This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2012 
TAGS: IT PREL RS PREL RS NATO MEPPIT NATO MEPP
SUBJECT: READOUT OF BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT 
 
REF: STATE 43835 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MC TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON:1.5 (B)(D) 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01723  01 OF 02  051649Z 
¶1.  (C) ON APRIL 5, PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI'S SENIOR 
DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA, TOLD POLMINCOUNS 
TOM COUNTRYMAN THAT THE APRIL 2-3 BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT WAS 
THE MOST SUCCESSFUL RUSSIA-ITALY BILATERAL MEETING EVER HELD. 
 PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI HIS DESIRE TO ENHANCE AND 
EXPAND UPON THE "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES.  NEXT TO GERMANY, ITALY IS RUSSIA'S MAIN 
TRADING PARTNER, AND PUTIN WANTS TO USE GERMANY AND ITALY AS 
HIS MAIN CONNECTION TO AND SUPPORT IN THE EU.  AN INDICATION 
OF THE SPECIAL PLACE ITALY HOLDS IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN 
RELATIONS IS THE FACT THAT BERLUSCONI IS THE FIRST FOREIGN 
LEADER TO BE INVITED TO PUTIN'S DACHA IN SOCHI, WHERE THE 
FIRST DAY'S MEETINGS WERE CONDUCTED.  ON APRIL 3 THE SUMMIT 
SHIFTED TO MOSCOW, AND BERLUSCONI WAS JOINED BY THE MINISTERS 
OF FINANCE, INTERIOR, PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, AND CULTURAL 
HERITAGE.  THE SECOND DAY WAS CUT SHORT BY THE EMERGENCY EU 
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG. 
 
¶2.  (C)  CASTELLANETA TEMPERED BERLUSCONI'S VERY POSITIVE 
PUBLIC COMMENTS ON RUSSIA'S EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU AND 
EVEN NATO BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE PM WAS REFERRING TO THE 
VERY LONG TERM.  BERLUSCONI DOES SEE ROOM FOR QUICKER 
MOVEMENT IN THE MEDIUM TERM, THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
COMMON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE.  THIS WILL BECOME 
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE EU EXPANDS TO INCLUDE POLAND 
AND THE BALTICS, ENVELOPING KALININGRAD IN THE PROCESS. 
 
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NATO-RUSSIA 
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                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01723  01 OF 02  051649Z 
¶3.  (C)  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN CALLED PRESIDENT 
BUSH DURING BERLUSCONI'S VISIT, AND DISCUSSED HIS DESIRE FOR 
ACCELERATED NATO-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS, CULMINATING IN A TREATY 
TO BE SIGNED IN ROME ON MAY 29.  THE CHOICE OF DATE WAS BASED 
ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRAVEL TO RUSSIA 23-26 MAY, AND PUTIN'S 
REQUIREMENT TO BE IN MOSCOW ON MAY 28 FOR THE RUSSIA-EU 
SUMMIT.  FOR THIS TIMING TO WORK, ADDED CASTELLANETA, THE 
DOCUMENT NEEDS TO BE IN FINAL FORM FOR FMS TO APPROVE IN 
REYKJAVIK ON MAY 15. 
 
¶4.  (C)  CASTELLANETA SAID THAT PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT IT 
WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO GO TO THE NOVEMBER NATO SUMMIT 
IN PRAGUE "AS THINGS ARE TODAY."  CASTELLANETA SAID THAT A 
NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT IN ROME WOULD HELP PUTIN TO JUSTIFY HIS 
PRESENCE IN PRAGUE. (SEPTEL REPORTS RELATED CONVERSATION 
BERLUSCONI HAD WITH AMBASSADOR SEMBLER WHEN THE FORMER 
RETURNED FROM MOSCOW). 
 
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MEPP 
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¶5.  (C)  BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN SHARE PRESIDENT BUSH'S POSITION 
ON THE NEED FOR A MEDIATED PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 
PUTIN IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO TREAD CAREFULLY AND AVOID 
PUSHING ISRAEL TO THE WALL, AND WANTS TO FIND THE RIGHT 
BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, AS DOES BERLUSCONI. 
 
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IRAN/IRAQ 
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                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  01723  01 OF 02  051649Z 
 
¶6.  (C)  CASTELLANETA SAID THAT BERLUSCONI, AS REQUESTED BY 
PRESIDENT BUSH (REFTEL), CARRIED THE U.S. MESSAGE OF CONCERN 
REGARDING WMD, STRESSING THE GOI WAS WORRIED THAT THE 
TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM RUSSIA TO IRAN WAS 
AIDING IRAN'S ATTEMPTS TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  BERLUSCONI 
EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOI HAD INFORMATION (WITHOUT NAMING THE 
SOURCE) THAT IRAN HAD AN ACTIVE PROGRAM TO DEVELOP BOTH 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.  PUTIN DISMISSED 
THESE CONCERNS, ASSURING BERLUSCONI THAT RUSSIA SOLD ONLY 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO IRAN, AND SAID THAT THERE WERE STRICT 
CONTROLS ON ALL DUAL-USE AND NON-CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES. 
PUTIN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO SELL 
SUCH CAPABILITIES TO IRAN, WHEN RUSSIA ITSELF COULD BE THE 
FIRST TARGET. 
 
¶7.  (C)  PUTIN EXPRESSED TO BERLUSCONI HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE 
POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ, NOTING THAT 
RUSSIA WANTS TO BE ABLE TO COLLECT ON IRAQ'S HEAVY BILATERAL 
DEBT.  PUTIN STRESSED THE NEED TO USE THE UN TO DEAL WITH 
IRAQ. 
 
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                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3519 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01723  02 OF 02  051649Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DS-00    OIGO-00  FBIE-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   VCE-00   M-00 
      NSAE-00  PM-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------7FBC4A  051649Z /38 
O 051600Z APR 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3127 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2012 
TAGS: IT PREL RS PREL RS NATO MEPPIT NATO MEPP
SUBJECT: READOUT OF BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT 
 
BALKANS 
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¶8.  (C)  PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT THE CAPABILITY OF RUSSIA 
TO COOPERATE WITH THE ESDP PROCESS WOULD REMAIN LIMITED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01723  02 OF 02  051649Z 
BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS TAKING KOSOVO IN A 
DIRECTION THAT RUSSIA CAN'T ACCEPT.  ACCORDING TO PUTIN, THIS 
IS THE MAIN REASON THAT RUSSIA WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE THE 
NUMBER OF ITS TROOPS COMMITTED TO KOSOVO. 
 
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AFGHANISTAN 
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¶9.  (C)  PUTIN REITERATED TO BERLUSCONI HIS SUPPORT FOR THE 
OEF ALLIANCE'S GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WOULD NOT COMMIT 
RUSSIAN TROOPS TO THE EFFORT.  HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT, GIVEN THE SOPHISTICATION OF U.S. WEAPONS 
ALREADY USED IN AFGHANISTAN, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE THE USE 
OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 
 
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WARHEAD REDUCTION 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT NUCLEAR WARHEAD 
REDUCTION TALKS WITH THE U.S. WERE CLOSE TO SUCCESSFUL 
CONCLUSION.  ONE AREA OF CONCERN FOR THE RUSSIANS IS THE U.S. 
PREFERENCE TO STOCKPILE, RATHER THAN DESTROY, THE EXCESS 
WARHEADS.  PUTIN CITED THE HIGH COST OF STORING WARHEADS, BUT 
SAID THAT IF THE U.S. INSISTS, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO ALONG. 
 
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DEBT 
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                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01723  02 OF 02  051649Z 
¶11.  (C) PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT HE WELCOMED THE IDEA OF 
"TEN PLUS TEN OVER TEN".  PUTIN WOULD PREFER, HOWEVER, THAT 
THE DENOMINATOR OF THE EQUATION BE REDUCED TO FIVE YEARS. 
CASTELLANETA TOLD COUNTRYMAN THAT ITALY SUPPORTS THE IDEA IN 
PRINCIPLE, BUT WOULD PREFER A RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM, RATHER 
THAN USING NEW MONEY AS PROPOSED BY GERMANY.  THE G-8 HAS 
TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE. PUTIN ASKED BERLUSCONI TO CONSIDER 
DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA'S DEBT TO ITALY. 
NOTE: RUSSIAN DEBT TO ITALY, APPROXIMATELY 9.2 BILLION, IS 
SECOND ONLY TO ITS DEBT TO GERMANY.  OF THAT AMOUNT, NEARLY 
USD 7.6 BILLION IS SOVIET-ERA DEBT. 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2002ROME01723 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL