This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, PM 
OSD FOR NELSON 
LAGOS FOR HINSON-JONES, GREANEY, CASS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 5/8/12 
TAGS: PREL MASS PHUM EAID KHDP NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ARMY MINISTER ON RONCO, BENUE, 
TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON 
 
REF: A.) STATE 79557, B.) LAGOS 927, C.) ABUJA 1193 
 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 
(D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a May 2 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Minister of State for Defense (Army) Lawal 
Batagarawa said he planned to visit Washington on May 
24 to meet with human rights NGOs, USG officials and 
the Hill. Impressed by the accomplishments of 
Operation Avid Recovery, he agreed help identify two 
people as points of contact for RONCO in Abuja and 
Lagos. Batagarawa added that he would try to help 
RONCO as much as possible. Ambassador Jeter was 
accompanied by PolMilOff, and Batagarawa by his 
Special Assistant, Balarabe Lawal.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
============ 
BENUE UPDATE 
============ 
 
 
¶2. (C) Unable to travel to Washington in late April as 
initially planned, Batagarawa now hoped to leave Abuja 
May 24 for the U.S. (this has now been shifted to May 
26).  The main purpose of the trip would be to give an 
update on the GON investigation into the communal 
violence in the Middle Belt, especially the violence 
in Benue last October when soldiers killed scores of 
civilians in reprisal for the execution of 19 
soldiers. While in Washington, Batagarawa wants to 
meet with human rights NGOs, particularly Human Rights 
Watch, and hopes to make calls at State, DOD and on 
the Hill. He might be joined by Dr. Sani Sufi, the 
Secretary of the Judicial Inquiry on Conflict in 
 
SIPDIS 
Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa and Taraba States, to help 
brief people on the latest in the investigations. 
Batagarawa added that he hoped to resolve the issue of 
funding for the Commission before his departure for 
Washington.  Ambassador Jeter commended his plan to 
call on human rights NGOs as well as keeping in touch 
with the Hill. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Focusing on Benue, the Ambassador noted that he 
had spoken to former Chief of Army Staff Malu 
recently, who was going to make a submission to the 
Commission. Malu was still upset that the President 
had not apologized for the events of last October or 
offered condolences to the families.  Batagarawa 
argued that an apology could impugn guilt, an 
inappropriate step before the Commission completed its 
investigations.  The Commission had to be allowed to 
function without influence or complications created by 
public statements from the government; the 
institutionalization of rule of law being the ultimate 
goal.  Becoming animated, and showing disdain for Tiv 
claims of being the sole victims, the Army Minister 
added that Tiv were killing Fulani, "on a daily basis- 
even today, as we sit here." 
 
 
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Conflict between Fulani, Tiv and Jukun 
is still an unfortunate common occurrence in the 
troubled eastern Middle Belt, despite the efforts of 
federal security services and some state governments. 
Fulani nomadic herders are often targets of Tiv 
farmers who perceive the Fulanis' grazing cattle as a 
threat to their crops.  The causes of clashes between 
Tiv and Jukun are more complicated; involving access 
to resources through control of local governments and 
historical distrust over past grievances.  The 
Commission, in addition to investigating unlawful 
acts, is supposed to reveal the causes of these 
conflicts, and to offer solutions (Ref C). END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
===== 
RONCO 
===== 
 
 
¶5. (C) Shifting the conversation to Operation Avid 
Recovery (OAR) and the RONCO follow-on effort, 
Ambassador Jeter updated the Minister on the successes 
of the OAR team, in terms of ordnance and civil 
affairs work.  As RONCO would soon begin operations, 
the contractor would likely need points-of-contact in 
Abuja and Lagos to address operational and other 
issues.  Ideally, one POC should be civilian, the 
other military.  For example, RONCO needed C-4 or an 
equivalent to destroy unexploded ordnance, but was 
unsure to whom to turn for its supply or if C-4 were 
even available in Nigeria.  Moreover, RONCO would need 
assistance for duty-free customs clearance for its 
equipment, as delays would seriously impede its work. 
¶6. (C) Batagarawa agreed, and said his Special 
Assistant, Balarabe Lawal would be the Abuja-GON POC 
for the contractor.  Lawal would help resolve issues 
and would keep Batagarawa in the loop.  The Minister 
said he would check on the C-4 question himself. 
Meanwhile, he would identify a POC from the military 
in Lagos that he could trust to assist RONCO there. 
Batagarawa was tempted to call the Customs Chief 
himself to facilitate the RONCO shipments.  Thinking 
better of it, he reasoned that the Ministry and 
Services have people in Lagos who work with Customs 
there.  In the long run, utilizing the people in Lagos 
would be more reliable.  In any case, RONCO would have 
the support it needed to get the job done, Batagarawa 
promised. 
 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: We have plans for the RONCO team 
leader to come to Abuja meetings the week of May 20. 
This will ensure a smooth operation on this end, and 
facilitate Lawal's assistance to the contractor. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Batagarawa has not been able to provide an 
answer on C-4 equivalent, though we have been in daily 
contact with his office on the subject. It may not be 
available in Nigeria.  He planned to name BG Emden, 
Commandant at Ikeja, as the Lagos POC, but PolMilOff 
suggested otherwise due to problems with Emden. 
Batagarawa readily agreed to find someone else, and 
has been discussing "the right person" with MG Abdu, 
GOC of 1 Division.  In any case, with his assurances 
we are mildly confident that we can move the RONCO 
mission forward.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
JETER