THE U.S. JUNE 1-8 FOR MEETINGS 
WITH USG AND PRIVATE SECTOR OFFICIALS AS PART OF A JOINT 
U.S.-VIETNAM TRADE COUNCIL-UNDP SPONSORED TRIP.  A SEPARATE 
CABLE WILL REPORT ON CHANGES UNDERWAY IN THE STATE BANK OF 
VIETNAM.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
THE BTA AS A TOOL OF CHANGE 
 
3.  (C) THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IS A NEW BODY, HAVING BEEN 
ABOLISHED BY THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 1970'S 
AND WAS ONLY RE-ESTABLISHED 10 YEARS AGO.  MINISTER LOC HAS 
BEEN AT THE HELM THROUGHOUT. MOJ'S POWER BASE AND POSITION 
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE ARE SLOWLY EVOLVING.  AT 
THE RECENT MEETING OF THE U.S.-VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENT JOINT COMMITTEE IN HANOI, DELEGATION MEMBERS WERE 
CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY THE WELL-PREPARED, PROFESSIONAL AND 
FRANK PARTICIPATION BY MOJ OFFICIALS.  EVEN MORE STRIKING 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01384  01 OF 02  301039Z 
WAS THE CLEAR LINK THAT MOJ AND OTHER MINISTRIES' OFFICIALS 
MADE BETWEEN THEIR WORK ON IMPLEMENTING THE LEGAL AND OTHER 
COMMITMENTS IN THE BTA, THE HELP OF THE ONGOING USG 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THESE AREAS, AND THE MORE 
GENERAL LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM EFFORTS UNDERWAY IN 
VIETNAM TODAY. 
 
4.  (C) THE BTA, BY VIRTUE OF THE LEGAL COMMITMENTS IT 
CONTAINS, IS BEING USED BY THE MOJ (AND OTHER MINISTRIES) 
TO PROMOTE CHANGE WITHIN THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONS. IT IS NO 
COINCIDENCE THAT MOJ, PREVIOUSLY A MORIBUND AGENCY WITH 
LIMITED AUTHORITY AND A LIMITED MANDATE, IS NOW IN THE 
CENTER OF THE BTA IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT.  CLEARLY THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTA AND THE INCREASED TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE U.S. AND OTHER DONORS ARE 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE GREATER ENTHUSIASM, COMPETENCE, 
AUTHORITY, AND IMPORTANCE OF THE MOJ.  THIS IS A POSITIVE 
MOVE TOWARD THE RULE BY LAW IN VIETNAM. 
 
NEW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MOJ LEADING TO GREATER INFLUENCE 
 
5.  (SBU) DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE BTA, THE MOJ HAD 
ONLY LIMITED INPUT.  HOWEVER, AFTER THE BTA WAS SIGNED 
(JULY 2000), THE PRIME MINISTER INSTRUCTED MOJ TO BEGIN A 
REVIEW OF ALL LEGAL DOCUMENTS (LAWS, DECREES, ORDINANCES, 
ETC.) IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY WHICH ONES NEEDED TO BE REVISED 
IN ORDER TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BTA.  AFTER THE 
REVIEW, WHICH INCLUDED 148 LEGAL DOCUMENTS, MOJ SUGGESTED 
REVISIONS TO 24, PROPOSED 39 NEW DOCUMENTS, AND RECOMMENDED 
9 TO BE CANCELLED.  MOJ HAS NOW BEEN ASKED TO REVIEW LOCAL 
LEVEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS IN THE SAME MANNER.  ALTHOUGH A 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01384  01 OF 02  301039Z 
SIMPLE SOUNDING OPERATION, PRIOR TO THAT TIME MOJ HAD NOT 
BEEN GIVEN AUTHORITY TO REVIEW LEGAL DOCUMENTS PROMULGATED 
BY OTHER MINISTRIES AND HAD NO MANDATE TO REVIEW LEGAL 
DOCUMENTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, EVEN IF JUST TO ENSURE 
CONSISTENCY WITH NATIONAL LAW.  MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, 
PROVINCES, AND COMMUNES TRADITIONALLY CAN PROPOSE LAWS TO 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ISSUE DECREES, ORDINANCES, ETC. 
ON THEIR OWN AUTHORITY. SOME MINISTERIAL OR PROVINCIAL 
DECREES AND ORDINANCES NEED THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPROVAL 
BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE CLEARANCE OR CONCURRENCE OF OTHER 
MINISTRIES OR AGENCIES.  AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, OFTEN THERE IS 
NO REVIEW OR APPROVAL PROCESS AT ALL.  THIS LACK OF REVIEW 
CONTRIBUTES TO OVERLAPPING, CONTRADICTORY, AND INCONSISTENT 
LEGAL DOCUMENTS.  THIS YEAR, MOJ WAS ALSO PUT IN CHARGE OF 
A MAJOR EFFORT CALLED THE "LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT", A 10- 
YEAR PLAN ON THE FULL RANGE OF LEGAL REFORMS NEEDED IF 
VIETNAM INTENDS TO INTEGRATE SUCCESSFULLY INTO THE REGIONAL 
AND WORLD ECONOMY, INCLUDING POSSIBLE WTO ACCESSION.  THIS 
ASSESSMENT GOES BEYOND JUST BTA IMPLEMENTATION AND 
ADDRESSES A WIDE RANGE OF LEGAL ISSUES IN VIETNAM. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ9249 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  01384  02 OF 02  301039Z 
ACTION SS-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   ANHR-00  TEDE-00  JUSE-00  STR-00   SAS-00 
        /000W 
                  ------------------B59E1D  301040Z /38 
O 301026Z MAY 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6624 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC 
USDOC WASHDC 
DEPTTREAS WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 001384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DEPSEC ARMITAGE 
STATE PASS USTR FOR HUNTSMAN/IVES/BRYAN 
STATE PASS USAID FOR BALLANTYNE 
JUSTICE FOR AAG VIET DINH 
 
THE VALUE-ADDED FROM USG TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
 
6.  (C) THE USG'S DAY TO DAY WORK ON LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01384  02 OF 02  301039Z 
IN VIETNAM IS NOT ALWAYS OBVIOUS TO OTHER DONORS OR THE GVN 
BUT FROM WHAT WE ARE SEEING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE EFFECT IS 
REAL AND GOES BEYOND THE MERE ECONOMIC. THE ISSUE OF 
TRANSPARENCY IS A CASE IN POINT.  THE GVN IS IN THE PROCESS 
OF AMENDING ITS "LAW ON LAWS" ("THE LAW ON PROMULGATION OF 
LEGAL DOCUMENTS") WHICH GUIDES THE OVERALL PROCESS FOR 
LEGISLATION AND RULEMAKING IN ALL AREAS FOR VIETNAM.  THIS 
EFFORT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN AS A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE 
TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS IN THE BTA.  THE USG AT SEVERAL 
LEVELS - EMBASSY, WASHINGTON AGENCIES AND USG-FUNDED 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - IS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THIS 
EFFORT THROUGH CONSULTATION AND GUIDANCE.  WHILE THE 
EMBASSY'S AND WASHINGTON AGENCIES' EFFORTS ARE SIGNIFICANT, 
PERHAPS THE BIGGEST BANG FOR THE BUCK COMES FROM THE 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED THROUGH TWO USAID-FUNDED 
PROGRAMS - THE STAR PROJECT AND U.S.-VIETNAM TRADE COUNCIL 
PROGRAM.  THESE PROGRAMS HAVE GIVEN US ADDITIONAL ACCESS 
ROUTES TO THE GVN, ESPECIALLY IN SOME SENSITIVE AREAS.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, WE WERE ABLE TO OFFER ONLY GENERAL COMMENTS TO THE 
GVN REGARDING OUR EXPECTATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS 
IN THE AMENDED LAW ON LAWS, BUT WE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO SEE 
THE DRAFT IN PROGRESS.  HOWEVER, THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT OF 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TURNED TO THE STAR PROJECT FOR 
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT AND GAVE STAR A COPY. THUS STAR WAS 
ABLE TO COMMENT ON SPECIFICS OF THE LAW, IN PARTICULAR, 
WHETHER THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS GO FAR ENOUGH TOWARD 
MEETING VIETNAM'S COMMITMENTS ON TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE 
BTA.  WHILE THAT LAW IS STILL A WORK IN PROGRESS, WE FEEL 
CONFIDENT THAT ALL THESE EFFORTS WILL HAVE A POSITIVE 
IMPACT ON THE FINAL LAW AND ON GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN 
VIETNAM. 
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7. (C) ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
ON LEGAL REFORM ISSUES IS EXPOSING VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TO 
THE U.S. AND U.S. OFFICIALS.  THE U.S.-VIETNAM TRADE 
COUNCIL AND THE UNDP ARE JOINTLY SPONSORING THE U.S. VISIT 
OF JUSTICE MINISTER LOC JUNE 1-8.  LOC WILL BE ACCOMPANIED 
BY SOME OF HIS BEST STAFF AND WILL BE LOOKING AT LOCAL 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES AS WELL AS DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
BETWEEN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES.  THE LACK OF 
CLEAR JURISDICTION AND DIVISION OF AUTHORITY IS A MAJOR 
OBSTACLE TO LEGAL REFORM IN VIETNAM AND THIS VISIT WILL 
HELP PROVIDE SOME NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO APPROACH THIS 
DIFFICULT AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
8. (C) LEGAL REFORM IN VIETNAM IS AN ONGOING EFFORT, BUT 
ONE IN WHICH THE BTA AND USG TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ARE 
PLAYING A POSITIVE AND IMPORTANT ROLE.  THE MORE WE CAN DO 
TO ASSIST VIETNAM IN THIS AREA, THE MORE WE WILL BE ABLE TO 
INFLUENCE THE PACE AND DIRECTION OF REFORM, WHICH WILL HAVE 
POSITIVE EFFECTS ACROSS THE LEGAL SPECTRUM. 
PORTER 
 
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