This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5 PRIORITY 
JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2012 
TAGS: PTER PGOV CASC NP
SUBJECT: 50 REPORTED DEAD IN MAOIST ATTACKS ON POLICE POSTS 
IN DANG 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 731 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) At least 50 people are reported dead after Maoist 
insurgents attacked a civilian police post and an Armed 
Police Force (APF) post in the western district of Dang about 
30 km from the Indian border late April 11. The insurgents 
are reported to have looted armories at both posts, making 
off with with an unknown number of weapons, according to 
police sources.  Smaller-scale attacks on two Royal Nepal 
Army (RNA) posts and a second APF post were successfully 
repulsed.  The attacks discredit reports in the press and on 
the political/NGO rumor circuit that the Maoists are seeking 
ways to resume dialogue.  End summary. 
 
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DANG AGAIN 
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¶2.  (U) In an eerie reminder of the coordinated attacks on 
Dang military and police targets that broke the cease-fire 
November 23, late April 11 Maoist insurgents once again 
launched a series of closely timed raids on five military and 
police targets in the southwestern district close to the 
Indian border.  Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldiers successfully 
repulsed small-arms fire on two of their posts in the 
district, while an attack on a training center for the 
paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF) was also repelled. 
(Note:  These attacks may have been diversionary tactics to 
prevent reinforcements being sent to the other two posts 
under attack.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  (U)  At about 11:00 p.m. Maoists attacked the 65-man 
police station at Lamahi (on the East-West Highway about 25 
km due south of district headquarters and about 30 km north 
of the Indian border).  According to police sources, nine 
policemen were killed and 63 .303 rifles taken from the 
armory.  The insurgents also stopped a bus at a roadblock and 
shot some of the passengers, killing one (reportedly the 
driver), and injuring seven. 
 
¶4.  (U) At about 11:30 p.m. the 125-man company of the APF at 
Satbariya--hometown of Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadga--was 
attacked.  (Note:  Satbariya is off the main highway, a few 
km west of Lamahi and about 30 km north of the Indian border. 
 End note.)  Fighting continued until about 2:20 a.m. the 
following morning when, according to survivors of the attack, 
the embattled APF ran out of ammunition.  After the Deputy 
Superintendent in command of the company surrendered, 
survivors said, he and three other inspectors were executed. 
According to the National Security Council, 40 APF were 
killed in the attack, and another 40 wounded. 
 
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THE VIEW FROM THE RNA OPS CENTER 
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¶5.  (C) Members of a PACOM assessment team happened to be 
visiting the RNA Operations Center the morning of April 12 
and were briefed on--and able to observe in part--the RNA's 
reaction to the crisis.  The Ops Center first became aware of 
the attacks when reports came over HF radio about 1:30 a.m. 
At about 2:00 a.m. a radio transmission from the APF company 
at Satbariya requested ammunition resupply.  An RNA M-17 
helicopter took off from Western Division Headquarters in 
Nepalgunj with the requested ammunition, but was hit by enemy 
fire near the site and was forced to return.  At about 2:15 
a.m. a second request for ammunition came in, but a second 
helicopter dispatched to the site lost communications with 
the APF site, was unable to determine the situation on the 
ground, and was ordered to return to Nepalgunj as well. 
According to the RNA, the attack was launched from the south; 
after the attack the insurgents were observed heading to the 
north. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Brig. Gen. Dipak Malla, Director of Military 
Operations, who was in the Ops Center during the PACOM team's 
visit, briefed the assessment team on the RNA's response to 
the attacks, including the construction of blocking forces 
along the road to Nepalgunj; the dispatch of patrols to track 
insurgents retreating to the north; the dispatch of two 
fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter to Nepalgunj to bring in 
ammunition and pick up wounded; and the preparation of the 
military hospital to receive the wounded.  Malla told the 
team the RNA had received general indications that Dang was a 
transit point and that activities in the area were 
increasing.  Malla said the RNA had advised the APF to 
conduct searches in response to this information, but the APF 
had not done so. 
 
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"PEACE" FEELERS 
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¶7.  (C)  The Dang attacks follow closely on increased reports 
in the press, as well as rumors among political observers and 
human rights groups, that the Maoists are seeking a way to 
restart dialogue with the Government of Nepal (GON).  Two 
NGOs have told poloffs over the past two weeks that their 
Maoists contacts were actively seeking a channel to the GON, 
but the sources were unable to explain convincingly why the 
Maoists might be contemplating such a bid.  At the same time, 
other reports are circulating that former Prime Minister G.P. 
Koirala--whose relations with the insurgents during his own 
administration were abysmal--may be trying to meet Maoist 
deputy Baburam Bhattarai in India (reftel), presumably for 
the same purpose.  (Note:  The bloody Maoist attacks in 
Achham Feb. 17 followed similar rumors, and actually took 
place during a visit by a representative of a reputable 
conflict mitigation group, reportedly at the behest of 
high-ranking Maoists who had signaled their wish to resume 
talks with the GON.  End note.) 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C)  The Maoists' actions speak louder than whatever 
they, for their own cynical purposes, may be telling NGOs and 
politicians or saying in their press statements.  As long as 
the Maoists can overrun and  disarm a relatively well-manned 
APF post, popular confidence in the GON's ability to protect 
the general population--emergency or not--will continue to 
decline. End comment. 
MALINOWSKI