This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002529 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2012 
TAGS: JO KISL PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: TENSE REGIONAL SITUATION INCREASES ELECTION 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
REF: 01 AMMAN 03093 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Developments across the river and elsewhere in the 
region continue to place strong pressure on King Abdullah's 
reformist agenda.  Along with the pressure, speculation 
concerning the status of parliamentary elections that were 
tentatively scheduled for the fall has grown.  On May 10, 
Jordan's Prime Minister stated that a date for holding 
elections will be announced in July, unless extraordinary 
circumstances make elections "impossible."  The Prime 
Minister did not comment on what might happen if elections 
are deemed impossible, and left open the possibility that the 
King might reinstate the former parliament.  The general 
belief among Embassy contacts is that the GOJ will not hold 
elections this fall, though we are still being told by 
Jordanian officials that no decision has been made.  End 
summary. 
 
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THE PM HINTS AT POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS . . . 
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¶2. (C) Jordan's lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, was 
dissolved in June 2001.  Following dissolution, the GOJ 
announced that it would hold elections requisite to forming a 
new parliament, but only after implementing new procedures 
called for in a July 2001 temporary elections law.  The GOJ's 
central aim in amending the elections laws was to promote a 
moderate, pro-regime parliament - through redistricting, 
redistributing parliamentary seats, reforming voter 
registration mechanisms, and increasing representation from 
tribal areas where the Islamic Opposition has little support 
(reftel). 
 
¶3. (U) Until recently, the GOJ had indicated that elections 
would be held in fall 2002 and it appeared that announcement 
of a date could be imminent.  However, rumors to the contrary 
have been circulating for some time.  This skepticism became 
all the stronger when, on May 10, Prime Minister Ali Abul 
Ragheb told the London-based daily Al Quds Al Arabi that the 
GOJ will not announce a date until July.  Abul Ragheb said 
the GOJ will prepare to conduct elections by the end of the 
year, but acknowledged that "extraordinary regional 
circumstances" could yet make elections impossible.  When 
asked if the old parliament might be reinstated, Abul Ragheb 
noted that this prerogative rests with the King.  Abul Ragheb 
again addressed the elections topic during a May 20 meeting 
with the Ambassador.  According to the Prime Minister, the 
GOJ will monitor the internal political situation in May and 
June, and make a decision on elections in July.  He hoped 
that development projects coming on line in June as well as 
the anticipated Middle East peace conference would produce 
more favorable conditions for elections. 
 
¶4. (C) Abul Ragheb's reference to "extraordinary regional 
circumstances" clearly encompasses the situation on the West 
Bank and the possibility of a U.S. offensive against Iraq, 
both of which bolster sympathy for the Islamic viewpoint.  As 
a former parliamentarian representing Madaba puts it, the 
Islamic Opposition is enjoying a growing surge of support 
generated by the perception that Islam alone can offer 
deliverance from vexing regional issues.  (Comment: Equally 
to the point, even many people who have no use for the 
Islamists' program would be tempted to cast protest votes.) 
He and other former parliamentarians parrot the popular 
belief that the GOJ will be loath to lock in strong Islamist 
parliamentary representation - and thereby allow a primary 
purpose of the new elections law to be defeated - by holding 
elections at a time when Islamist influence is unusually 
strong. 
 
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AND THE CONSTITUTION MAY PERMIT POSTPONEMENT 
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¶5. (C) The GOJ may end up foregoing elections on grounds that 
"extraordinary regional circumstances" prevent them.  Under 
the Constitution, when "a force majeure has occurred which . 
. . render(s) the holding of elections impossible," a new 
Chamber of Deputies does not have to be elected.  The King 
can (but is not required to) in these circumstances reinstate 
the former parliament.  If this were to happen, the former 
parliament would resume its activities as if at the beginning 
of an election cycle, though the King would retain his normal 
prerogative to dissolve parliament at any time.  If the 
conditions rendering the holding of elections impossible were 
to abate without reinstatement of the old parliament, a new 
parliament would have to be elected following abatement. 
 
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BUT THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENT 
. . . 
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¶6. (C) We believe that there is broad support among the 
public for the restoration of a functioning parliament. 
Indeed, as a prominent human rights contact points out, 
regional tensions make a functioning parliament more 
important than it otherwise would be.  But the consensus 
among several Embassy contacts is also that the most 
legitimate way of restoring parliament would be through 
holding elections, because conditions preventing elections do 
not genuinely exist.  One contact, a University of Jordan law 
professor, explains that regional (as opposed to domestic) 
circumstances cannot - under well-settled legal principles - 
provide a basis for declaring a force majeure in the first 
place.  Another contact, the head of the El Urdon El Jadid 
"think tank," also believes regional instability should not 
provide a basis for declaring a force majeure because 
instability in this region is endemic. 
 
¶7. (C) Many Embassy contacts believe the GOJ will reinstate 
the old parliament as a means of averting election of a 
strong Islamist block in a new parliament, though they view 
the fear of Islamist "overrepresentation" as overblown.  Some 
believe Islamists will not fare particularly well under the 
procedures established by the temporary elections law (i.e., 
a common prediction is that Islamists will only capture 15-20 
of 104 seats), and that the composition of the new parliament 
will be more representative and democratic under the new law. 
 Another view is that strong Islamist representation in 
parliament is actually desirable to some degree because it 
will carry with it an increased resolve to battle government 
corruption and promote other important causes.  On the other 
hand, one former parliamentarian from rural Tafileh believes 
the GOJ has reason to worry that sustained economic 
difficulties are severely eroding tribal support for the 
regime. 
 
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AND THE ISLAMISTS WANT POLLS NOW 
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¶8. (C) Members of the Islamic opposition - who believe they 
have the most to gain in elections - want elections as 
quickly as possible.  Islamic Action Front (IAF) Secretary 
General Hamza Mansour opposes "any new postponement or 
bringing back the dissolved parliament."  The Muslim 
Brotherhood has likewise gone on record "reiterat(ing) the 
importance of maintaining a democratic process" by holding 
elections this year.  Nonetheless, the IAF has said it will 
defer a decision on whether to participate in elections until 
after the GOJ sets a polling date.  According to one former 
parliamentarian who was also a member of the IAF, deep 
internal divisions underlie the decision to defer commitment 
on this point.  Though the Islamic Opposition's parliamentary 
elections boycott prevented it from taking any seats in 1997, 
regional developments have added resonance to calls from 
within the Opposition to again forego participation. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (C) As long as the GOJ maintains the position that 
"extraordinary regional circumstances" constitute a force 
majeure, it can claim that the Constitution relieves it of 
any obligation to elect a new parliament, and it can continue 
without a functioning parliament or by reinstating the old 
one.  It is difficult to reliably predict which course the 
King will ultimately choose.  No matter how much the King may 
want to hold elections, he will have to balance this against 
the risk that elections could result in a conservative or 
Islamist parliament opposed to his reformist agenda.  In the 
meantime, we expect rumors about the elections - and the 
government reshuffle that might go with a decision to 
postpone - to continue going the rounds with infinite 
variations.  End comment. 
Gnehm